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ABSTRACT
Burroughs, Michael. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. December 2012. Ideal
Adults, Deficient Children: The Discourse on the Child in Western Philosophy. Major
Professor: Dr. Deborah Tollefsen.
The child of Western philosophy is conceptualized in a two-fold manner: first, in
the work of philosophers ranging from Plato to Rawls, the child is defined through a
negation of the positive traits of the adult. The child is not-rational (as the adult is), notmoral (as the adult is), not-citizen (as the adult can be). In short, the child is
conceptualized as the non-adult, lacking (or possessing in primitive form) the qualities of
the adult. Second, given his deficient classification, the child is regarded as a being-to-betransformed. The child must be corrected and become the adult prior to his inclusion in
moral and political realms. This dual conceptualization of the child as a deficient being is
informed by a correlative idealization of the adult as a rational, autonomous, moral and
political agent. In relation to the ideal adult, the child—both in the canon and, ultimately,
in the world—has been produced as a subjected being. Conceptualized and approached as
a deficient being, the child is subjected to the corrective strategies of the adult and,
further, to a deficient self-identification. In contesting the subjection of the child, I argue
that the canonical uniformity between moral and political existence and adult existence
must be deconstructed. It then becomes possible to reconsider moral and political
existence apart from adulthood and recognize, perhaps for the first time, the child’s moral
and political possibilities. Philosophers—both in theory and practice—can begin to ask
what children can be apart from their deficient classification and begin to listen for the
voices of children in moral and political realms. In doing so, we begin to develop a new
conception of the child and the moral and political existence of children.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is a critical examination of the place of the child in Western
philosophy. It is my contention that philosophers throughout the canon have offered
impoverished analyses of the child, analyses that ultimately have had a detrimental
impact on those persons classified as children. Upon cursory review of the canon one
might think this project wrongheaded. After all, Plato (Republic, Laws) and Aristotle
(Nicomachean Ethics, Politics) develop precise accounts of socialization and education
for the child. Rousseau (Emile) and Kant (On Education) write entire treatises detailing
forms of education and moral development for the child. Contemporary philosophers—
including John Rawls (A Theory of Justice) and Tamar Schapiro (“What Is a Child?” and
“Childhood and Personhood”)—have, to varying degrees, regarded discussions of
education and political and moral development as significant for their own work. Thus,
one might contend, to the extent these philosophers are discussing education for or
development of the child, they must also devote substantial consideration to the child, the
subject of education and development.
But herein lies the paradox of discussions of the child in Western philosophy—the
child can be the focus of an entire treatise, a precise method of socialization, moral
development, or education without ever being considered in his own right. That is,
Western philosophers consistently fail to develop (or even recognize the need for) a
positive conception of the child, one focusing on the child’s qualities and concerns qua
child (apart from those of the adult).1 Instead, the child is generally discussed in a two!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

A positive concept of the “child” presupposes some conception of “childhood,” or, the
condition in which one is regarded as a child. Throughout this dissertation I will primarily focus
on the child as conceptualized in Western philosophy, but this discussion necessarily crosses over
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fold manner: first, the child is conceptualized in relation to the adult as the end of his
development and measure of his moral and political status. In relation to the adult the
child occupies a space of deficiency. Whether he is discussed in educational, moral or
political realms, the child’s conceptualization is generally obtained through a negation of
the positive traits of the adult. The child is not-rational (as the adult is), not-moral (as the
adult is), not-citizen (as the adult can be). In a word, the child is conceptualized as the
non-adult, lacking (or possessing in primitive form) the qualities of the adult. Second,
insofar as the child is not the adult, he is regarded as a being-to-be-transformed. If the
child is an animalistic, appetitive being, lacking agency and the ability to act from choice
with others, he is incapable of maintaining the moral and political traditions of the adult.
Prior to his inclusion in moral and political realms of activity the adult must correct and
reform the child. For this reason, the child is most often encountered in discussions of
education and moral and political development. Only through precise plans of education
and reform can the child shed his deficient nature and achieve the telos of human
existence (adulthood).
Taken together, these conceptions of the child—as non-adult and being-to-betransformed—yield the figure of the deficient child in Western philosophy. It is this
conception of the child—as a deficient being, absent from moral and political realms of
human activity—that is of primary concern in this dissertation. Although not uniform in
its representation, I contend that the image of the deficient child is developed and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
into conceptions of childhood. For example, in the history of Western philosophy the child is
often identified as an animalistic being, classified in virtue of his condition of deficient reason,
virtue and autonomy. It is one’s (supposed or actual) inhabitation of this condition that provides
for one’s classification as a child. Thus, some conception of “childhood” (its qualities and
differentiation from the condition of adulthood) is requisite for delimiting the figure of the
“child.” For more on the relationship between the concepts “child” and “childhood,” see David
Archard’s Children: Rights and Childhood (London: Routledge, 1993), 21-28.
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reinforced by philosophers throughout the Western philosophical canon. Insofar as this
conception of the child is uncritically accepted (and remains unquestioned throughout
Western society) those persons classified as children are subjected to an image of
deficiency. Primarily understood as deficient beings, children are regarded as devoid of
moral and political possibility and devalued in relation to the existence of the adult (that
person who unquestionably does possess moral and political agency). Thus, although my
primary concern is to reveal a particular concept of the child at play in the Western
philosophical canon, I am also concerned with how this concept influences our
understanding of and interactions with children.
In Chapter I, I focus on the emergence of the deficient child in the history of
Western philosophy and the origins of the child’s subjection to a deficient moral and
political status. Examining the conception of the child in the work of Plato, Aristotle,
Rousseau, and Kant, I argue that the child is primarily represented as the non-adult and
being-to-be-transformed. In the work of Plato, Aristotle and Kant the child is primarily
understood in reference to what he is not (the adult). For these figures, “child” is a
secondary concept insofar as it is shaped in opposition to the “adult” as rational agent and
moral and political being. For example, whereas Plato and Aristotle’s paradigm adult is
ruled by reason and capable of participation in the political affairs of the polis, their child
is not rational, nor political. The child is ruled by passions and appetites and, in his
deficiency, is regarded as a potential danger to the continuation of the traditions of the
state. Kant’s adult, too, is a rational agent and full member of moral and political realms.
As a rational, moral and political actor he marks a sharp contrast with the child—an
animalistic being, merely inhering (not participating) in the commonwealth and kingdom
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of ends. For each of these philosophers, then, the child is a moral and political agent in
waiting, a becoming that must learn to yield to the commands of reason or forever remain
in the deficient state of the child. Given his deficiencies, the child is regarded as a beingto-be-transformed. If the child is conceptualized as a being close to nature and devoid of
rational control, the adult’s sole engagement with the child must center on transforming
this animalistic being, steering him and his desires toward the virtuous ends of the adult
and the condition of adulthood.
Rousseau’s child is not approached as the Platonic, Aristotelian, or Kantian nonadult. That is, the child of Emile and Discourse On the Origin of Inequality is not
conceptualized negatively in relation to the adult as political and moral agent of the polis.
Rousseau’s ideal adult—the natural or savage adult —is excellent in spite of (not because
of) his place in the state and, thus, Rousseau’s discussion of the child in relation to the
adult necessarily shifts. But this is not to say that the child qua non-adult is absent from
Rousseau’s work. Rousseau is concerned with the child as one that must be confined to
the natural state of being (innocent, pure, devoid of multifarious passions) as long as
possible such that he can eventually become the savage adult. Thus, despite Rousseau’s
claims to the contrary, the child’s identifying quality is still that of a becoming, one who
must follow Rousseau’s natural education in order to reach the end of the adult, noble
savage. For this reason Rousseau’s educational plan for the child (as discussed in Emile)
is extremely controlling—every element of the child’s existence is managed (and
manipulated) by the educator to ensure his fulfillment of Rousseau’s vision of the natural.
No matter how well intentioned Rousseau is in his educational plan, then, the child
remains a being-to-be-transformed. The child’s value is located in his potential to fulfill
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the plans of the adult or, in this case, Rousseau’s vision of the natural state (as opposed to
the moral and political commonwealth).
Having discussed the origins of the deficient child in the history of Western
philosophy, in Chapter II I focus on the continuing representation of the child as a
deficient being in contemporary Western philosophy (especially in liberal ethical and
political thought). Rawls’s Theory contains an approach to the child familiar to us from
the work of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant in that the child continues to be identified in terms
of deficiencies—his limited rationality, deficient agency and appetitive nature. These
deficiencies are stark in contrast to the qualities of the Rawlsian adult—an ideally
autonomous, rational and moral being. Insofar as the child is not the autonomous,
rational, and moral adult, he represents a problem for Rawls’s ideal state. The deficient
child must become (or be transformed into) what he is not, the rational and autonomous
adult. In similar fashion, Tamar Schapiro’s work (which is heavily influenced by Kant
and Rawls) provides a conception of the child as animalistic, devoid of will, and lacking
a self. Childhood is classified as a deviant condition in relation to the ideal standard of
liberal adulthood. Thus, for both Rawls and Schapiro the child continues to be defined in
reference to a deficient state of being. The child is not the adult and the adult’s primary
concern in engaging with the child remains an effort to move him from an animalistic
state of being to the ideality of adulthood.
As I contend at the conclusion of Chapter II, this image of the ideal adult (and the
contrasting image of the deficient child) extends into psychological accounts of moral
development in the work of Lawrence Kohlberg (Essays on Moral Development). A
broad thread of discourse (what I call the hegemony of adulthood) runs throughout
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philosophical and psychological conceptions of the child, presenting the child as a
deficient being in relation to the adult as the telos of human existence. Adopting Kantian
and Rawlsian accounts of agency, Kohlberg presents the liberal adult as the universal end
point of moral evolution, a being separated from the child by an expanse of
developmental stages. In conjunction with Kohlberg’s naturalistic account of moral
development, the philosophical account of the deficient child and the ideal adult
(ostensibly) gains substantial strength. The normative distinctions between the adult and
the child offered by Kant, Rawls and Schapiro (and the Western liberal philosophical
tradition more generally) are now presented as objective, natural divisions in the human
species. Given that the child has not realized adulthood—the biological and evaluative
end of this developmental model—he is classified, both naturally and normatively, as a
deficient being.
In my final chapter (Chapter III) I argue that the representation of the child as a
deficient being (revealed throughout Chapter I and II) is problematic and argue for the
reconsideration of the moral and political possibilities of the child (beyond mere
deficiency in comparison to the adult). My argument is informed by Michel Foucault’s
discussion of the production of human subjects, such as the sexually perverted child and
the delinquent. In The History of Sexuality and Discipline and Punish Foucault reveals
how kinds of persons can be produced as subjected beings—subjected to the interests of
others and to a deficient self-identification—within institutionalized networks of
discourse, knowledge and power. Following Foucault, I argue that the deficient child of
Western philosophy is a production of the Western philosophical canon. The image of the
deficient child takes shape in relation to the moral, political and educational projects of
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philosophers throughout the canon. The child is located at the origins of these plans,
posited as a being possessed of numerous deficiencies that, when corrected, lead to the
completion of the projects of the adult philosopher, legislator, and educator. Throughout
the canon, then, we find a classification of the deficient child that is both malleable and
instrumental, taking on the qualities—whether appetitive or irrational, innocent or pure—
of greatest need to the philosopher in question.
Given his deficient classification, the child—as discussed in Western philosophy
and, ultimately, as existing in the world—can be subjected to both the corrective
strategies of the adult and the pathological identity of a deficient being. As noted above,
philosophers from Plato to Rawls primarily represent the child as a being that must be
corrected and reformed in order to take on the moral and political norms of the adult. The
child must be subjected to strategies of correction through control, discipline, and moral
and political development. But the child is also a subjected being insofar as he is always
spoken for in moral and political realms of activity and excluded from identification with
moral and political actors. In this sense, the deficient child of Western philosophy
occupies a similar position to the morally immature woman as discussed in Carol
Gilligan’s In a Different Voice. Just as the woman of developmental psychology has been
saddled with a demeaning image (as morally immature or undeveloped) and spoken for
by the figure of the male, so, too, the child has been silenced in Western philosophy by
the adult. The child has been isolated from any recognition as a being with moral and
political concerns, instead confined to a demeaning identity (as irrational, appetitive,
incapable of moral and political action, etc.). Ultimately, those classified as children are
left to accept the deficient identity imposed upon them and, in virtue of their exclusion
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from a moral and political community, often do lack the ability to engage in moral and
political realms of activity.
In order to challenge the subjection of the child and, in turn, reconsider the moral
and political possibilities of the child, I argue that the canonical uniformity between
moral and political existence and adult existence must be deconstructed. The child is
subjected to a deficient identity insofar as he is encountered as the non-adult, as deficient
in relation to the ideal adult qua sole bearer of moral and political existence. But in taking
a critical eye to the actual condition of adulthood, it becomes clear that the adult rarely (if
ever) realizes the idealizations of the canon. The adult does not possess unhindered
autonomy and independence in moral and political realms. Nor is the adult’s moral and
political development ever complete. If upon deconstructing the hegemony of adulthood
it becomes clear that adults are not ideal beings, then adults cannot be attributed sole
possession of (nor children denied) moral and political status on the basis of this
assumption. It is clear, then, that reconsidering the moral and political possibilities of the
child calls for an antecedent examination of the ideality of adult existence. In relation to
this image of the ideal adult the child has been provided with little opportunity to be
recognized as (and, I contend, to be) anything other than the subject of correction and
reform. However, once we move away from this conception of the adult and moral and
political existence, it becomes possible to reconsider the moral and political possibilities
of other persons, including children. Free of the assumed equivalence between moral and
political existence and adult existence, the moral and political possibilities of children
becomes an open question. We can begin to ask what children can be apart from their
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deficient classification and where philosophers have long spoken for children—namely,
moral and political realms—we can instead begin to listen for the voices of children.
Following the work of figures such as Gareth Matthews (Dialogues with Children
and Philosophy and the Young Child) and Robert Coles (The Moral Life of Children), I
conclude this dissertation by illustrating ways that adults can create an open space for the
child to assume an identity apart from deficiency. By listening to the voices of children
(as opposed to focusing on strategies of correction or the canonical standards of adult
moral and political agency) Matthews and Coles provide children with new moral,
political, and philosophical possibilities. That is, they offer children recognition as beings
capable of possessing (and acting on) moral, political, and philosophical concerns. In
turn, the children with whom they work come to regard themselves as potential actors in
moral, political, and philosophical realms of human activity. As in the work of Matthews
and Coles, I contend that philosophers must begin to listen to the voices of children, both
in theory and practice. In doing so, the canonical image of the deficient child is contested
and those classified as children can gain recognition, perhaps for the first time, apart from
their likeness or divergence from the condition of the adult.
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CHAPTER I
THE NON-ADULT AND BEING-TO-BE-TRANSFORMED: THE DISCOURSE
ON THE CHILD IN THE HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
Introduction
When we turn to Plato’s Republic and Laws, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and
Politics, Rousseau’s Emile, and Kant’s On Education and Metaphysics of Morals we find
that each text contains discussions of children. In this chapter I want to devote closer
attention to discussions of the child in these texts.1 That is to say, I want to examine the
way the child is conceptualized in reference to the educational, political and moral
concerns of the adult. The critical move I will make in this chapter does not turn on, say,
whether Plato provides a praiseworthy account of early childhood education or whether
Kant provides an empirically accurate account of child development. It is beyond debate
that each of these philosophers (including Aristotle and Rousseau) offers
recommendations for children—in the form of educational practices and social and moral
development techniques—that strike the contemporary reader as wrongheaded.2 Instead,
my concern will be to, first, draw attention to the very fact that the child is a significant
issue for each of these thinkers. The child appears as a “problem” of sorts that continually
surfaces to occupy a space in their work. Second, I shall approach the “child” as taken up
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

I focus on these texts for two reasons: First, these texts are of great significance in the
Western philosophical canon. Many readers will already be familiar with these texts given their
overall importance in the history of moral, political, and educational thought. Second (and as
discussed in my Introduction), each of these texts contains focused discussions of the child. Given
that I am interested in understanding dominant conceptions of the child in Western philosophy,
these texts serve as an important point of departure.
2

For example, the recommendations of Rousseau and Aristotle to habituate infants to
cold water or Plato’s recommendation to remove children from their biological families. See
Rousseau’s Emile, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 60; Aristotle’s Politics,
trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998), 223 (1336a10-15); Plato’s
Republic, trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2004), 237 (541a-b).
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in the history of Western philosophy in order to identify as far as possible why the child is
discussed (the function of the discussion of the child in these texts) and the manner in
which the child is conceptualized in these discourses.3
We can begin with a few questions to orient our investigation of these texts and
discussions of the child found within them: First, in the texts under consideration, what
are the primary contexts for the discussion of the child? When the child is discussed, is
this occurring in conjunction with a discussion of education or the stability of the state or
political and moral agency or something else entirely? Second, what concerns does the
child raise for these philosophers? Does the child present a problem for them, and, if so,
what are the contours of this problem and what form does it take?
My hope is that approaching accounts of the child with these questions in mind
will provide for novel engagement with the location of the child in the history of Western
philosophy. Rather than beginning with simple (and potentially anachronistic) critiques
centered on the misguided developmental and educational views of these philosophers,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3

My use of the term discourse has affinities with (though does not directly correspond
to) Foucault’s understanding of this term in works such as Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the
Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995) and The History of Sexuality: An
Introduction, Volume 1, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990). I am not only
interested in documenting explicit discussions and characterizations of the subject (the child) in
the work of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Kant. Although doing so is significant in its own
right, I also want to reveal the broader ethical and political aims that permeate these discussions
and, conversely, that prevent or inhibit the formation of others. It is my contention that broader
ethical and political aims condition the explicit characterizations of the child that we find in
works ranging from the Republic to the Doctrine of Right, the Nicomachean Ethics to Emile.
Thus, it is important not only to understand what is said about the child, but also why the child
emerges in the work of these thinkers in a specific form. The forms of the child in the history of
Western philosophy, I argue, are the non-adult and being-to be-transformed, characterizations
that issue from the child’s discursive location at the nexus of broader ethical and political aims
and relations of knowledge and power. The totality of these relations, ethical and political aims
and explicit characterizations is what I refer to here as discourse.
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we can instead pay greater attention to the conceptualization of the child himself,4 the
moral, socio-political, and educational relevance of discussions of the child and the
function of these discussions in the work of these philosophers. We can also pay heed to
what is not said about the child and the political and moral domains in which the child is
absent.5
In adopting this method of approach to the work of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and
Kant we will find a dominant (but not uniform) conceptualization of the child as a
deficient being, as the non-adult—that is, a being understood as lacking (or possessing in
primitive form) the positive traits of the ideal adult. Given this deficient status, the child
is commonly encountered as an object of control, a being-to-be-transformed who must be
led (if not forced) to preserve the moral and socio-political norms of the adult. The adult
is the ideal in comparison to which the child is nonideal, the end toward which the child,
if he is to have any purpose, must progress.
Section 1: Plato
Plato’s influence in a vast range of sub-disciplines of philosophy—ethics, politics,
epistemology, metaphysics, etc.—is well documented. No less significant, however, is his
impact on conceptions of the child in Western philosophy. Plato serves as the first
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4

Where necessary I will use the masculine pronoun in place of “child.” I adopt the
masculine pronoun in order to avoid confusion and to remain congruent with this use by the
figures discussed in this chapter (Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Kant).
5

I do not focus on what is not said about the child with an eye toward an anachronistic
critique of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant, and their lack of substantive engagement with the
child’s possibilities in moral and political realms. Rather, it is my contention that a complete
understanding of the concept of the child is aided by paying attention both to what is and is not
said about the child by these figures. Apart from any critique, if the child is never discussed by
these figures as an active participant in moral and political realms, then we gain evidence for
understanding their conception of the child as, in part, a being lacking (or possessing in primitive
form) moral and political agency.
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Western philosopher to devote extended attention—systematically, throughout multiple
texts—to the child. Especially important for our considerations is the influence of this
work on Aristotle, Rousseau, and Kant. There are clear traces of Plato’s approach in the
work of these philosophers, both in regard to educational approaches to the child and
conceptions of the child.6 It is fitting, then, that we begin our examination with Plato’s
foundational discussion of the child.
My aim is to uncover the concept of the child in Plato’s work. In order to do this
it is necessary to turn to the child’s location in the Republic and Laws, texts containing
Plato’s most substantive discussions of the child.7 In discussing these texts I will turn to
the following questions: First, what are the primary contexts of the child’s appearance?
Second, what concerns does the child raise for the philosopher in question? And, in sum,
what concept of the child emerges within Plato’s ethical, political, and educational work?

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6

For example, see Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing, 1999), 21 (1104b10-14); Rousseau’s Emile, 40, 107, 362-363.
7

Of course, more can be said about Plato’s treatment of the child in other texts. For the
purposes of this dissertation, however, I have chosen to focus my efforts on the primary contexts
of emergence for the child in Platonic texts (Republic and Laws). In future work I plan to expand
my focus on the child as found in other Platonic texts, including: Crito, trans. G. M. A. Grube, in
Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 41, 43
(46c, 49b); Protagoras, trans. Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell, in Plato: Complete Works, ed.
John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 760 (325d-326e); Phaedrus, trans.
Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 517-520 (238e-241d); Symposium, trans. Alexander
Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing, 1997), 463-464 (178c-179b); and Meno, trans. G. M. A. Grube, in Plato:
Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 872, 873 (71e,
73b). I will also consider dialogues concerned more generally with education, and thus which
comment on the child indirectly. For example, see Plato’s Laches, trans. Rosamond Kent
Sprague, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing,
1997).
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1.1: The Child, the Ideal Polis and Education
The Republic and Laws serve as accounts of Plato’s ideal polis.8 Providing both a
model for the ideal state and a plan of action to realize it, Plato fills these texts with
specifications on matters of state legislation, forms of government, defense, education,
and the arts. The attempt in both texts is not only to explain in detail the establishment of
the ideal polis but also the benefits that would result for its inhabitants. Among these
benefits are stability in the state and its institutions, the inculcation of justice in the
operations of the state and its citizens, and the promotion of the philosophical life.
We should recognize from the start that Plato’s discussion of the child in these
texts cannot be separated from his concern with the formation and security of the ideal
polis. Discussions of the child—as with other topics of discussion in the Republic and
Laws, such as the arts and the attainment of virtue—do not occur as an island,
contextually separated on all sides from the larger body of Plato’s social and political
concerns. Rather, the child is discussed in these texts precisely as an integral part of
forming the ideal state, or, in some cases, as a perceived threat to this end. Given that the
child is situated and conceptualized within a discourse on the formation of an ideal polis
we can take Plato’s preoccupation with achieving this end as relevant to his account of
the child in these texts.
The fact that discussion of the child is located within Plato’s larger discussion of
the formation of the state is evident once we turn to Plato’s account of education. To
understand the establishment of the ideal polis in the Republic and Laws we must, in turn,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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On the ideal nature of the Kallipolis of the Republic, see Plato’s Republic, 47 (369c10),
147 (458a-b5). On the ideal nature of Magnesia, the ideal state of the Laws, see Plato’s Laws,
trans. Trevor J. Saunders (New York: Penguin Books, 1970), 110-111 (702d-3e).
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consider the ends of education. First, education is intended to produce a certain
individual—the virtuous adult possessing a well-ordered soul.9 Second, education is
intended to produce a certain state—the just and well-ordered state. In order to create the
just and well-ordered state we must create just and well-ordered individuals.10 Thus, we
cannot understand the formation of the state without understanding Plato’s plan for
education as it is one of the primary conditions of possibility of the ideal state. And,
given that children are the subjects of education, we can begin to see the importance that
these beings have for Plato. The ideal state will rise or fall largely on the basis of proper
education of children; children must become the virtuous adults that will preserve the
polis, the citizens that will obey its laws, the craftsmen that will work within its walls.
Given the significance of education in these texts we should briefly familiarize
ourselves with the fundamental elements of Plato’s educational curriculum. The child
must go through education (paideia) of two primary kinds: musical education (mousike)
for the philosophical element of the soul and physical education (gumnastike) for the
body and spirited element of the soul.11 Musical education—composed of stories, songs,
rhythms and harmonies—is of paramount importance in Plato’s educational plan as it
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The Platonic soul consists of three parts: the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive.
The well-ordered or “just” soul is one in which the inferior, spirited, and appetitive parts follow
the guidance of the superior, rational part. See the Republic, 132-133 (443d-444d5), 280-281
(580b-581a5), 293 (588e-589d).
10

Plato, Republic, 109 (425a-5), 122 (435e-436a); Plato, Laws, 237-238 (797a-c).
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Plato, Republic, 56 (376e-4), 215-216 (521e-522b). In the Republic (as opposed to the
Laws) Plato marks a distinction between Guardian and Ruler education, with the latter form of
education building on the former (Republic, 96-99 (412a-414b), 216-233 (522b-537e)).
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focuses on the most important, philosophical element of the soul.12 Physical education—
composed of training for physical fitness, training for war,13 and the improvement of the
spirited part of the soul14—is of secondary importance. Regardless of the qualitative
ranking of these elements of education, Plato specifies that an education does not qualify
as “correct” unless it adequately covers both the musical and physical elements.15 Both
elements are established “chiefly for the sake of the soul” as are all other subjects,
including literature, mathematics, astronomy, and dialectic.16
Plato specifies that the songs, rhythms and harmonies to which the child will be
exposed—the musical education of the child—must be those that best imitate “the voices
of temperate and courageous men in good fortune and bad.”17 Stories (included as a
branch of musical training) must be supervised to “shape the souls” of children
properly.18 To this end, stories, both in content and style, must avoid negative portrayals
of the gods (as lacking virtue, as fighting amongst themselves), illustrating instead a
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Guardian education consists of physical training for the body and the spirited element
of the soul, and musical training for the philosophical element of the soul (Republic, 56 (376e4),
96 (411e3-412a)). Plato specifies that musical training must come prior to physical training
(Republic, 57 (377a-10)).
13

For the general distinction between musical and physical education in the Laws see
page 70 (673a). The specificities of training for war include activities of war (Laws, 234, 260
(794c-d, 813d-e)), ambidextrous training (Laws, 235 (795d)), and dancing and wrestling (Laws,
235-236, 261-263 (795d-e, 814d-816d)).
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Plato, Republic, 96 (411e-412a7).
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Plato, Laws, 226 (788c).
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Plato, Republic, 94 (410b5-c5). On the presence of these special subjects in the
curriculum see Laws, 253-271 (809b-822c) and Republic, 216 (522a).
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Plato, Republic, 81 (399c1-2).
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Plato, Republic, 57 (377b-c).
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virtuous and law-abiding existence for citizens to emulate.19 Games—akin to musical
training insofar as they are deployed to shape the souls of children—are also an integral
part of the educational plan of both the Republic and Laws. If children play games that
replicate just citizens and the governance of laws they will in turn seek to replicate and
preserve both when they are adults; by absorbing “lawfulness from musical
training…lawfulness follows them in everything and fosters their growth, correcting
anything in the city that may have been neglected before.”20 Key to all forms of musical
education, then, is training the child, habituating the child’s soul to morally and socially
expedient ends. This habituation results from repeated imitation of the noble and the fine,
in game, story, song, rhythm, and harmony. Focusing on the latter two modes of
habituation, Plato writes:
Because rhythm and harmony permeate the inner most
element of the soul, affect it more powerfully than anything
else, and bring it such grace, such education makes one
graceful if one is properly trained, and the opposite if one is
not…since he [the well-educated child] feels distaste
correctly, he will praise fine things, be pleased by them, take
them into his soul, and, through being nourished by them,
become fine and good. What is ugly or shameful, on the
other hand, he will correctly condemn and hate while he is
still young, before he is able to grasp the reason.21
The end of this training is the excellent adult and the just and dedicated citizen of
the state. The unity of these aims is clear for Plato: “what we have in mind is education
from childhood in virtue, a training which produces a keen desire to become a perfect
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Plato, Republic, 57-75 (377a-394c).

20

Plato, Republic, 109 (425a-5).
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Plato, Republic, 84 (401d5-402a3).
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citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled as justice demands.”22 To educate the child is
to rule the child properly, to “establish a constitution in them as in the city…[to] take care
of their best part with the similar one in ourselves and equip them with a guardian and
ruler similar to our own to take our place.”23 To achieve these aims a specific mode of
approach toward the child is required:
Education has proved to be a process of attraction, of leading
children to accept right principles as enunciated by the law
and endorsed as genuinely correct by men who have high
moral standards and are full of years and experience. The
soul of the child has to be prevented from getting into the
habit of feeling pleasure and pain in ways not sanctioned by
the law and those who have been persuaded to obey it.24
The adult’s approach is that of “leading” children away from childhood, of “attracting”
children to adulthood along lines of pleasure, game, and song. There is a precise manner
in which the adult will approach the child; he will always advance with numerous
“charms” in hand, “deadly serious devices” for subduing the soul of the child and
investing him with the laws and ways of the state.25
But if the child is the focal point of this rigorous educational training and
socialization there is very little concern with him in his own right. That is, there is little
concern with a positive conception of the child, one focusing on the child’s qualities and
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Plato, Laws, 29-30 (643e-644a); B.II, 42 (653b).
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Plato, Republic, 295 (590e-591a). Also see Laws, 29 (643d).
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Plato, Laws, 51-52 (659d-e).
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Plato, Laws, 51-52 (659d-e). These “charms” and “deadly serious devices” are “songs”
and “recreation.” Plato writes, “the souls of the young cannot bear to be serious, so we use the
terms ‘recreation’ and ‘song’ for the charms, and children treat them in that spirit.”
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concerns qua child, apart from those of the adult.26 This should not surprise us; the
context of the child in education—within a broader account of the ideal polis—is not
governed by a concern with an understanding of the child but with forming a certain type
of being other than the child: the virtuous adult. In turn, the repeated and systematic
achievement of this end is requisite for founding the state and preserving its laws and
moral and social norms. Paradoxically, Plato’s discussion of the child does not center on
the child or the concept of childhood; it is an account of the most effective methods
(“charms”) for correcting the child’s soul. Plato is concerned with how best to form the
child as an obedient subject able to control his desires, obey the laws, and become the
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This is not to say that Plato does not offer any positive characterizations of the child.
For one, Plato discusses the moral psychology of the child, specifically in regard to the child’s
natural drives to imitation (for example, see Republic 76-77, 84, 109 (395c-396a, 401b-402a,
424e5-425a5)). In virtue of the child’s tendency to imitation the adult educator must avoid
exposing the child to vice and carefully control his educational and social environment such that
he imitates a virtuous existence. I grant that Plato (and other philosophers considered in this
dissertation) do offer some consideration of the child’s nature, often centering on the child’s
moral psychology. And, in general, a fully developed philosophical concept of the “child” must
pay heed to these considerations and be careful not to ignore and contradict basic psychological
facts about the child. Psychological facts have a direct bearing on what a “child” is, and, thus,
they need to be considered in any robust philosophical account of the child. However, when
considering a psychological conception of the child we must be careful not to simply accept the
psychological facts as presented. It is my contention that we must take a critical eye to
psychological observations and attempt to understand the paths of their formation (whether
through extensive observation and study or as influenced by preconceptions about the child and
his relation to the adult as the end of psychological development). However, in this dissertation
my primary aim is not to reject the empirical or psychological claims of major figures in the
canon. Rather, I focus on (1) the child as presented to us by major figures in the Western
philosophical tradition (including their psychological observations) and (2) the manner in which
empirical claims and psychological facts about the child are developed and become instrumental
to the larger ethical and political projects of the philosophers in question. For example, if the
child is a being with a strong drive toward imitation, then he can be led to imitate the virtuous
adult, thereby making possible the ideal polis. If the child is governed by animalistic impulse,
then he must be controlled and coerced, thereby taking on the norms and traditions of the adult. In
each of these cases, “facts” about the child’s psychology are such that, when corrected or
reformed, the moral and political ends of the philosopher become possible. It is my contention
that these ends inform much of the philosopher’s understanding of the child in the Western
philosophical canon, including many prominent claims as to his nature and moral psychology.
For more on this point, see Chapter 3, Section 2 below.
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virtuous adult. In effect, the child is located in this discussion not insofar as he is a child,
but insofar as he is the subject of transformation with the potential to enter adulthood; he
is taken up in discourse as a being-to-be-transformed.
1.2: Controlling the Children of the Kallipolis
The child is situated within an account of education that serves the end of the
establishment of the ideal polis. He is taken up as the non-adult and, in turn, as an object
of transformation, a being-to-be-transformed. Education—and adult engagement with the
child—is successful insofar as it moves the child from childhood toward adulthood. If the
child is a being-to-be-transformed, with the ends of the transformation—the virtuous
adult and state—always cast in advance of his conceptualization, then he must always be
understood as both “morally” deficient insofar as he has not reached the end of virtuous
adulthood, and as “politically” dangerous, insofar as he jeopardizes the other (the ideal
polis). It is to the danger of the child that I now turn my attention.
In uncovering the child’s location in the Republic and Laws it becomes clear that
he presents a problem for the educator and legislator. A corresponding need to resolve
this problem emerges in the form of controlling the child. The child is a problem that
must be subdued in order to ensure the establishment and preservation of the just state.
As an example of this concern to control, consider the following passage from Book VII
of the Laws:
I maintain that no one in any state has really grasped that
children’s games affect legislation so crucially as to
determine whether the laws that are passed will survive or
not. If you control the way children play, and the same
children always play the same games under the same rules
and in the same conditions, and get pleasure from the same
toys, you’ll find that the conventions of adult life too are left
in peace without alteration….In fact, it’s no exaggeration to
say that this fellow [one who introduces novelty in games to
!

%-!

!
children] is the biggest menace that can ever afflict a state,
because he quietly changes the character of the young by
making them despise old things and value novelty. That kind
of language and that kind of outlook is—again I say it—the
biggest disaster a state can suffer.27
Plato’s language is striking here; it is worth considering why a seemingly benign change
in the games of children constitutes “the biggest disaster a state can suffer.” According to
Plato the danger lies in the fact that with the introduction of new games children will
“inevitably turn out to be quite different people from the previous generation; being
different, they’ll demand a different kind of life, and that will then make them want new
institutions and laws.”28 There is a fear, then, of the introduction of novelty into the state,
a newness that will disrupt trans-generational continuity in the laws and socio-political
and moral norms.29 This fear is present in Plato’s general educational plan and informs
the pervasive censorship of the arts in the polis,30 as well as the creation of a centralized
office for the control of children—“by far the most important of all the supreme offices in
the state”31—the Minister of Education.
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Plato, Laws, 237-239 (797a-c, 798e). Plato maintains a general aversion to “change”
throughout the Laws. Plato writes: “Change, we shall find, except in something evil, is extremely
dangerous. This is true of seasons and winds, the regimen of the body and the character of the
soul—in short, of everything without exception (unless, as I said just now, the change affects
something evil)” (Laws, 238 (797d-e)). Plato is particularly concerned with alterations or changes
that “harm” the traditions of the polis—for example, changes to the laws (which codify absolute
moral standards) and changes of the “criteria for praising or censuring a man’s moral character”
(Laws, 239 (798d)).
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Plato, Laws, 239 (798c).
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I thank Dr. Mary Beth Mader for helping me to clarify this point in my work on Plato.
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For examples of censorship in the Kallipolis, see Republic, 57-75 (377c-394a5). For
examples of censorship in Magnesia, see Laws, 243-245 (801d, 802b-d).
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!

Plato, Laws, 195 (765e), 259-260 (813c-d).

%$!

!
Children are the primary targets of these strategies of control. Plato maintains that
“change…except in something evil, is extremely dangerous”32 and children just are a
form of novelty; they are new insofar as they are born into a pre-existent world without
the values of the adult and devoid of the norms of the state.33 The child is not disposed to
take on these norms or seek out virtue, but must be compelled to seek these ends. Failure
to invest the child with these ends—via Plato’s plan of education, censorship, and
control—leaves open the possibility of social rupture and the dissolution of the state. To
avoid this end, control must originate prior to conception. “Supervised procreation” will
ensure that parents do not produce “unbalanced children who are not to be trusted, with
devious characters, and…misshapen bodies.”34 Immediately following conception, while
in the womb, the fetus will be subjected to “athletics of the embryo”: a method of
keeping the fetus in invigorating motion as much as possible.35 The eventual deployment
of games (and musical education in general) is concerned first and foremost with control
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Plato, Laws, 238 (797d).
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But if we take Plato’s theory of knowledge and maintenance of the immortality of the
soul into account, the child’s novelty is perplexing. It is unclear how the child can be “new” if his
soul is immortal and his knowledge is “recollection” of that which his soul previously
encountered in the realm of the Forms (see Plato’s Meno, 886 (85d-86b)). For one, Plato
maintains that knowledge is effectively “lost” or “forgotten” upon birth (see Plato’s Phaedo,
trans. G. M. A. Grube, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 1997), 66 (75c-e)). Thus, even if the child possesses an immortal soul (and is not
“new” in this sense), he does not automatically recall the knowledge gained by his soul during its
time in the realm of the Forms. He must be treated by the adult as if he is a wholly new being that
lacks knowledge of virtue. Second, the child lacks knowledge of the particular norms and
traditions of the state (as discussed in the Republic and Laws). In this sense, the child is a new
political being and, thus, the adult educator and legislator must ensure that he learns and accepts
the laws and traditions of the state.
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Plato, Laws, 222, 211 (784b, 775d). Plato discusses “female officials” appointed by
state officials for this supervision: “The female officials must enter the homes of the young
people and by a combination of admonition and threats try to make them give up their ignorant
and sinful ways” (Laws, 222 (784c)).
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over the child that allows the educator to form the child’s incomplete and “tender” soul
into that of the virtuous adult and the law-abiding citizen, providing the child with a
second nature superior to its original, deficient nature.36 In order to accomplish this allimportant end the legislator can use any means at his disposal:
The young can be persuaded of anything; he [the legislator]
has only to try. The only thing he must consider and discover
is what conviction would do the state the most good; in that
connexion, he must think up every possible device to ensure
that as far as possible the entire community preserves in its
songs and stories and doctrines an absolute and lifelong
unanimity.37
Thus, Plato’s legislator will deploy the “useful lie”38 along with the song, the game along
with the story, the harmony along with the poem. Each of these tactics has a specified
role for Plato’s educational plan or, what is the same, Plato’s plan for controlling the
child and preserving the state.
If, with a whole economy of control being specified in these texts, we still sense
an element of fear in Plato’s discussion of the child it is because this control can never be
perfect. The child is not always within the adult gaze and control of children cannot be
accomplished in a simple, one-off act. Therefore, controlling the child requires constant
vigilance, spurred on by the possibility of a failure so terrible that “it would be
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Plato, Laws, 29 (643c-d).
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Plato, Laws, 57 (664a). Also see Republic, 108 (424b5-c5). In the Laws Plato praises
Sparta and Crete as actual examples of states that successfully maintained unanimity and
continuity in the laws and traditions of the state (though he does not reference the role of stories
and songs in their achieving these ends). Plato writes, “The criticisms people bring against the
way Sparta and Crete are run might be right or wrong…However, …one of the best regulations
you have is the one which forbids any young man to inquire into the relative merits of the laws;
everyone has to agree, with one heart and voice, that they are all excellent and exist by divine fiat;
if anyone says differently, the citizens must absolutely refuse to listen to him” (Laws, 17 (634 de)).
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inappropriate to describe the consequences.”39 To prevent this possibility a regime of
control will be deployed by the legislator: controlling children’s games, censoring stories
and songs, keeping “the young people themselves under constant surveillance.”40 This
education will be “compulsory for ‘one and all’…because they [children] belong to the
state first and their parents second.”41 Via these tactics the educator and legislator will
rule over children at every turn:
Children must not be left without teachers, nor slaves without
masters, any more than flocks and herds must be allowed to
live without attendants. Of all wild things, the child is the
most unmanageable: an unusually powerful spring of reason,
whose waters are not yet canalized in the right direction,
makes him sharp and sly, the most unruly animal there is.
That’s why he had to be curbed by a great many bridles so to
speak.42
Insofar as he is continually subjected to “bridles” of control—starting in the
womb and proceeding throughout childhood—the child is treated as the being-to-betransformed. Here, this approach is constituted by the rejection of the child as a cause of
change in the polis. This rejection of change begins with a paradoxical rupture with
tradition and the past. Plato’s educational and legislative plan originates in a move to
“take over the children” by exiling their families from the polis, thereby removing
children from their habits and traditions to bring them up in the laws of the state.43
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Plato, Laws, 260 (813d).
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Plato, Laws, 287 (836a).
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Plato, Laws, 248 (804d).
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Plato, Laws, 252 (808d-e).
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Plato, Republic, 237 (541a-b). Plato notes that this plan will begin with “everyone in
the city who is over ten years old.”
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1.3: The Child of Education and Control
A focus on Plato’s plan of education allowed us to locate the child within this
discourse as a deficient being (a non-adult) and, thus, a being-to-be-transformed.44 In
turn, we have seen that this deficient being emerges as a problem for the legislator and
educator. Anxiety surrounds the newness inherent to the child and methods of control are
developed to neutralize the problem (the child) as threat to the polis. Whereas the
emphasis in education is moving the child from childhood to a virtuous and stable
adulthood, the emphasis in control of the child is subsuming him (as newness, as
unknown danger) within the traditions of the state.
Taken together, these ends of control do more than preserve the state; they also
cover over substantive consideration of the child. What we find instead is a totalized
child—a concept that is distinct in its lack of distinction, a homogenous conception of the
child as a target for intervention, born of the concerns of the adult. There is little attention
paid to differences between children; there is little place (and certainly no motivation) for
focused consideration of the diverse qualities and concerns of children as, instead, the
focus is placed squarely on the child’s transformation into the adult.
What, then, are we to make of the characterizations of the child that Plato does
offer to us? Perhaps, after all, we do find substantive consideration of the child in these
accounts. The child is an appetitive being: he is ruled by the appetitive and spirited parts
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But the child is not the only deficient being in the Republic. Plato writes, “pleasures,
pains, and appetites that are numerous and multifarious are things one would especially find in
children, women, household slaves, and in the so-called free members of the masses—that is,
inferior people” (Republic, 117 (431c)). Like the child, the “masses” (or the worker class—
farmers, craftsmen and common laborers) are compared to the appetitive part of the soul
(Republic, 281 (580d-581a)). And, like the child, they are regarded as inferior beings, lacking
wisdom and requiring the government of the naturally superior class (the Guardians). Unlike
(some) children, however, the worker class lacks the potential to shed their deficiencies through
the process of education and development.
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of the soul45 and is of the class of “inferior people” who seek “pleasures, pains, and
appetites that are numerous and multifarious.”46 His condition is one, like the drunkard,
of a lack of self-control.47 The child is irrational; he lacks knowledge and understanding
and is weighed down by “leaden weights…which have been fastened to it by eating and
other such pleasures and indulgences, which pull its soul’s vision downward.”48
But these characterizations do not provide us with a robust conception of the
child. Rather, Plato’s characterizations of the child are largely derived from a negation of
the traits of the adult. By contrast, the virtuous adult—inhabiting the ideal condition of
the human being—is characterized by a number of positive abilities and characteristics:
the ideal adult is virtuous, possessing temperance, courage, and wisdom;49 he chooses
pleasure properly50 and is just in that he rules over himself with reason.51 These positive
characteristics—essential for the adult and the state—structure Plato’s perception of the
child. He is understood as lacking virtue, as choosing pleasure before all else, as ruled by
the worst part of the soul. Regarded as a deficient being in contrast to the ideal adult, he
must be made the object of educational and social intervention.
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Plato, Republic, 129 (441a5-b), 230, 235 (534d-5, 539b-c). Also see Laws, 30-31
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Plato, Republic, 117 (431c).
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Plato, Laws, 32-33 (645e-646b).
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Plato, Republic, 212 (519a7-b5).
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Plato, Republic, 121-122 (435b5-e5).
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Plato, Laws, 19 (636e).
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Plato, Republic, 132-133 (443d, 444d), 281 (580c).
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Section 2: Aristotle
Plato’s influence on Aristotle’s discussion of the child is evident in the
Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. As in Plato’s Republic and Laws, Aristotle’s
account of the child is inextricably bound up with concerns over education and moral and
political development. And, as in Plato’s discourse, Aristotle’s discussion of the child in
the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics provides for an encounter with the child as a
problem, a deficient being (the non-adult) and, thus, a being-to-be-transformed. But I do
not want to oversimplify; there are important differences between these accounts, too,
and although Plato’s influence on Aristotle should be considered, we should not do so at
the expense of failing to treat Aristotle’s discourse in its own right.
Aristotle departs from Plato (and all other philosophers before him) in authoring a
systematic ethical treatise, the Nicomachean Ethics.52 This pursuit brings with it a focus
on the excellent (adult) life and, in turn, an account of the child as deficient insofar as he
is not excellent. Plato, too, considers the child’s deficiencies in relation to the excellent
adult. However, Plato’s account of the deficient child and the excellent adult lacks the
sustained teleological approach found in Aristotle’s Ethics. On Aristotle’s teleological
approach, the child is not just deficient in virtue or dangerous to the state; the child is
primarily understood as an incomplete human being. That is, the child (unlike the
excellent adult) has not actualized the capacities of the complete human being, nor
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The Nicomachean Ethics is closely related to the Eudemian Ethics with Books IV, V
and VI of the latter reoccurring as Books V, VI, and VII in the former. In this work I focus on the
content of the Nicomachean Ethics. See Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics, trans. J. Solomon, in The
Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume Two, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984).
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achieved the end for the sake of which human beings live (the human telos).53 Thus,
where Plato places a primary emphasis on controlling the child for the preservation of the
polis, Aristotle emphasizes the child’s development toward the realization of the human
telos.
2.1: The Ethics and the Child
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle is concerned with providing an account of
the ultimate end of human life and the excellent life as lived in accord with this end. The
end of human life—“most choiceworthy” and “complete and self-sufficient, since it is the
end of the things achievable in action”—is happiness (eudaimonia).54 In turn, the
excellent life is one that realizes this ultimate end over the course of a complete life.55
In order to illustrate eudaimonia in outline (providing a “target” for the potentially
excellent individual56) Aristotle provides an account of human function (ergon). For
Aristotle, we must locate the essential activity of the human being in order to understand
his best good, as this good just is the excellent performance of this activity over a
complete life.57 This activity must be distinctive of human beings; it is not located in the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53

Aristotle’s conceptual approach has been extremely influential for subsequent accounts
of the child, including many of the dominant accounts in our own era. Here I am thinking of, for
example, contemporary developmental psychology and its reliance on a teleological account of
human development. For more on this point see Chapter 2, Section 3 below. We might also
consider the common understanding of the child in the West as “incomplete” in various ways
(physically, morally, etc.).
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 8 (1097b2), 162-163 (1176a30-1177a10).
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 12 (1100a5).
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2 (1094a25).
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The kind of essential activity in question varies depending on which part of the
Nicomachean Ethics one consults. Books II-V focus on practical virtue as excellent activity
whereas Books VI and X focus on theoretical virtue and contemplation as excellent activity. For
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essential activities of plants or non-human animals (taking nutrition or perceiving via the
senses). Rather, given that the possession of reason is distinctive of human beings, human
function must be found in “some sort of life of action of the [part of the soul] that has
reason.”58 Excellent human function, then, is “activity of the soul in accord with virtue,
and indeed with the best and most complete virtue…in a complete life.”59 This discussion
of the human good serves as foundation for the remainder of the Ethics in which Aristotle
provides an account of the primary components of the excellent life: the acquisition of
virtue (both virtues of character and virtues of thought), friendship, external goods, and
contemplation.60
For our purposes Aristotle’s ethical treatise is significant insofar as it provides
another primary context for discussion of the child in the history of Western philosophy.
We have seen that Plato’s discussion of the child cannot be separated from his political
concerns in the Republic and Laws, namely, the formation and preservation of the ideal
polis. Likewise, Aristotle’s discourse on the child cannot be detached from concerns
centering on the formation of the ideal moral agent, the practically wise individual
(phronimos). To be practically wise is to be in “a state grasping the truth, involving
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Aristotle’s distinction between practical virtue (virtue of character) and theoretical virtue (virtue
of thought) see Nicomachean Ethics, 18 (1103a5-10).
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 9 (1098a3-4). Taking nutrition is the function of a
plant, while sense-perception is the function of a non-human animal. Also see Aristotle’s On the
Soul, trans. J. A. Smith, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume Two, ed. Jonathan Barnes
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 658 (413a20-30).
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 9 (1098a15-19).
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For Aristotle’s discussion of virtues of character see Nicomachean Ethics, B.II-V; for
discussion of virtues of thought see B.VI and B.X; for discussion of friendship see B.VIII-IX; for
discussion of external goods see 11 (1099a25-1099b7), 116-117 (1153b15-20), 148 (1169b10),
166 (1179a); for discussion of contemplation see 163-167 (1177a15-1179a30).
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reason, concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a human being.”61
The phronimos—the individual possessing practical wisdom—possesses all of the virtues
of character (the possession of practical wisdom is necessary and sufficient for virtue of
character62), chooses pleasures correctly, deliberates well and decides correctly about
actions regarding human goods.63 In short, the phronimos is the “standard and measure”
for the student of Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,64 and as an ideal standard the phronimos
conditions and colors Aristotle’s account of the child.
In Aristotle’s outline of the human good and moral excellence the child is taken
up insofar as he is not, indeed, cannot be the excellent individual. He is not eudaimon
(along with non-human animals) because “happiness requires both complete virtue and a
complete life”65 and the child possesses neither. The child is understood in relation to
what he lacks: he is devoid of complete virtue given that he is incapable of deliberation
and decision as well as the lived experience necessary to be practically wise.66 Given
these deficiencies, the child’s state of being is inhospitable to the excellent life. As

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 89 (1140b5-8).

62

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 99 (1145a).
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 89-90, 98-99 (1140a25-1140b25, 1144b-1145a5).
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 37 (1113a35), 142 (1166a13). Also see Aristotle’s
Politics, 192 (1323b20-24). Practical wisdom serves as a unifying link between the Ethics and
Politics given its status as the primary virtue of both the morally excellent individual and the
excellent statesman and citizen. In the best of constitutions the excellent individual and the
excellent citizen are one and the same (Politics, 100 (1288a35-40)).
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 12 (1100a-5).
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 33 (1111b5-10), 93 (1142a13-15).
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Aristotle writes, “no one would call a person blessedly happy who…has a mind as foolish
and prone to error as a child’s or a madman’s.”67
Lacking a developed rational part of the soul, the child is understood as
possessing a thoroughly appetitive nature. Children are akin to the intemperate, living “by
appetite, and desire for the pleasant is found more in them than in anyone else.”68 In all,
the child’s life is wholly undesirable: “no one would choose to live with a child’s [level
of] thought for his whole life, taking as much pleasure as possible in what pleases
children, or to enjoy himself while doing some utterly shameful action.”69 These
deficiencies call for a specific mode of approach to the child, one of control and
subordination to the norms of the excellent adult:
If, then, [the child or the appetitive part of the soul] is not
obedient and subordinate to its rulers, it will go far astray.
For when someone lacks understanding, his desire for the
pleasant is insatiable and seeks indiscriminate satisfaction.
The [repeated] active exercise of appetite increases the
appetite he already had from birth, and if the appetites are
large and intense, they actually expel rational calculation.
That is why appetites must be moderate and few, and never
contrary to reason. This is the condition we call obedient and
temperate. And just as the child’s life must follow the
instructions of his guide, so too the appetitive part must
follow reason.70
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 49 (1119b6).
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 157 (1174a-5).
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The discourse on the child in the Ethics—taken up within Aristotle’s concerns with the
excellent adult—leaves us with an account of the child as in need of reform.71 The
perception of the child is covered over by deficiencies within a discussion of the virtuous
adult (the excellent individual) such that he is taken up as a being-to-be-transformed. For
this reason he must become “obedient and subordinate” to his “rulers” in order to cast off
his deficient condition. It is to Aristotle’s method of reforming the child—moving him
from childhood to adulthood—that we will now turn.
2.2: The Child, Education, and the City-State
We can now turn to a second primary context in which the child is discussed, a
location necessitated by the end of the virtuous adult and the deficiency of the child. This
context—the realm of education and moral development—is intimately related to
Aristotle’s discussion of the excellent individual. If the child is deficient in reason and
virtue, if he is not excellent, it is crucial that he be “well brought up” and habituated to
the fine and the noble.72 For the child it is not unimportant “to acquire one sort of habit or
another, right from…youth. On the contrary, it is very important, indeed all-important.”73
The method employed to direct the child on the path to virtue is that of training
and habituation. Being “well brought up” is a necessary condition for actualizing the
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I use the terms “reform” and “correction” to indicate the adult’s primary mode of
engagement with the child as discussed in Western philosophy. The child is regarded, first and
foremost, as deficient in relation to the adult and, thus, as in need of reform or correction. Both
terms indicate the adult’s desire to change or alter the child’s condition such that he sheds his
deficiencies and advances toward adulthood. As discussed in this dissertation, “education” and
“control” are the primary means for reforming and correcting the child. Educational strategies and
tactics of control are deployed with the goal of “transforming” the child from his deficient state
into the ideal condition of the adult.
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capacity for excellent activity.74 Thus, to become the fully virtuous adult the child must
first learn to take pleasure in the just and noble, and pain in evil and injustice. Those
children deprived of proper moral development will lack the necessary motivation to seek
virtue because the non-rational part of the soul has not been trained to “listen to
reason.”75 In essence, depriving a child of moral training is to abandon him to his own
deficiencies, to a life of the base pleasures and interests of the child. To avoid this
condition a harmonious partnership between the non-rational and rational parts of the
soul must be established in one’s youth as arguments for the fine and noble cannot
surmount the motivational force of ingrained habituation in childhood.76 The child must
be transformed; he must be prepared for virtuous adulthood “like ground that is to
nourish seed” via “all-important” moral development and training.77
At this point, we can identify two clear elements of Plato’s influence on
Aristotle’s account of the child: first, a conception of the child as naturally appetitive and
devoid of virtue and, second, a belief that this deficient being must (and can) be
transformed to take on a virtuous character. A significant passage in Book III of the
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 169 (1180a15-16).
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 17-18 (1102b29-1103a4). Aristotle devotes pages 1618 (1102a5-1103a10) to a discussion of the parts of the soul—the rational and the non-rational—
and their contributions to virtue. Virtues of thought issue from the rational part of the soul and
virtues of character issue collectively from the rational part of the soul in cooperation with the
non-rational part. The non-rational part of the soul is divided into two parts (the nutritive and the
appetitive). The extent to which the appetitive part of the soul “listens to reason” determines the
degree of moral virtue in the agent. For more on the structure of the soul see On the Soul, 658659 (413b13-32), 687 (432a15-b8), 689, (433a31-b13).
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Republic demonstrates Plato’s pioneering thought on the importance of moral
habituation:
They must imitate right from childhood what is appropriate
for them—that is to say, people who are courageous,
temperate, pious, free, and everything of that sort. On the
other hand, they must not be clever at doing or imitating
illiberal or shameful actions, so that they won’t acquire a
taste for the real thing from imitating it. Or haven’t you
noticed that imitations, if they are practiced much past youth,
get established in the habits and nature of body, tones of
voice, and mind?78
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle directly references Plato’s influence in this regard:
“we need to have had the appropriate upbringing—right from early youth, as Plato says—
to make…[children] find enjoyment or pain in the right things.”79
We continue to see the influence of Plato on Aristotle, namely, in Aristotle’s
discussions of music and organized games as primary means of moral habituation.80 We
will recall that in the Republic and Laws Plato argued that the control of children’s games
is essential in shaping their character, thereby preserving the interests of the state. Music
in the Kallipolis had to be that which best imitates “the voices of temperate and
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Plato, Republic, 76-77 (395c-d2). Plato is discussing the early education of the
Guardians of the Kallipolis.
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 21 (1104b10-14). Plato’s Republic and Laws are also
referenced numerous times in Aristotle’s Politics. See Politics, 26-45 (1260b30-1267b20), 224
(1336a34), 241 (1342a33).
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These are not the only means of moral habituation discussed by Plato and Aristotle. For
example, in both the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics Aristotle stresses the role of the family
in the early moral development of the child (Nicomachean Ethics, 133 (1162a5-9), 169 (1180a3033); Politics, 1-5 (1252a-1253a35)). Plato diverges from Aristotle on this point in his proposal to
abolish the nuclear family in the Republic (107-108 (423e4-424a2), 147 (457c10-d2)).
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courageous men in good fortune and bad,” while stories had to be closely supervised by
state officials to “shape the souls” of children properly.81
In the educational plan of Aristotle’s Politics children must be limited to games
that are worthy of free citizens and that replicate the virtuous activity of mature adults.82
Aristotle takes musical education to be a primary means of moral habituation,
maintaining that the use of harmonies and rhythms in moral development is especially
important given the ability of these mediums to “represent” noble characters to the child:
Everyone who listens to representations comes to have
similar emotions, even apart from the rhythms and melodies
of those representations. And since it so happens that music
is one of the pleasures, and virtue has to do with enjoying,
loving, and hating in the right way, obviously one must learn
and become accustomed to nothing so much as correctly
judging and enjoying decent characters and noble actions. In
rhythms and melodies there is the greatest likeness to the true
natures of anger and gentleness, and also courage and
temperance, all of their opposites, and the other
characters…we undergo a change in our souls when we listen
to such things. Someone who is accustomed to feeling pain
and pleasure in things that are likenesses is close to someone
who reacts in the same manner to the true things.83
Given that music has the ability to produce “a certain quality in the soul,” we should use
it to make virtuous characters familiar and pleasing to the child.84
Aristotle’s choice of music and games as primary means of habituation is
anything but arbitrary; their selection follows directly from his account of the child. The
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Plato, Republic, 81 (399c1-2), 57 (377b-2).

82

Aristotle, Politics, 224 (1336a25-34).
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Aristotle, Politics, 235 (1340a12-25).
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Aristotle, Politics, 236 (1340b11). On page 236 (1340a38-1340b10) Aristotle details
the “different dispositions” a listener takes on upon hearing various melodies and rhythms. For
example, “relaxed harmonies” create a “tender-minded” disposition while “Phrygian harmonies”
create a “state of inspiration.”
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child is not capable of philosophical reflection, lacks practical wisdom, and is not subject
to moral education via the intellectual process of dialectic. The child’s paramount
concerns are gaining pleasure and avoiding pain. Given this understanding of the child,
the educator turns to methods of habituation that take advantage of the appetitive
condition of the child such that our “whole discussion” must be about these ends
(pleasure and pain).85 Music and games are the ideal means of early moral development
as both are productive of pleasure and, when associated with the noble, fine, or socially
expedient, will connect the appetitive focus of children to these ends, thereby leading
them to the end of virtuous adulthood. Aristotle’s choice of music as a means of moral
habituation is grounded in the “natural pleasure” of this medium:
The teaching of music is appropriate to their nature at this
stage of life. For because of their age the young do not
willingly put up with anything unsweetened with pleasure,
and music by its nature is one of the sweeteners…there
seems to be a certain affinity among children to harmonies
and rhythms.86
Pleasure and pain in music provides the means to “steer” children to proper ends and, in
effect, serve as motivating forces in habituation to virtue.87 These forces make virtuous
ends amenable to the appetitive child and (if deployed effectively) eventually bring him
to choose these ends as a mature adult.
But more hinges on habituation and training than the transformation of the
deficient child into the excellent adult; these tactics are also deployed in order to form the
ideal city-state. The aim of the Ethics—the formation of the excellent individual—serves
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Aristotle, Politics, 236 (1340b10-18).

87
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as a condition of the possibility for the Politics and the excellent political community and
constitution.88 The excellent individual (the subject of Aristotle’s Ethics) will inhabit and
make possible the excellent city-state (the project of Aristotle’s Politics). The legislator
must understand both the human good and the constitution that best suits this end as a
“city-state is excellent…because the citizens who participate in the constitution are
excellent.”89 The excellence of the city-state and the phronimos are one and the same—
both forms of excellence are composed of “a life of virtue sufficiently equipped with the
resources needed to take part in virtuous actions.”90 Thus, political science—the ruling
science for city-states and human action—will seek to “decide” on these ends in the same
way:
Decisions about all these matters [deciding on the excellent
life and the excellent city-state] depends on the same
elements. For if what is said in the Ethics is right, and a
happy life is the one that expresses virtue and is without
impediment, and virtue is a mean, then the middle life, the
mean that each sort of person can actually achieve must be
the best. These same defining principles must also hold of the
virtue and vice of a city-state or constitution, since a
constitution is a sort of life of city-state.91
The greater significance of the discourse on the child now presents itself. In order to
discuss the excellent constitution we must first investigate “how a man becomes
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One need only read the last sections of the Nicomachean Ethics to see that a primary
purpose of this text is to act as ground for Aristotle’s work in the Politics. The final chapter of the
Ethics (B.X.8) moves from ethical to political discussion with Aristotle emphasizing the need to
examine legislative science and political systems to “complete the philosophy of human affairs”
(171 (1181b15)).
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excellent.”92 But creating the excellent individual begins with investing the child with
“good habits” from his earliest years (the habits of the virtuous adult). Thus, the projects
of the Ethics and Politics originate with the child. If the child is finely brought up and
habituated he can become an excellent individual who will inhabit the best constitution,
thereby carrying out the project of the Ethics and, in turn, providing a foundation for the
excellent city-state of the Politics.
But it is also possible that the child will fail to become the excellent adult. Given
this ever-present danger we find an emerging discussion of control centering on the child.
In the Politics this control begins with education:
Of all the ways that are mentioned to make a constitution
last, the most important one…is for citizens to be educated in
a way that suits their constitutions. For the most beneficial
laws, even when ratified by all who are engaged in politics,
are of no use if people are not habituated and educated in
accord with the constitution…[and] if weakness of will
indeed exists in a single individual, it also exists in a citystate.93
The need to form excellent citizens requires beginning with a focus on children as “from
children come those [citizens] who participate in the constitution.”94 To the extent that
the child fails to achieve the virtue of the citizen—“the capacity to rule and be ruled”95—
he is regarded as a problem for the adult educator and legislator and a danger for the city-
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Aristotle, Politics, 25 (1260b19).
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Aristotle, Politics, 72, 74, 66 (1277a25, 1278a10, 1275a22).
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state. In order to avoid this danger the child must be subjected to “corrective
treatments.”96
These “treatments” extend throughout the child’s life. They begin prior to birth
with state supervision of marriage, procreation, and the child in the womb in order to
“ensure that the bodies of those who are born are as he [the legislator] wishes.”97 Once
born, state control over the child intensifies, regulating child nutrition and exercise.98
And, as he grows older, “child-supervisors” control the child’s games, stories, and play
partners.99 Throughout this discussion the child is taken up as a form of danger for the
city-state such that “legislators should be particularly concerned with the education of the
young, since in city-states where this does not occur, the constitutions are harmed.”100
Whereas in the Ethics the child was taken up in discourse as the deficient being in
relation to the (adult) phronimos, in the Politics the child is discussed as a potential
danger to the formation of the excellent city-state. As we have seen, these conceptions of
the child—as deficient and dangerous—cannot be separated any more than we can
separate the projects of the Ethics and the Politics: the formation of excellent individuals
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 169 (1180a10). On this point also see the Eudemian
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and, in turn, the formation of the excellent city-state. Of key import at this point,
however, is the conceptualization of the child as deficient in relation to the excellent adult
(the child as non-adult) and the perception of the child as problem and potential danger to
the excellent city-state.
2.3: Teleology and the Incomplete Child
A unifying method of investigation in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics is the search
for ultimate ends. In this sense, Aristotle’s methodology in the Ethics and Politics is
essentially teleological.101 For example, in the Ethics Aristotle presents eudaimonia as
the ultimate end of human life. As the “end of human aims” all other goods (complete
and incomplete) are ultimately chosen for and understood in light of their relation to this
ultimate end.102 Eudaimonia, then, is the telos in virtue of which we can understand the
excellence of all other goods: goods are excellent insofar as they promote or serve as
components of eudaimonia. Likewise, in the Politics political goods such as household
management and its constituent relations of rule (master over slave, husband over wife,
father over child103) are understood in reference to an ultimate end, the city-state. The
city-state is the ultimate end of all other political communities (such as the husband and
wife, the household, and the village):
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I do not mean to suggest that Aristotle’s teleological approach is confined to his
ethical and political thought. Most notably, Aristotle’s teleological approach can be found in his
accounts of causation and the natural world. For example, see Aristotle’s discussion of the final
cause as an “end” (or telos) in the Metaphysics, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Complete Works of
Aristotle, Volume Two, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1571
(994b5-15). Also see Aristotle’s Physics, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in The Complete
Works of Aristotle, Volume One, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1984), 333-334 (194b30-195a1).
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We see that every city-state is a community of some sort, and
that every community is established for the sake of some
good…Clearly, then, while every community aims at some
good, the community that has the most authority of all and
encompasses all the others aims highest, that is to say, at the
good that has the most authority of all. This community is the
one called a city-state, the community that is political.104
Aristotle’s teleological method is diffuse, extending throughout the Ethics and
Politics. With this methodology comes a distinct mode of understanding: ends and goods
that are not “ultimate” are understood in virtue of what they are not, in relation to the best
end or highest good. Constitutions that are not “correct”—such as tyranny, oligarchy, and
democracy—are classified as deviant and conceptualized in relation to the best
constitutions—kingship, aristocracy, polity.105 We have an essentially relational mode of
understanding between (among other things) constitutions, persons, and their ends.
The child, too, is conceptualized in virtue of a relational mode of understanding.
In both the Politics and the Ethics the child is taken up in discourse in relation to what he
is not. The child is a deviant in relation to the end of human nature:
We say that each thing’s nature—for example, that of a
human being, a horse, or a household—is the character it has
when its coming-into-being has been completed. Moreover,
that for the sake of which something exists, that is to say, its
end, is best, and self-sufficiency is both end and best.106
Aristotle maintains that “reason and understanding” constitute the “natural end” of the
human being.107 With the teleological understanding of being in mind—one that
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understands the essential being or good of a thing in terms of its end—the child is
encountered as incomplete. More specifically, he is ethically incomplete insofar he does
not possess the virtue and reason of the adult (the complete moral agent). As Aristotle
writes, “since a child is incompletely developed, it is clear that his virtue too does not
belong to him in relation to himself but in relation to his end and his leader.”108 The child
will have virtue when he attains completion as the adult.
And the child is politically incomplete insofar as he is not the adult citizen (the
complete political agent). Children are “citizens of a sort, but not unqualified citizens.
Instead, a qualification must be added, such as ‘incomplete’ or ‘superannuated’...For we
are looking for the unqualified citizen, the one whose claim to citizenship has no defect
of this sort that needs to be rectified.”109 The adult is the “unqualified citizen” and the
child is a citizen “given certain assumptions,” namely, that he will overcome his
deficiencies and become the adult.110 Until then the child is kept from those activities
“not appropriate for someone who is incomplete,”111 the political activities of the adult
practiced in leisure. As we have seen, he is instead subjected to the educational plan of
the state.
Imbued with this teleological mode of understanding, Aristotle’s discourse marks
a novel mode of knowing the child. Aristotle is not unique in discussing the child as
irrational or appetitive, pre-political or pre-moral; these modes of knowing the child can
already be found in Plato. Aristotle’s distinction comes with his teleological method and
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discourse on the natural as applied to the child. When applied to the child, he is
necessarily taken up as deficient. For if it is obvious that the rational adult is the natural
end and perfection of the human species, it is just as obvious that the child is not the adult
and, thus, just as obvious that he is deficient. Following Aristotle’s teleological discourse
on the child, the child’s deficiencies are undisguised, exposed for all to see as clearly as
they see a child before them. We might now think of the child as the product of the adult
gaze: a totalizing act of perception that, to the extent it brings a child into view,
constitutes this being as less than the adult, as in need of reform. From the moment the
child is taken up in this discourse he has no other position than deficiency as the
potentially virtuous and potentially complete being.
Section 3: Rousseau
Rousseau’s Emile represents a shift in the discourse on the child. The child is no
longer approached as the Platonic or Aristotelian non-adult. That is to say, the child is not
conceptualized negatively in relation to the ideal adult as political and moral agent of the
polis. Rousseau’s ideal adult—the natural adult or savage—is excellent in spite of (not
because of) his place in the state and, consequently, Rousseau’s discussion of the child in
relation to the ideal adult necessarily shifts. Whereas the child was taken up as a being-tobe-transformed with the end of transformation located in the political and moral adult,
Rousseau is concerned with the child as one that must be confined to the natural state of
being as long as possible: innocent, pure, dependant on things (not wills), and devoid of
multifarious passions. Dominant conceptualizations of the child fail, Rousseau argues,
precisely insofar as they pass over the nature of the child; they are “always seeking the
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man in the child without thinking of what he is before being a man.”112 Educators must
recall and preserve the natural state of being located in the child, a state of being distinct
from the impoverished condition of the adult in civil society.
To situate the child in the discourse of Rousseau, then, requires understanding his
place in a broader account of the natural that permeates Rousseau’s educational and
political work. Rousseau’s plan of education—as found in Emile—stays true to nature by
forming the child as the natural being while his account of the “natural” informs his
understanding of the child as non-adult in relation to the “savage” (ideal adult) who will
“inhabit cities.”113 The image of the savage or natural adult structures Rousseau’s
approach to the child, serving as the end point in virtue of which the child is educated,
rigidly controlled, and made docile throughout Emile. This end surrounds Rousseau’s
child, directing the plans of the educator and serving as the end in virtue of which the
child is paradoxically forced to be free.
3.1: The Child and the Discourse on the Natural
Rousseau begins Emile with the following claim: “Everything is good as it leaves
the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man.”114 That
which is created by the Author of things is natural, an original state of being that serves
as standard of the pure and good in human beings and, further, that serves as a point of
contrast to the degenerate condition of civilization (issuing from “the hands of man”). In
his idealization of the natural, Rousseau sets an “incontestable maxim”: “the first
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movements of nature are always right” and, thus, “there is no original perversity in the
human heart.”115 This understanding of the natural has far reaching implications for his
political and educational work, informing his understanding of the child, the correct
process of education, the formation of man, and the deviant society. It is in comparison to
the natural condition of man in the state of nature that all socio-political, moral, or
educational “progress” is evaluated. Given the implications of Rousseau’s discourse on
the natural we should briefly turn to a primary context for the discussion of nature and the
natural man, the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality.
In the Discourse Rousseau attempts to grasp man in his “original constitution,”116
a task made difficult given the vast separation between civilized man and natural man in
the state of nature:
With original man gradually disappearing, society no longer
offers to the eyes of the wise man anything but an
assemblage of artificial men and factitious passions which
are the work of all these new relations and have no true
foundation in nature…savage man and civilized man differ
so greatly in the depths of their hearts and in their
inclinations, that what constitutes the supreme happiness of
one would reduce the other to despair.117
The transition away from the state of nature and natural man toward society and civilized
man is a shift from a superior to an inferior state of being. Physically, natural man is “the
most advantageously organized of all.”118 Nearly devoid of disease, skilled in providing
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for his needs, and located in a state of nature possessed of abundant resources, natural
man is in sound condition. By contrast, civilized man is often crippled by illness and has
more needs than his own strength, ability and environment can satisfy.119 Having few
relations with others, natural man has few passions—those centering on food, rest, and
sex—and a settled imagination that does not reach beyond this tranquil state of being.120
By contrast, civilized man, in constant dependence on others, is chained by his desires for
power, advantage and esteem.121 If he is a moral being who possesses reason, he is also
one who lacks a robust sense of pity and commits vicious acts at every turn.122 According
to Rousseau, “reason is what engenders egocentrism” and “turns man in upon himself.”123
Relying on reason and a morality of “subtle arguments,” civilized man turns away from
the natural “sentiment of humanity,” and, with it, any feeling for the needs of others that
do not concern his own.124
Concluding his account of man in the natural state, Rousseau writes:
Wandering in the forests, without industry, without speech,
without dwelling, without war, without relationships, with no
need for his fellow men, and correspondingly with no desire
to do them harm, perhaps never even recognizing any of
them individually, savage man, subject to few passions and
self-sufficient, had only the sentiments and enlightenment
appropriate to that state; he felt only his true needs, took
notice of only what he believed he had an interest in seeing;
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and…his intelligence made no more progress than his
vanity.125
Human beings possess an original constitution that is pure and good and the advance of
society marks a perversion of this original constitution. The emergence of societal man
brings “progress” in the form of new relations with others and, in turn, new needs,
desires, and knowledge. With the advent of these “chains” and the development of social
relations with others—beginning in small herds and families and ultimately leading to the
formation of laws and the state—a new encounter with oneself and others becomes
possible. Rousseau writes:
Each one began to look at others and to want to be looked at
himself, and public esteem had a value…And this was the
first step toward inequality and, at the same time, toward
vice. From these first preferences were born vanity and
contempt on the one hand, and shame and envy on the other.
And the fermentation caused by these new leavens eventually
produces compounds fatal to happiness and innocence.126
Natural inequality—disparities in age, physical strength, health and mental acuity—
which mattered little in the state of nature, takes on a greater import, becoming aligned
with moral or political inequality based on one’s honor, power, or esteem in the eyes of
others.127 Man becomes a “slave” to his vastly expanded needs and desires and “vicious”
insofar as he deceives and uses others to compensate for these newly formed chains.128
So many steps of ostensible progress “toward the perfection of the individual”—the
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progress of reason, morality, society, and law—are in fact so many steps “toward the
decay of the species.”129
In short, in Rousseau’s discourse on the natural, the transition from the natural to
the civil state is a disaster for human happiness and innocence. But Rousseau’s discourse
on the natural is of particular import for our purposes given his coupling of the natural
state of being and the condition of the child. As discussed in the Discourse, prior to the
advance of society savage man “remained ever a child.”130 He was innocent, influenced
by few passions, and possessed of no morality, abstract reason or imagination; he was
childlike. In Emile the link between the natural and the child only becomes more explicit.
The common transition from childhood to adulthood can be read as a microcosm of the
transition of natural to civilized man as recounted in the Discourse. Like the natural man
the child begins in a state of innocence, living simply via the use of the senses and
possessing no conception of morality. He has needs, but they are few and his happiness is
not difficult to secure. Like natural man, the child does not bear the artificial chains of
social and moral relations with others and the passions born of these relations. But as he
grows in society, the child becomes the societal and moral man, taking on relations with
others and multifarious passions and appetites. There is, then, a thematic unity between
Rousseau’s account of natural man in the state of nature and the transition to civil society,
and his account of the child: both natural man and the child possess a purity that is
corrupted in society where “being something and appearing to be something become two
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completely different things.”131 The threat of this corruption of the natural structures
Rousseau’s approach to the child throughout Emile.
3.2: The Education and Control of Emile
Rousseau’s discourse on the natural and the child come together insofar as the
child is conceptualized as the natural being. Like the adult, the child is located in society.
But he is still close to nature, only recently delivered from the Author of things and not
yet (fully) deformed by the perversions of society. Rousseau’s idealization of nature and
the child as representative of natural purity informs a specific mode of approach to the
child. As the natural being within an artificial society the child becomes an object of
control and constraint in order to ensure that his innocence and purity are preserved. The
child must become a docile being, one that will yield to the educational strategy of the
adult (isolating the child from the impurities of society). A docile child will not resist the
control of the adult, nor the coercion intended to prevent the loss of his purity in the midst
of an impure society. Thus, ensuring the child’s docility—controlling his every
movement and making him reliant on his educator instead of passions and desires—is an
integral element in the preservation of his innocence and, in turn, the eventual realization
of the adult noble savage (a being that has reached maturity largely unhindered by the
multifarious chains of society). To this end, Rousseau’s educator will deploy the natural
method of education.
The “systematic part” of the natural educational method is nothing other than the
“march of nature.”132 But we do not live in a natural state and, thus, nature can no longer
unfold in man fully isolated from the effects of society:
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In the present state of things a man abandoned to himself in
the midst of other men from birth would be the most
disfigured of all. Prejudices, authority, necessity, example,
all the social institutions in which we find ourselves
submerged would stifle nature in him and put nothing in its
place. Nature there would be like a shrub that chance had
caused to be born in the middle of a path and that the passersby soon cause to perish.133
It is through natural education that the child will gain strength, cultivate his faculties, and
maintain the natural state of being (as far as is possible) in the midst of society. Within
the artifice of society this education must take a precise form, uniting education by men
and by things (those forms of education over which we possess some control) for the
benefit of education by nature (over which we do not have control).134 In practice, the
natural education of Emile (Rousseau’s imaginary pupil135) takes the form of an
“education of things,” a choice of method stemming from Rousseau’s account of the
child’s nature and the natural development of our “original dispositions”:
We are born with the use of our senses, and from our birth
we are affected in various ways by the objects surrounding
us. As soon as we have, so to speak, consciousness of our
sensations, we are disposed to seek or avoid the objects
which produce them, at first according to whether they are
pleasant or unpleasant to us, then according to the conformity
or lack of it that we find between us and these objects, and
finally according to the judgments that we make about them
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on the basis of the idea of happiness or of perfection given us
by reason. These dispositions are strengthened as we become
more capable of using our senses and more enlightened; but
constrained by our habits, they are more or less corrupted by
our opinions. Before this corruption, they are what I call in us
nature.136
By nature our education begins at birth as we sense and respond to objects (“things”) in
our environment. Ideally, the depth of our responses to these objects develops naturally;
we maintain sensory engagement with our environment and incorporate other faculties—
such as judgment, reason, imagination, and sentiment—as we age, encounter new
relations of objects, and develop the requisite knowledge to master them. Through this
education by things the child remains a “physical being” (as opposed to a “moral” or
“social” being), only feeling the “chains of necessity” in his own needs.137 In moving
from sensations to more complex ideas based on relations between objects in his
environment the child has a natural impetus toward developmental maturity, culminating
in the move from purely physical being to “moral being” in understanding one’s
“relations with men.”138
Thus, to perform education by nature we need not do anything, we need only
follow “the order of nature” by exposing the child to the bonds of necessity found in the
relation between objects, the child’s own needs, and the relative strength he possesses to
satisfy them.139 Education by nature as deployed in an education by things is a negative
education; the adult does not attempt positive instruction of the child, but rather, focuses
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on “securing the heart from vice and the mind from error,” thereby allowing nature to
unfold in the child as he responds to his environment.140 Departing from this form of
education marks the error of common pedagogy, exposing the child to the vices of
society and, in consequence, the corruption of nature. By becoming dependent on others
(wills) the child is prematurely introduced to artificial relations of men and society; he no
longer develops internally via the unfolding of nature. Worst of all, substituting the
education of society for that of nature fosters the premature formation of amourpropre.141 To love and preserve oneself (self-love) is the most natural of sentiments, but
bound up in social and moral relations we flatter the child’s amour-propre, we teach the
child to be dependent on wills and to make comparisons between himself and others.142
Ignoring the demands of nature, we instead plant the seeds of “hateful and irascible
passions” born of these comparisons, such as jealously, vanity, deceit, and vengeance.143
In order to avoid this problem the educator must employ a “well-regulated freedom” over
the child, exposing him to “the force of things alone without any vice having the occasion
to germinate in him.”144
At the beginning of this section I remarked on the natural educator’s need to
control and constrain the child in order to maintain the child as natural being. At this
point, however, there seems to be a distinct lack of constraint and control on the part of
Rousseau’s educator. On the contrary, Rousseau’s educator deploys an education by
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things, a negative education, in virtue of which the child develops naturally and learns
through his attempts to master his environment. If anything, Rousseau’s discussion of
natural education repeatedly stresses the freedom of the child:
The first of all goods is not authority but freedom. The truly
free man wants only what he can do and does what he
pleases. That is my fundamental maxim. It need only be
applied to childhood for all the rules of education to flow
from it.145
Rousseau argues against the physical constraint of infants—swaddling, walking-strings,
etc.146—just as he argues against the constraint of the young adult by passions emerging
from his premature introduction to the moral and social relations of civilized adults.147
Each of these constraints—whether physical, moral, or social—is a chain placed on the
developing human being and an affront to natural freedom. In order to provide children
more true freedom Rousseau keeps the infant and young child on the path of nature,
obeying nothing but the necessity of things in their environment. As the child develops
into a rational, social, and moral being freedom is maintained insofar as the natural
constitution of the child has been preserved. Though not living apart from society,
Rousseau writes, “it suffices that, enclosed in a social whirlpool, he not let himself get
carried away by either the passions or the opinions of men, that he see with his eyes, that
he feel with his heart, that no authority govern him beyond his own reason.”148
But, in truth, subjection of the child has never been absent from Rousseau’s
natural education and tactics of constraint and control are inextricably tied to the
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educator’s deployment of “well-regulated freedom.” In order to secure the child in his
“original form” we must “preserve it from the instant he comes into the world,” we must
“take hold of him and leave him no more before he is a man.”149 From the very start of
the natural education of the child the discourse on freedom is paralleled by an exhaustive
practice of control and coercion:
Let him always believe he is the master, and let it always be
you who are. There is no subjection so perfect as that which
keeps the appearance of freedom. Thus the will itself is made
captive. The poor child who knows nothing, who can do
nothing, who has no learning, is he not at your mercy? Do
you not dispose, with respect to him, of everything which
surrounds him? Are you not the master of affecting him as
you please? Are not his labors, his games, his pleasures, his
pains, all in your hands without his knowing it? Doubtless he
ought to do only what he wants; but he ought to want only
what you want him to do. He ought not to make a step
without your having foreseen it; he ought not to open his
mouth without your knowing what he is going to say.150
This “perfect subjection” starts from Emile’s earliest youth in the education by things.
The objects that Emile “naturally” encounters—for example, the garden or the forest—
are all carefully presented by the adult, as is the entire surrounding environment in which
he will learn.151 As the child matures, gaining reason and sentiments, control continues in
channeling the child’s own desires to the end of natural education (the adult savage).
Whereas the young child was coerced by force (directly controlling the objects and
environment of the child), the maturing child and his sentiments present “many new
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chains” to “put around his heart.”152 To deploy these sentiments effectively (for example,
sentiments of friendship, gratitude, and self-love), the child is made subject to a
continuous surveillance by the adult, “observing him, spying on him without letup and
without appearing to do so, sensing ahead of time all his sentiments and forestalling those
he ought not to have.”153
In essence, Rousseau’s account of the free child entails the child’s docility, and
the perfection of natural education is located in large part in the progression of control
over the child’s development: beginning with docility via the use of force, progressing to
the use of the child’s own emerging passions as tools of control, and ending with Emile
willing his own control at the hands of the adult.154 Reflecting on the perfection of
Emile’s subjection, Rousseau writes:
It has taken fifteen years of care to contrive this hold for
myself. I did not educate him then; I prepared him to be
educated. He is now sufficiently prepared to be docile…It is
true that I leave him the appearance of independence, but he
was never better subjected to me; for now he is subjected
because he wants to be.155
Perhaps the last words of Emile in Rousseau’s treatise on education speak best to the
perfection of his docility: “We [Emile and Sophie] shall be docile. As long as I live, I
shall need you. I need you more than ever now that my functions as a man begin.”156
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Even in progressing through Rousseau’s natural education and achieving the mark of
manhood in securing a relationship with a woman, Sophie, (another area of the child’s
life that has been meticulously orchestrated by the adult157), Emile is fully docile and
always in need of the adult. If Emile is “free,” he has never been more controlled.158
3.3: The Natural Child
Rousseau’s natural education and, in turn, the strategy for the control and
coercion of the child are directly linked to his conception of the child as a natural being.
On Rousseau’s account, childhood is a distinct stage of being with “ways of seeing,
thinking, and feeling which are proper to it.”159 By nature, childhood is a time of
“reason’s sleep,” with the child’s experience of the world being constituted by sensations
and simple ideas rather than reason, memory, judgment, and robust imagination.160
Children are “little innocents,” weak and pure, curious and naïve.161 Taken together,
Rousseau’s normative commitment to the superiority of the natural over the civilized and,
further, his idealized conception of the child as a natural being provide for the need to
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control and coerce those designated as children to preserve this state of being. It is up to
the adult to preserve the natural (the child) within the artificial society.
To see the relationship between the discourse on the natural and Rousseau’s
concept of the child we can look at a parallel case of this discourse as applied to woman
in Book V of Emile. Again, Rousseau’s claim is ostensibly a simple one: “the essential
thing is to be what nature made us.”162 I quote at length Rousseau’s account of what
nature has made woman:
The quest for abstract and speculative truths, principles, and
axioms in the sciences, for everything that tends to generalize
ideas, is not within the competence of women. All their
studies ought to be related to practice. It is for them to apply
the principles man has found, and to make the observations
which lead man to the establishment of principles. Regarding
what is not immediately connected with their duties, all the
reflections of women ought to be directed to the study of men
or the pleasing kinds of knowledge that have only taste as
their aim; for, as regards works of genius, they are out of the
reach of women. Nor do women have sufficient precision and
attention to succeed at the exact sciences. And as for the
physical sciences, they are for the sex which is more active,
gets around more, and sees more objects, the sex which has
more strength and uses it more to judge the relations of
sensible beings and the laws of nature. Woman, who is weak
and who sees nothing outside the house, estimates and judges
the forces she can put to work to make up for her weakness,
and those forces are men’s passions. Her science of
mechanics is more powerful than ours; all her levers unsettle
the human heart. She must have the art to make us want to do
everything which her sex cannot do by itself and which is
necessarily agreeable to it. She must, therefore, make a
profound study of the mind of man.163
Paradoxically, within a discourse (on the natural) Rousseau is attempting to place these
claims beyond the reach of discourse; ostensibly, these are not claims at all, they are
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natural attributes of the woman as read from the book of nature.164 Whereas man is by
nature “active and strong,” woman just is “passive and weak;” she has been “made to
please and to be subjugated.”165 While man has reason to restrain his desires, woman has
modesty and the virtue of chastity to constrain her own.166 If these attributes seem to
disadvantage women it is because, in society, we misunderstand the inherent goodness
and purity of the natural order of things.167 To correct this perversion we should move
closer to nature by educating women to embrace the “glory” of their weakness, to learn to
“please men, to be useful to them, to make herself loved and honored by them, to raise
them when young, to care for them when grown, to counsel them, to console them, to
make their lives agreeable and sweet.”168
I cite this discussion not to establish Rousseau’s sexism (not because I do not find
his sexism problematic or worthy of attention, but because the fact of his sexism is clear
enough on its own) but to point out the role of the concept of the natural in supporting his
conception of the natural woman within this discourse. Regardless of his claims,
Rousseau is not pointing to the natural woman (and whether there even is a natural
womanhood to point to is certainly not beyond debate), but within his discourse on the
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natural he is providing support for a particular conception of woman—as passive, gentle,
weak, etc.—already prevalent in his historical era and socio-cultural setting.169
Likewise, in Rousseau’s discussion of the natural qualities of the child (innocent,
pure, naïve, curious) we are seeing a particular concept of the child bound up in the
discourse on the natural and presented as the “nature” of the child, as beyond discourse. It
is true that the attributes of Rousseau’s natural child—his curiosity, purity, and
innocence—are more palatable to the contemporary reader than those traits ascribed to
the woman, but Rousseau’s child is no less a result of a particular discourse on the
natural. That is to say, if through a greater critical distance it has become obvious to us
that Rousseau maintains a particular, sexist conception of woman via his discourse on the
natural, it should be no less obvious that he is developing a particular conception of the
child via his discourse on the natural. Neither of these beings is “natural,” even on
Rousseau’s own terms.170 He is not finding and reporting on a pre-existent child as found
in nature, as given directly by the Author of things. Rather, Rousseau just is the “minister
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is) by demonstrating that the concept of the child is formed in relation to the broader moral and
political concerns of the philosopher in question. These broader moral and political concerns—
such as the formation of the polis, the ideal adult, or the natural savage—provide the context
within which the conceptualization of the child occurs and, I contend, shape the concept of the
child at hand.
170

That is to say, Rousseau is not providing a “natural” account of the woman or child as
he presents it (one that describes the woman or child as they essentially are, apart from any
normative evaluations or presuppositions). Rather, his own normatively loaded conception of
what the woman or child is and ought to be is cloaked in essentialist language on being “what
nature made us” (Emile, 386).
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of nature,”171 determining what is natural and what is not. In Emile it is his discourse,
bound up, no doubt, with numerous other discussions of his era that determines what it
means to be the natural man, woman, and child.
But the natural child will not always remain as such, nor should he on Rousseau’s
account. If the child is encountered as a pure being to be preserved he is also a weak
being with incomplete freedom insofar as he lacks the strength to satisfy his needs. The
child must mature physically, mentally, and emotionally; he must become self-sufficient
like the natural adult. Thus, in conjunction with the idealization and preservation of the
child in society, we should not forget the end of this preservation. The child is
approached as the non-adult insofar as he is not and must become the savage adult. A
child is, by nature, “made to become a man”172 and the progression of the natural
culminates in savage adulthood. To this end, as stated by Rousseau, education just is the
“art of forming men”173 with this formation requiring the control and coercion so
prevalent throughout Emile. Rousseau describes this transition—from childhood to
adulthood—as a “second birth,” such that “it is now that man is truly born to life and now
that nothing human is foreign to him. Up to now our care has only been a child’s game. It
takes on true importance only at present.”174
This is not to say that Rousseau maintains the same approach to the child as his
predecessors. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, Rousseau does not regard the child as in need of
control insofar as he is a deficient being, lacking the qualities of the adult. Rousseau pays
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a great deal of attention to the distinctive goods of the child (for example, his purity and
innocence) and, in this regard, his engagement with the child is novel in the history of
Western philosophy. Given his conception of the pure, natural child, Rousseau deploys a
controlling pedagogical strategy for the child’s own preservation and betterment. That is,
Rousseau’s controlling approach is not intentionally set against the child as an
animalistic, appetitive being that must be reformed. However, the fact remains that
insofar as the child fails to realize the end of adulthood he is presented as a problem, as a
threat to the natural who must be corrected via Rousseau’s education. In this sense, the
child—despite Rousseau’s regard for his distinctive goods—is also treated as an
instrumental being, one that is valued by the adult insofar as he makes possible greater
moral and political projects (whether the formation of the Kallipolis or the formation of
the natural adult in the midst of an artificial society). For Rousseau, the figure of the
natural savage remains the telos of human existence and, thus, the child is often taken up
insofar as he must become this adult. In this sense, the need to control and coerce the
child is not only grounded in an attempt to preserve the goods of the young child, but
also, to provide for the formation of the “man of nature,”175 the ideal adult as savage.
Section 4: Kant
Kant’s educational, political, and moral work presents us with familiar themes as
embedded in the discourse on the child in the history of Western philosophy. As in the
work of Plato and Aristotle before him, Kant’s child often surfaces as a deficient being in
relation to the rational, moral, and political adult. And, like Rousseau, Kant develops a
systematic educational treatise to ensure a proper pedagogical approach to the child, a
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sustained education that will (as far as is possible) ensure the realization of ideal
adulthood. Encountered as the non-adult, the child is approached as a being-to-betransformed within strategies of education and control.
But Kant also presents a novel form of approaching the problem of the child
insofar as he is bound up in the specificities of his own educational, political, and moral
concerns. Kant’s moral philosophy allows for the child to be encountered as one who is
not a full member of humanity, as a person lacking the freedom from nature to selflegislate in accord with the autonomy of his own will. Kant’s political philosophy
provides for the child to be encountered as a “passive” member of the commonwealth in
opposition to the full or “active” membership of the adult (male). Within the broader
framework of Kant’s political and moral philosophy we can recognize the child as always
outside the gates of the kingdom of ends (or the moral realm as such) and the
commonwealth. The child’s potential for full moral and political status requires that he
not be mistreated by those inside (or, those ideally “inside” in the case of the kingdom of
ends), but he cannot enter until his deficiencies—his undeveloped reason and animalistic
nature—have fallen away. In order to become an “active” member of the moral and
political realm—that is to say, in order to become a moral and political agent—the child’s
original, appetitive nature must first change into that of the rational, self-determining
adult. By nature, then, the child is a moral and political agent (adult) in waiting, a
becoming that must learn to yield to the “commands of reason” or remain forever in the
deficient state of childhood.
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4.1: Educating the Child for Moral and Political Adulthood
In On Education Kant claims that “the greatest and most difficult problem to
which man can devote himself is the problem of education.”176 The greatness of this
problem stems, in part, from the fact that “man can only become man by education. He is
merely what education makes him.”177 There is a tremendous responsibility on the part of
the adult educator to determine the formation of man through the cultivation of the
“germs” or “natural gifts” lying undeveloped in the child.178 If executed poorly, education
will fail to lead the child to moral and political adulthood; if executed properly, the child
“fulfills his destiny” and becomes the moral and political adult.179 The contours of the
problem of education expand insofar as Kant views this discipline as the key element in
improving humanity as a whole:
With education is involved the great secret of the perfection
of human nature. It is only now that something may be done
in this direction, since for the first time people have begun to
judge rightly and understand clearly, what actually belongs to
a good education. It is delightful to realize that through
education human nature will be continually improved, and
brought to such a condition as is worthy of the nature of man.
This opens out to us the prospect of a happier human race in
the future.180
Succeeding in this task requires the work of “the whole human race,” with the
pedagogical efforts of each generation improving on those of the past while informing
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those of the present and future.181 Education, which is an art, must become a science
toward the end of advancing “the human race towards its destiny.” 182
This rather ambitious plan of education cannot begin at once with the whole
human race. The educator must begin more modestly with the undeveloped material at
hand, the child, and a pedagogical strategy that we can read as a microcosm of the greater
ambition to improve the human race. As Kant writes, “Children ought to be educated, not
for the present, but for a possibly improved condition of man in the future; that is, in a
manner which is adapted to the idea of humanity and the whole destiny of man.”183 To
achieve this dual end—improvement of the child and, in turn, the human race—the child
is first preserved by techniques of nurture (basic elements of feeding and tending to the
young child) and corrected by techniques of discipline. Discipline is a negative education
(as opposed to positive instruction) with the aim of counteracting the child’s “natural
unruliness.”184 The “unruliness” of the child largely consists of the determination of his
will by “animal impulses” and, consequently, a life lived in “independence of law.”185
Discipline is deployed by the adult to counter the child’s animalistic state of being,
preventing the child from “being turned aside by his animal impulses from humanity, his
appointed end.”186 In practice, this strategy takes the form of subjecting the child to laws
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(of mankind, of school, etc.) and punishment at an early age as once habits and a certain
character are formed they are extremely difficult to change:
Men should therefore accustom themselves early to yield to
the commands of reason, for if a man be allowed to follow
his own will in his youth, without opposition, a certain
lawlessness will cling to him throughout his life.187
As the child advances in age discipline is united with physical education of the
body and mind, an aspect of Kant’s educational plan that is heavily influenced by
Rousseau’s Emile.188 In its early stages, physical education (like discipline) is classified
as a negative education, “that is, we have not to add anything to the provision of Nature,
but merely to see that such provision is duly carried out.”189 Thus, like Rousseau, Kant
rejects “artificial instruments” of education—such as swaddling, leading strings, and
excessive clothing—that inhibit the freedom of children and contribute to their
dependence on others.190 The key here is to provide the child only with “natural
opposition” and to avoid the introduction of new passions and sentiments that will stoke
the child’s animalistic nature (as happens, for example, when the adult caters to the
crying child).191 Taken together, discipline and negative physical education make his will
“docile” for positive educational training.192
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Building on early physical education, positive physical education (culture)
concerns the exercise of the child’s mental faculties with a continuing emphasis (like
Rousseau) on dispensing with “artificial aids” in the training of mental acuity.193 The
physical cultivation of the mind involves both the development of the “superior”
(understanding, judgment, reason) and “inferior” faculties (cognition, senses,
imagination, memory, attention, intelligence) and occurs primarily via child’s play or in
work (“scholastic culture”).194 In this form of education—especially in play—the child
naturally develops his body and mind and sets the ground for denying his animal
impulses as a moral adult:
For the sake of these games the boy will deny himself his
other wants, and thus train himself unconsciously for other
and greater privations…for that very reason these games
must not be mere games, but games having some end and
object. For the more a child’s body is strengthened and
hardened in this way, the more surely will he be saved from
the ruinous consequences of over-indulgence.195
Having outlined the basic elements and ends of nurture, discipline, and physical
education we can turn to the primary aim of Kant’s education: moral training and
practical education.196 The basic distinction between Kant’s strategies of education is
clear: whereas much of physical education is passive, with the child being subjected to
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the adult’s plan of education, moral training must be active for the child. That is to say, in
his moral education the child must understand his actions as principled (not merely
assigned to him by an adult) and related to the idea of duty.197 Moral training:
depends not upon discipline, but upon ‘maxims.’ All will be
spoilt if moral training rests upon examples, threats,
punishments, and so on. It would then be merely discipline.
We must see that the child does right on account of his own
‘maxims,’ and not merely from habit; and not only that he
does right, but that he does it because it is right. For the
whole moral value of actions consists in ‘maxims’
concerning the good.198
For moral training to be successful more is required than obedience or prudent action on
the part of the child. The child must also learn to “act according to ‘maxims,’ the
reasonableness of which he is able to see for himself.”199 This lawful existence—so
foreign to the child in his original condition—requires the gradual “formation of
character” (character being “readiness to act in accordance with ‘maxims’”), a process
that begins with the child feeling the necessity of duty to law as he is subjected to rules
by the adult and culminates (ideally) with the child exercising his practical freedom by
subjecting his actions to the law of his own will.200
The child embodies a problem for this educational strategy insofar as it is unclear
how the adult can educate a deficient being—necessarily using methods of submission
and restraint—to be a free, autonomous adult. As Kant writes, “one of the greatest
problems of education is how to unite submission to the necessary restraint with the
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child’s capability of exercising his freewill—for restraint is necessary. How am I to
develop the sense of freedom in spite of this restraint?”201 In educating a child who is
animalistic, who is pre-moral, pre-political, and not fully rational, restraint is
necessary.202 But to be successful Kant’s educational strategy must provide for the child
to move beyond motivation based on restraint to the recognition of freedom and
humanity as determining the will. Ultimately, Kant’s solution is to prove to the child that
“restraint is only laid upon him that he may learn in time to use his liberty aright, and that
his mind is being cultivated so that one day he may be free.”203 But it is not clear exactly
when the child will make this transition, shedding his deficient nature and coming to act
as a practically free, autonomous individual.204 Nor, given Kant’s numerous warnings
about the lasting effects of early habituation, is it clear that an early education in
constraint and external discipline will not act as a lasting hindrance to the child’s ability
(as he progresses toward adulthood) to act as a free and autonomous moral agent.
But my aim here is not to debate the merits or empirical problems of Kant’s
pedagogy. Rather, I want to disclose the child’s location in Kant’s account of education
and moral and political agency. To this end, it is of greater import that we recognize what
now sits plainly in view—the child’s emergence as a problem in the first place (prior to
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any practical discussion on solving the problem that the child embodies).205 The child is
presented as a problem given, first, Kant’s emphasis on moving the child from his
deficient condition to ideal adulthood and, second, the emergence of obstacles to this
transition as located in the child’s deficient nature. Much hinges on the solution to this
problem: the plan of On Education presents us with the most systematic discussion of the
formation of Kant’s moral and political agent. By nature the child is not disposed to these
conditions and this is precisely why a systematic plan of education is both necessary and
problematic when unable to rectify his deficiencies.
4.2: The Child of the Commonwealth and the Kingdom of Ends
The location (and absence) of the child in Kant’s moral and political work
reinforces the child’s location as deficient being in On Education. For example, consider
Kant’s discussion of the attributes of the political agent, the citizen, in The Doctrine of
Right:
In terms of rights, the attributes of a citizen, inseparable from
his essence (as a citizen), are: lawful freedom, the attribute of
obeying no other law than that to which he has given his
consent; civil equality, that of not recognizing among the
people any superior with the moral capacity to bind him as a
matter of right in a way that he could not in turn bind the
other; and third, the attribute of civil independence, of owing
his existence and preservation to his own rights and powers
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as a member of the commonwealth, not to the choice of
another among the people. From his independence follows
his civil personality, his attribute of not needing to be
represented by another where rights are concerned.206
It is clear that the child is not the citizen, or, more precisely, he is a passive as opposed to
an active citizen of the state.207 The child’s inability to act as a full member of the
commonwealth (as the active citizen) is explained, in part, by his deficiencies as outlined
in On Education: his undeveloped reason and animalistic nature. In the political realm
these attributes take on new relevance; they prevent the child from securing his
independence from nature and from the adult to take on a “civil personality.”208
The child does possess limited rights in the commonwealth. The child qua
“human being” must not be violated in his “freedom and equality,” he must not be
grossly mistreated or subjected to laws that violate his status as a person.209 But the child
lacks all of the substantive attributes of the adult citizen (lawful freedom, civil equality,
and civil independence). Insofar as he is deficient in this regard he must be treated as a
passive “part” of the state as opposed to an active “member” with the standing to
participate in political activity (voting, cooperation in drafting laws, etc.).210 The child’s
existence in the commonwealth is “only inherence” and he—in a similar fashion to other
“mere underlings,” women and common laborers—must be tolerated by and depend on
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the good will of the active citizen until he reaches maturity and can participate fully in the
commonwealth.211
In discussing Kant’s citizen (the political agent), then, we are discussing the
independent, propertied adult male. The child is understood in relation to this adult as
deficient, as the passive citizen until he becomes the active adult. If we want to approach
the concept of the child in Kant’s political discourse we should look to the most primary
political union: the family. Within the family (parents and their children) children are
understood on a property model as a possession of their parents.212 This is not to say that
the child—brought into the world without his consent by the choice of his parents—is a
mere thing lacking rights as a person against his parents. On the contrary, through the act
of procreation parents take on an obligation to their children. The child has an “original
innate (not acquired) right” to the care of his parents until he reaches independence.213
From this obligation:
there must necessarily arise the right of parents to manage
and develop the child, as long as he has not yet mastered the
use of his members or of his understanding: the right not only
to feed and care for him but to educate him, to develop him
both pragmatically, so that in the future he can look after
himself and make his way in life, and morally, since
otherwise the fault for having neglected him would fall on
the parents. They have the right to do all this until the time of
his emancipation…when they renounce their parental right to
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direct him as well as any claim to be compensated for their
support and pains up till now.214
The pragmatic and moral obligations of parents to the child qua possession
involve a unique kind of right: “a right to a person akin to a right to a thing” (as opposed
to a right to a thing, as the child is not a mere thing; and, as opposed to a right against a
person, as the child is not just a person but also a possession of his parents).215 Insofar as
I have a right to a person akin to a right to a thing I can “make direct use of a person as of
a thing, as a means to my end, but still without infringing upon his personality.”216 In the
case of the child the extension of this right is diffuse, covering the child’s obligation to
not run away from home, the parent’s right to take the child back from anyone who
attempts to take their “possession” and, in general, to “parents’ being justified in taking
control of them [children] and impounding them as things (like domestic animals that
have gone astray).”217
The child’s political status as possession, as akin to a thing and lacking (active)
citizenship, runs parallel to his location (or, rather, his absence) in the moral realm. The
same features that prevent the child’s active citizenship in the commonwealth—his lack
of independence, his primitive rationality, and animalistic nature—exclude his full or
active presence in Kant’s moral realm. To understand this exclusion more precisely, let
us briefly review some of the fundamental elements of Kant’s moral system. As will be
familiar from texts such as Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of
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Practical Reason, authentic morality (as opposed to popular morality predominately
composed of hypothetical imperatives or precepts of prudence) is grounded in moral
obligations derived from indubitable law holding for all rational beings. Such moral
obligation, as duty, lies in objective necessitation of the free will by the categorical
imperative.218 The human will is taken to be practically free or autonomous precisely
insofar as it is subject to a purely formal determination by the moral law.219 For the moral
agent—the active member of Kant’s moral realm—the subjective recognition of this
determination provides the consciousness of his freedom and dignity as an end in itself.
In turn, this full member of humanity is fit for (ideally) taking part as sovereign and
subject in the kingdom of ends, that concept inhering in rational wills completely
determined by the categorical imperative. Kant writes:
A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member
when he legislates in it universal laws while also being
himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign,
when as legislator he is himself subject to the will of no
other…A rational being must always regard himself as
legislator in a kingdom of ends rendered possible by freedom
of the will, whether as member or as sovereign.220
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The kingdom of ends is an ideal concept, a union of moral agents that will not be realized
in the sensible world. Nonetheless, as moral agents and intelligible beings, human beings
are to think of themselves as legislating members and subjects of such a kingdom.221
Children are not mentioned in Kant’s discussion of the kingdom of ends, nor, for
that matter, are they substantively discussed in any of Kant’s moral works. If we consider
the fundamental elements of Kant’s moral system and reflect back on the discussion of
the child in Kant’s political and educational discourses—the animalistic child of
undeveloped reason and autonomy—his absence from the moral realm should, at this
point, be expected. The child’s state of being runs directly counter to the fundamental
elements of Kantian moral agency: the child’s will just is one determined by the impulses
of nature and, thus, he lacks a will determined by reason. The child’s sensible
determination ties him to action from animalistic inclination as opposed to action from
duty and recognition of the moral law. The obstacles to the child’s participation in the
moral realm are substantive enough that he is largely dismissed; he is acknowledged as
passively moral—a person who is not to be morally violated through treatment as a mere
thing—but he has no active place in the moral realm as practical agent or (ideally)
potential member of the kingdom of ends. Rather, where we do see the child emerge is,
again, in connection with education by the adult for moral agency, as in Kant’s discussion
of the “moral catechism” in The Doctrine of Virtue.222 The emphasis here (as in On
Education) is a familiar one: forming the child into the moral adult via training that will
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bring him to shed his animalistic nature and recognize human dignity in practical
necessitation (duty) of the will by the moral law.223
At this point in our examination, then, we might pause and consider the near
absence of the child in Kant’s moral realm as significant in itself. It becomes tiresome to
focus attention solely on fragments, to look for a more substantive account of the child
where there is none. Another option before us is to sit with the silence surrounding the
child. We can recognize an immense silence constituted by all that is not said about the
child, by a moral realm nearly devoid of children. If Kant provides us with little
substantive discussion of the child, he provides an abundance of silence; in it we can see
the child as covered over, emerging only when called by the adult, educational strategy in
hand.
4.3: The Ideal Adult and the Deficient Child
Having sought out the location of the child in Kant’s educational, political, and
moral work we can now take full account of Kant’s conception of the child. As we have
seen, in the realm of education the child is subjected to strategies of education in order
that he shed his animalistic nature and gain the rational, political and moral nature of the
adult. In turn, he is located as a problem insofar as his original, deficient nature prevents
response to the educational strategies of the adult, leaving open the possibility of the
child’s failure to reach his necessary educational, political, and moral end. In the political
and moral realms, the child possesses a passive status, only becoming active (if at all)
once reaching adulthood. Taken together, these discourses form a clear account of the
child and warrant a specific response by the adult—in educational, political and moral
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realms the child inhabits a state of deficiency that must, at first, be tolerated and,
ultimately, turned toward adulthood. As soon as is possible, the child’s deficiency calls
for a transformative response—whether in the form of restraint, discipline, or positive
instruction—from the adult educator, citizen, and moral agent.224
This general trajectory—from childhood, to adulthood—is not novel, nor is the
location of the child as non-adult and, in turn, being-to-be-transformed. In various forms
all of the figures considered in this chapter have taken up the child as deficient in relation
to the adult. If Kant’s account of the child is of particular interest it is, in part, due to the
child’s relation to a particular form of the ideal adult, one that has taken on significant
relevance in contemporary philosophical and psychological approaches to the child.
Kant’s moral work is “ideal” (at least) insofar as it systematically abstracts away from
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As discussed above, Plato, Aristotle and Rousseau are also committed to transforming
the child into the adult. However, the proposed means of this transformation are not uniform in
the work of these authors. Differences between their accounts of the child’s transformation are
explained, in part, by differences in their broader accounts of the human being and his capacities.
For example, in the work of Plato (and to a lesser extent, Aristotle) the child is guided to
adulthood and citizenship through precise measures of control deployed by the legislator and
educator. These measures of control are developed in light of Plato’s broader account of the
human being as possessed of a tripartite soul (composed of rational, spirited, and appetitive
parts). Insofar as the child is governed by the appetitive part of the soul he will not respond to
reasoned arguments or dialectic. The educator and legislator must control and shape the child’s
appetites until the rational element of his soul becomes prominent. Given that Rousseau and Kant
share a different account of the human person, their accounts of transforming the child into the
adult do not correspond to Plato’s account. Both Rousseau and Kant maintain a concept of the
child as a natural being and present early education as negative, allowing for nature to unfold in
the child (to see Rousseau’s influence on Kant in this regard, see On Education, 28, 34, 39-44).
Ultimately, Kant maintains an account of the complete human being (the end of development) as
rational and autonomous in both moral and political realms of human activity. In order to realize
this conception of the human being the child must learn to subject his will to the determinations
of moral law and his appetites to the laws of the commonwealth. Insofar as Rousseau maintains a
primary focus on the natural adult (as opposed to the civilized moral and political adult), the
child’s education and control is directed toward preserving this natural state of being. Thus, rather
than advocating a positive control and discipline of the child (as is found in varying degrees in the
work of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant), Rousseau focuses on allowing the child’s natural capacities to
develop in relation to his own needs, the challenges he faces in his environment, and, eventually,
his occupation in society.
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experience and, further, does not purport to set moral ends achievable for actual moral
agents.225 The kingdom of ends is an ideal end that the rational adult must aspire to
inhabit, though he will never actually do so. The pure determination of the will by the
moral law is the ideal standard for morality, though this determination will never be
realized in the human will. Kant writes:
Nothing can protect us from a complete falling away from
our ideas of duty and preserve in the soul a well-grounded
respect for duty’s law except the clear convictions that, even
if there never have been actions springing from such pure
sources, the question at issue here is not whether this or that
has happened but that reason of itself independently of all
experience commands what ought to happen. Consequently,
reason unrelentingly commands actions of which the world
has perhaps hitherto never provided an example.226
In effect, the child is deficient in relation to a conception of moral agency that is not
actually realized by the adult.227 The adult, however, is in a position to aspire to this end;
he can strive to act in accord with a rationalistic morality by overcoming his sensible
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I will discuss ideal theory in Kant and other figures (John Rawls, Tamar Schapiro, and
Lawrence Kohlberg) more substantively in Chapter II of this work. Kant’s final practical work,
The Metaphysics of Morals (which is composed of The Doctrine of Right and The Doctrine of
Virtue) does acknowledge human nature and experience in relation to his moral theory. Kant
writes, a “metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with principles of application, and we shall
often have to take as our object the particular nature of human beings” (372 (6: 217)). However,
the foundational elements of Kant’s moral theory (and the primary elements taken up by the
figures discussed in Chapter II below) remain ideal, rational concepts—the categorical
imperative, the kingdom of ends, Transcendental Freedom, etc.—applied to human nature in parts
of The Metaphysics of Morals.
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Kant, Grounding, 20 (4: 408).
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More specifically, I contend that the child is understood as deficient in relation to
Kant’s ideal adult (insofar as he lacks the rational constitution and autonomy of this being) and
adults in general given that they are capable of pursuing this ideal (even if they never realize ideal
moral and political agency). As discussed in the canon, the child’s condition is such that he is not
capable of pursuing this ideal, let alone realizing it in action in moral and political realms. Kant
himself does not explicitly classify the child as deficient in relation to the ideal adult, but I take
this view to be implicit in his lack of discussion of children in moral and political realms and his
adoption of the rational and autonomous adult as the telos of human development.
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inclinations and, as far as is humanly possibly, by subjecting the maxims of his will to the
concept of the moral law.
It is this form of the ideal adult—the adult who conquers his inclinations, who is
(or is assumed to be) autonomous in possession of a rational will—that has come to be
extremely influential in philosophical and psychological approaches to the child. We can
see this influence in developmental psychology (in the work of Lawrence Kohlberg) and
contemporary moral and political philosophy (in the work of John Rawls and Tamar
Schapiro) insofar as they feature the Kantian ideal adult as the standard by which the
child is evaluated as deficient and in need of reform.228 I have identified the presence of
this adult and shown the deficiency of the child in Kant’s own work. In future work we
can examine the Kantian ideal adult and ideal theory as they structure prominent forms of
contemporary educational, political, and moral accounts of the child.
Conclusion
I began this chapter with the following aim: to draw attention to the place and
significance of the child in the history of Western philosophy via an examination of the
child’s location in the work of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Kant. To orient my
analysis of the child as discussed by these figures, I approached their texts with three
primary questions in mind: First, what are the primary contexts for the discussion of the
child? Second, what concerns does the child raise for these philosophers? Finally, what
conception of the child is at issue? Having completed my analysis I will now return to
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See Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, trans. Marjorie Gabain (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1997); Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development, Volume 1. The
Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice (San Francisco: Harper
& Row Publishers, 1981); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971);
Tamar Schapiro, “What Is a Child?” Ethics 109 (1999).
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these questions in order to provide a summative understanding of the child as represented
within the discourse on the child in the history of Western philosophy.
As evident in the work of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Kant, the child is most
commonly (though not exclusively) taken up in discussions of education. Though
differing substantially in their method of approach, each of these figures delimits a
precise educational plan such that, in some form, education centers on the child’s
development toward the achievement of broader moral and political objectives. The child
is located in these texts as a being to be shaped and reformed, educated and developed,
such that he can play an integral part in the formation of Plato’s Kallipolis and Kant’s
commonwealth, or become Aristotle’s eudaimon and Rousseau’s noble savage. In order
to understand the child’s location in the history of Western philosophy, then, we must
move beyond a focus on fragmentary encounters with the child (often confined to the
educational realm) and instead read these discussions alongside the broader moral and
political aims at play in these texts. As I have shown throughout this chapter, child
education and development constitutes an essential part of achieving these aims, as well
as the ethical and political work of these figures as such.
In turn, the concerns raised by the child are bound up with the child’s
instrumental role within the moral and political objectives of these figures. The child is
born into the world as a problem; he enters a pre-existent world devoid of the moral and
political norms of the adult. He is a new being and his novelty is potentially dangerous
(as is his animality and appetitive nature) insofar as it threatens to subvert extant moral
and political ends. For this reason, a concern to control the child runs parallel to
discussions of his education and development. For Plato and Aristotle, control of the
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child is explicit, taking the form of specific legislation and authorities empowered to
supervise and direct the child’s development. For Kant and Rousseau, control of the child
is often subtle, though certainly no less present. As we saw in Emile, although Rousseau
stresses the natural freedom of the child, his child is directed to docility, gradually taking
on the pre-determined shape of the adult noble savage.229
Taken together, the context and concerns surrounding the child lead to his
conceptualization as the non-adult and, in turn, the being-to-be-transformed. The child
emerges in these texts to be led to adulthood and it is the adult in possession of ideal
traits—virtue or reason, autonomy or agency—that conditions the conceptualization of
the child. Thus, we find a dominant (but not uniform) conceptualization of the child as
deficient, as lacking (or possessing in primitive form) idealized characteristics of the
adult. And given that the broader moral and political aims of these thinkers require ideal
adults, the child cannot be left to his deficient condition. Rather, he must shed his
deficiencies and take on these ideal traits. In this sense, the child is not only
conceptualized as the non-adult, but also, as the being-to-be-transformed who must
preserve the moral and socio-political norms of the adult.
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Though, for Rousseau, the natural educator’s control over the child just is the means
of his freedom. For more on this point see footnote 158 above.
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CHAPTER II
LIBERALISM AND THE HEGEMONY OF ADULTHOOD: THE DISCOURSE
ON THE CHILD IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
Introduction
In the previous chapter we examined the concept of the child as it appears in the
work of major figures in the history of Western philosophy. Focusing on the work of
Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Kant, it became clear that the child has been
conceptualized primarily as a deficient being in relation to the ideal adult. The child has
been regarded as the non-adult and, in turn, as a being-to-be-transformed. But for all of
his1 deficiencies, the child is nonetheless a figure of great importance in the history of
Western philosophy. Children embody the starting point for the larger ethical and sociopolitical projects of the philosophers in question; they must become the ideal adults who
will realize the ethical and socio-political ends of these philosophers. It is with these ends
in mind—the ideal polis or the ideal moral and political agent—that children are
encountered as objects of control, coerced or forced into taking on the norms of the adult.
To the extent that the child subverts this process due to his deficient nature he is a
problem or, what is more, a danger.
In this chapter I will turn to contemporary accounts of the child in the
philosophical work of John Rawls and Tamar Schapiro and the moral developmental
work of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg (work that is highly influential for Rawls
and Western accounts of the moral agency of children generally). My departure from the
history of Western philosophy is not complete, however, as the figures considered here
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Where necessary I will use the masculine pronoun in place of “child.” I adopt the
masculine pronoun in order to avoid confusion and to remain congruent with this use by the
majority of figures discussed in this chapter (Kant, Rawls, Jean Piaget, and Lawrence Kohlberg).
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are heavily influenced in their accounts of the child by Kant (and, to a lesser degree, by
Aristotle and Rousseau). In the work of Rawls, Schapiro, and Kohlberg the Kantian
moral and political adult serves as the end of the child’s moral and political development.
The child, poor in reason and lacking autonomy, sheds his deficient nature to the extent
he takes on the Kantian ideal.
As in the preceding chapter I will orient my discussion of these figures and their
accounts of the child at the level of discourse. I do not undertake a critique of the
empirical validity of the moral developmental accounts in question. Nor do I reject
outright the moral and political ends of the philosophers under examination. Rather, my
aim is to uncover the place of the child in the texts under investigation, to locate him in
the larger ethical and political projects of these figures and, ultimately, to reveal the
impoverished conceptualization of the child at hand.
Section 1: Rawls
John Rawls is widely recognized as the preeminent political philosopher of the
20th century in the Analytic tradition. His work in A Theory of Justice revitalized the
social contract tradition in liberal political thought and has become a source for
continuing scholarship on political justice throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. In the
Preface to the Theory Rawls describes his work as an attempt to “generalize and carry to
a higher order of abstraction the traditional theory of the social contract as represented by
Locke, Rousseau, and Kant” with a result that is “highly Kantian in nature.”2 In addition
to his many novel contributions to Western conceptions of political justice, then, Rawls is
influenced by and is working within a well-defined tradition: liberalism and social
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contract theory.3 Working within this tradition yields the basic concerns and questions of
the Theory concerning the liberty of citizens, the nature of political justice, and the
establishment of the well-ordered society.
But Rawls also develops the Theory in light of a tradition we have seen
represented in the work of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Kant. Like these philosophers,
Rawls devotes attention to the moral and political development of children. In order to
provide a comprehensive account of the formation of a just individual and, in turn, a just
society, Rawls and his predecessors identify children as those beings who will become
the virtuous adults inhabiting the just city (or, for Rawls, inhabiting the well-ordered
society). In the Theory, as in the Republic and Politics, children are the raw material from
which the ideal political union is fashioned.
For Rawls and his predecessors the child in his native state is conceptualized as
the non-adult, a being always confronted by the adult with clear ends of moral and
political transformation in mind. Only by devoting adequate attention to the process of
moral and political development can a just society be understood as “stable,” inhabited by
fully formed adults willing to support and participate in its institutions. In order to ensure
the stability of his conception of justice Rawls approaches the child as the subject of an
account of moral development that will lead him to take on the role of the ideal adult,
thereby shedding his deficient nature.
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Rawls writes, “I must disclaim any originality for the views I put forward. The leading
ideas are classical and well known. My intention has been to organize them into a general
framework by using certain simplifying devices so that their full force can be appreciated”
(Theory, preface, viii).
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1.1: The Well-Ordered Society and the Child
Before we turn to Rawls’s discussion of children it is necessary for us to review
some of the fundamental elements of his project. Doing so will allow us to grasp the
primary motivation and aims of Rawls’s work and, eventually, to understand the child’s
location within the ethical and political ends of the Theory.
In the Theory Rawls’s primary concern is to develop a theory of social justice,
outlining a scheme of distributive justice for society conceived as “a cooperative venture
for mutual advantage.”4 As made evident by traditional contract theories—those of
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant—there are multiple “conceptions of justice.”5 First,
there are differing ways of envisioning the best form of cooperation to achieve a just
society and, second, there are differing conceptions of the ends to be promoted in a
society such that it will be just (thereby creating conditions for the just or good life of its
citizens). In any society there is bound to be both an “identity” and “conflict” of
interests.6 There is an identity (or unity) of interests insofar as individuals desire the
mutual benefits made possible from coexisting in society. But there is a conflict of
interests insofar as disagreements arise as to how these benefits, in conditions of
moderate scarcity of resources, should be redistributed in society.7
The role of justice is to adjudicate these conflicts and establish a fair, nonarbitrary division of rights, advantages, and burdens to the individuals composing a
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Rawls, Theory, 5-8.
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society.8 In the face of the circumstances of justice (conflicting conceptions of justice and
conditions of moderate scarcity of resources) principles of justice are required to “provide
a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and…[to] define
the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.”9 The
Theory departs from traditional social contract theory insofar as the principles of justice
are not applied, in the first instance, to a particular society or form of government, nor are
they applied directly to laws or the attitudes and actions of individuals. Rather, the
primary subject of justice is the “basic structure of society,” or “the way in which the
major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties to determine the division
of advantages from social cooperation.”10 The major social institutions—the political
constitution and the primary economic and social arrangements—will determine more
than anything else the “life prospects” of individuals in a given society.11 Given that
individuals are born into different social positions of greater or lesser advantage within
this structure (due to no merit or deficiency on their part), principles of justice are
required to rectify these inequalities and provide for a just assignment of rights and
economic and social opportunities by regulating the selection of a just political
constitution and socio-economic system.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8
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Rawls, Theory, 4, 58.
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Rawls, Theory, 7. Rawls writes, “By major institutions I understand the political
constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements. Thus the legal protection of
freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private property in the means
of production, and the monogamous family are examples of major social institutions.”
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The essential elements for regulating the basic structure—the two principles of
justice—are determined by a hypothetical “original agreement” between contracting
parties envisioned as “free and rational persons concerned to further their own
interests…in an initial position of equality.”12 The general concept of an original
agreement or contract between rational agents will be familiar from the contract theories
of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. In those theories rational parties came together
by contract to form a mode of government, a vision of social union, and to determine
citizens’ rights within a particular society. Rawls’s conception of the procedure for
choosing principles of justice—justice as fairness—distinguishes his contract theory from
that of his predecessors.13
Justice as fairness calls for the selection of principles of justice via an original
agreement that is fair. The fairness of this choice is determined by the nature of the
original position and the process through which contracting parties arrive at the principles
of justice. Key to this process is the implementation of a heuristic device—the “veil of
ignorance”:
Among the essential features of this situation is that no one
knows his place in society, his class position or social status,
nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the
like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their
conceptions of the good or their special psychological
propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a
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Rawls, Theory, 11. Rawls goes on to write, “The idea here is simply to make vivid to
ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for principles of
justice, and therefore on the principles themselves…The aim is to rule out those principles that it
would be rational to propose for acceptance, however little the chance of success, only if one
knew certain things that are irrelevant from the standpoint of justice” (Theory, 18). Also see 21,
120.
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veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or
disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of
natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances.
Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design
principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of
justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.14
Behind the veil of ignorance contracting parties cannot rely on “specific contingencies”
(such as class position, social status, and natural assets) that would bias their choice of
principles and place them in opposition to those with recognized greater or lesser
advantages.15 In the absence of these conditions, individuals must choose principles in
light of “general facts about human society” (principles of economic theory and political
science as well as laws of human psychology) and in virtue of their general preferences
as free, rational and moral persons capable of effective deliberation toward ends.16 Given
their “mutually disinterested rationality” parties to the original agreement will seek to
promote their ends as much as possible, namely, by trying to secure “social primary
goods” (rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth).17 Upon
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Rawls, Theory, 12. Rawls writes, “It may be helpful to observe that one or more
persons can at any time enter this position, or perhaps, better, simulate the deliberations of this
hypothetical situation, simply by reasoning in accordance with the appropriate restrictions…To
say that a certain conception of justice would be chosen in the original position is equivalent to
saying that rational deliberation satisfying certain conditions and restrictions would reach a
certain conclusion” (Theory, 138).
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Rawls, Theory, 137. Rawls presents an additional heuristic device that is key to
choosing a just conception of the original position: we must seek a “reflective equilibrium”
between potential principles of justice adopted in the original position and our “considered
convictions of justice” (for example, that racism and religious intolerance are not acceptable in a
just society). Rawls writes, “By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the
contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to
principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both
expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments
duly pruned and adjusted” (Theory, 20).
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leaving the initial situation these goods will enable the contracting parties to “promote
their conception of the good” and pursue their rational plan of life, whatever this turns out
to be.18
Taken together, the methodological restrictions of the original agreement prevent
biases and arbitrary contingencies from entering into the choice of the parties, while their
mutually disinterested rationality leads them to “acknowledge principles which advance
their system of ends as far as possible.”19 Provided with a list of conceptions of justice
(including utilitarian, egoistic, and teleological conceptions) in the original position so
conceived, Rawls contends that parties to the original agreement would make a definitive
choice. The contracting parties cannot know their social position in the basic structure of
society (which they will take up once the veil of ignorance is lifted) and, thus, it is only
rational for them to choose principles of justice that will provide for the greatest possible
liberty to pursue their ends while ensuring that they will not be unfairly disadvantaged by
their starting position in the basic structure of society, whatever it may be. As Rawls
argues, the two principles of justice—the principle of greatest equal liberty and the
difference principle (prefaced by the principle of fair equality of opportunity)—present
the best means for these agents to secure their ends in light of the competing demands of
others.20 Once chosen these principles ensure, first, “equality in the assignment of basic
rights and duties” and, second, that “social and economic inequalities…are just only if
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they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least
advantaged members of society.”21
The principles of justice are born of a narrowly defined initial situation and a
resulting problem of choice taken up by rational parties apart from the “contingencies” of
the world.22 Once chosen they are to be implemented within a “perfectly just,” “wellordered society,” in which “everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in
upholding just institutions.”23 Justice as fairness, then, produces principles of justice
under the assumption of “strict compliance” and, in turn, a methodological disregard for
the nonideal “pressing and urgent matters” of everyday life.24 Only after a conception of
justice has been chosen under the assumption of ideal conditions do the envisioned
parties consider principles of justice for, as Rawls puts it, “less happy conditions.”25 In
effect, Rawls’s work on justice is that of ideal theory—developing principles of justice
for a perfectly just society under the assumption of strict compliance—with the added
assumption that these principles of justice will provide for a “systematic grasp” of
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Rawls, Theory, 14-15. For the first full formulation of the two principles of justice see
Theory, 60-61. For the final formulation of the two principles of justice see Theory, 302.
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Rawls, Theory, 88. Rawls writes, “the acceptance of the two principles of justice
constitutes an understanding to discard as irrelevant as a matter of social justice much of the
information and many of the complications of everyday life.” Thus, questions of justice centering
on issues such as race and racism, conflict between nations, and the nonideal rationality of actual
citizens are not considered in Rawls’s Theory.
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Rawls, Theory, 246. Considerations of “less happy conditions” are very limited in the
Theory, comprised of brief discussions of civil disobedience and conscientious refusal (Theory,
Ch.6). Even in these cases society is conceived as “nearly just” (Theory, 351, 363). Rawls writes,
“the only question of nonideal theory examined in any detail is that of civil disobedience in the
special case of near justice. If ideal theory is worthy of study, it must be because, as I have
conjectured, it is the fundamental part of the theory of justice and essential for the nonideal part
as well. I shall not pursue these matters further” (Theory, 391).
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nonideal problems in everyday society (though Rawls does not devote significant
attention to these problems).26
If we have not mentioned children up to this point it is because they are given no
place in the first, fundamental part of the Theory: the original position and the selection
of the principles of justice.27 Rawls’s ideal theory extends not only to the nature of
society or the principles of justice, but also to the agents choosing these principles and
inhabiting the well-ordered society. They are ideal agents, or, more specifically, ideal
adults. To recognize this we need only consider Rawls’s description of the agents in the
original position: they are “moral persons” and “rational beings with their own ends and
capable…of a sense of justice.”28 The rational person:
knows the general features of his wants and ends both present
and future, and he is able to estimate the relative intensity of
his desires, and to decide if necessary what he really wants.
Moreover, he can envisage the alternatives open to him and
establish a coherent ordering of them: given any two plans he
can work out which one he prefers or whether he is
indifferent between them, and these preferences are
transitive. Once a plan is settled upon, he is able to adhere to
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Rawls, Theory, 9. See Section 1.3 below for more on Rawls’s methodological dismissal
of nonideal problems for the just society.
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More is at stake here than the child’s absence from the text of the Theory; namely,
Rawls’s failure to consider questions of the moral status of children and, in turn, adult obligations
toward children. Rawls is silent on the rights of children and what justice requires of adults in
their interactions with children, whether in the public sphere or in the private realm of the family.
This lack of consideration is explained, in large part, by the child’s absence from the original
position and social contract (as discussed in Part One of the Theory). Given that children are
excluded from the original position and social contract, contracting parties do not consider justice
for children in their deliberations. For more on this problem see Samantha Brennan and Robert
Noggle’s, “John Rawls’s Children,” in The Philosopher’s Child. Critical Perspectives in the
Western Tradition, eds. Susan M. Turner and Gareth B. Matthews (Rochester: University of
Rochester Press, 1998), 210-212.
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it and he can resist present temptations and distractions that
interfere with its execution.29
Parties to the original agreement must be rational in this sense. The “time of entry” for
contractors to the initial agreement is noted specifically by Rawls as occurring “during
the age of reason” and once the veil of ignorance is lifted it is assumed contractors will
return to society as “rational and able to manage their own affairs.”30 What is more, the
parties to the original agreement are described as “heads of families” and assumed to
represent family lines.31 Even behind a veil of ignorance, then, the remaining attributes of
the parties to the original agreement are those of the adult of liberalism: they are
principled, ideally rational and moral beings.
By contrast, there are numerous “contingencies of childhood” which preclude
their status as rational and moral beings and, thus, prevent their participation in the moral
and political realm of the Theory. Children are beings whose “powers are undeveloped”
and that “cannot rationally advance their interests.”32 The child possesses a “primitive
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Rawls, Theory, 128. Rawls adopts the heads of families assumption to ensure “justice
between generations.” In Political Liberalism Rawls changes this characterization of contracting
parties to “representatives of citizens.” See Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2005), 20 (n.22), 274 (n.12), 305. For our purposes, this change is significant in that it
provides the possibility of child advocates within the Rawlsian system (though Rawls does not
address this possibility in the Theory or Political Liberalism). Even if children are not parties to
the original position and social contract, on the “representatives” model of contractors we could
imagine contracting parties acting as child advocates, taking into account the child’s welfare and
interests in the well-ordered society. For more on this possibility in the Rawlsian system, see
Brennan and Noggle’s “John Rawls’s Children,” 212-213.
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Rawls, Theory, 249, 514. In these ways the condition of childhood is presented as
similar to the condition of the “seriously injured or mentally disturbed” (Theory, 249). For more
on this comparison as taken up in contemporary Western liberal philosophy, see Section 2.3
below.

!

,$!

!
understanding” and “lacks the concepts for understanding moral distinctions.”33 Children
are subject to irrational passions; they are “often envious and jealous” with “moral
notions…so primitive that the necessary distinctions [between competing conceptions of
justice and the good] are not grasped by them.”34
These characterizations are significant in that, as Rawls notes, they are used “to
single out the kinds of beings to whom the chosen principles apply.”35 The principles of
justice hold for all moral persons under the assumption that “each can understand these
principles and use them in his deliberations.”36 But it is clear that Rawls presents children
as lacking moral agency and incapable of rational deliberation. It is confusing, then, that
Rawls presents the principles of justice as “universal in application”;37 that is, unless the
moral and political “universe” under consideration is limited to ideally rational and moral
adults. It is to these adults—the contracting parties and moral and political agents of the
Theory—that the principles of justice apply to in the first instance. Children are subject to
the principles of justice insofar as they have the potential to become these rational and
moral adults and insofar as they are the wards of full agents.38 Like Aristotle before him,
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permanently deprived of moral personality may present a difficulty” to his conception of full
equality in the initial agreement and the well-ordered society. However, he does not devote
substantive attention to this problem. Instead, Rawls “assume[s] that the account of equality
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Rawls envisions children as possessing the capacity for moral and political agency.39
Until this capacity is actualized the child is not a full citizen, nor a moral actor; his rights
are guaranteed as a future adult, a potential moral and political agent. Prior to his
realizing this potentiality, ideally rational and moral adults will unfailingly choose what
is in the best interests of the child. They will choose principles that are best for children
as a class of beings incapable of ideally advancing their interests, just as they do for
others left outside the gates of the original agreement, the “seriously injured or mentally
disturbed.”40
If children are not parties to the original position, play no part in determining the
principles of justice, and, further, are not full citizens capable of acting on the ideal
conception of justice once chosen, why, we might ask, does Rawls even consider them in
the Theory? In truth, Rawls does not consider children in great detail, with the
descriptions above serving as some of his most focused accounts of children. The wellordered society is administered and populated by rational and moral adults and, thus,
Rawls’s work on the formation and application of the two principles of justice is
overwhelmingly applied to a world of ideal adults.
Nonetheless, children do play a crucial role in the Theory. Specifically, children
are essential in determining the stability of Rawls’s two principles of justice. Discussing
the stability of a conception of justice, Rawls writes:
It is an important feature of a conception of justice that it
should generate its own support. That is, its principles should
be such that when they are embodied in the basic structure of
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society men tend to acquire the corresponding sense of
justice. Given the principles of moral learning, men develop
a desire to act in accordance with its principles. In this case a
conception of justice is stable.41
Recall that the parties to the original position choose principles of justice for the basic
structure of society in light of “general facts” about human nature, including laws of
human psychology. In making their decision contractors must determine whether the two
principles of justice are compatible with laws of human psychology such that it is feasible
that human persons would develop a corresponding “sense of justice,” a strong
disposition to adopt and support a conception of justice. Thus, demonstrating that free,
rational and moral persons would choose the two principles of justice in an original
position of equality is not sufficient. Rawls must also argue that, once chosen, the two
principles of justice will generate support from the citizens of a well-ordered society and,
further, that these principles will advance (or be “congruent” with) the good of rational
agents.42 Moreover, the desire to support and act on these principles must outweigh
human propensities toward injustice.43 No matter how ideally just, a conception of justice
(such as the two principles of justice) is not stable if rational individuals would not
willingly support its precepts.44
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Ultimately, the stability of the two principles of justice hinges on children, the
subjects of moral development in the perfectly just society. Rawls must show that
children raised within a well-ordered society will develop to be rational and moral adults
with the requisite sense of justice to support the principles of justice as fairness.45 If the
moral development of children can be shown to culminate in an adherence to rational
principles of justice Rawls can argue that his conception of justice is not only rational and
fair, but also, stable. To this end, Rawls’s discussion of moral development sketches the
development of the appropriate sense of justice in children and the psychological
principles that guide this development.46
The distinctive morality of the child is the “morality of authority,” a temporary
morality born of the child’s “peculiar condition and limited understanding.”47 Unlike the
rational and moral adult the child is deficient in reason and lacks autonomy; his actions
are guided by his original, appetitive inclinations and desires.48 Thus, in his original
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work. The child is deficient in reason and lacks independence, or, autonomy. Further, the child is
governed not by reason, but by animalistic impulse. Given this characterization of the child it is
unclear whether or not the child possesses a will at all for these thinkers. On the one hand, Kant
defines the will as follows: “the will is a faculty of choosing only that which reason,
independently of inclination, recognizes as practically necessary, i.e., as good” (Grounding, 23
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condition the child lacks a substantive morality and is not a moral actor, but rather, is
acted upon by his environment and appetites.
It is through the child’s relationship with his family that his path to adulthood and
moral agency truly begins. The child’s world is largely a product of his relation to his
parents as they expose him to new experiences, model correct conduct, and care for his
well being at every turn. In the well-ordered society parents possess “unconditional” love
for their child, “expressed in their evident intention to care for him” and “displayed by
their taking pleasure in his presence and supporting his sense of competence and selfesteem.”49 According to Rawls’s first psychological principle, the manifest love of his
parents brings the child to love them in return. Given this “new desire” the child:
will tend to accept their [the parents’] injunctions. He will
also strive to be like them, assuming that they are indeed
worthy of esteem and adhere to the precepts which they
enjoin. They exemplify, let us suppose, superior knowledge
and power, and set forth appealing examples of what is
demanded. The child, therefore, accepts their judgment of
him and he will be inclined to judge himself as they do when
he violates their injunctions.50
This first stage of development is crucial for Rawls and his account of the just society.
Without doubt, the child is still a primitive being and is not yet close to the ideal of
adulthood. But within the morality of authority the first seeds of the appropriate sense of
justice are in place. Through love and trust in his parents he has gained basic moral
precepts to which he feels some obligation (evidenced by feelings of guilt when
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transgressing these precepts) and is no longer completely governed by his own appetitive
nature. Further, he has developed a limited capacity for fellow feeling that will eventually
lead to communication and participation with others in a just association (the wellordered society structured by the two principles of justice).
It is during the next stage of moral development—the “morality of
association”51—that the child develops the necessary intellectual skills for participating in
a just society with moral and political actors. In contrast to the child’s early morality in
which he obeyed an ostensibly arbitrary assortment of rules handed down and modeled
by his parents, the morality of association finds the child coming to understand “the
moral standards appropriate to the individual’s role in the various associations to which
he belongs.”52 The child first learns these standards through the approval or disapproval
of those governing and participating in the association in question. Thus, we can imagine
the child coming to learn what it means, say, to be a good student from interactions with
his teacher or learning good sportsmanship through interaction with his peers in sport.
But there is a more significant development at play here. The child does not
merely obey an authority figure but, more significantly, comes to understand himself as
occupying a role in an association (a classroom or sports team) with others who, like him,
have interests and desires. In order to understand his role in various associations and to
treat others fairly the child must develop the “intellectual skills” to adopt the viewpoint of
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others.53 Through the development of these skills, the child is able to “regard things from
a variety of points of view and to think of these together as aspects of one system of
cooperation.”54 In turn, through intellectual simulation the child’s developing “moral
sensibility” is affected by the recognition of the wants and ends of others; he becomes
attached to “fellow associates” who, like him, have wants and ends, and, ultimately, seeks
to promote the “social arrangements” that provide for the realization of these ends.55 With
this simulative ability in place and following the first psychological principle, Rawls
posits his second psychological law:
Once a person’s capacity for fellow feeling has been realized
by his acquiring attachments in accordance with the first
psychological law, then as his associates with evident
intention live up to their duties and obligations, he develops
friendly feelings toward them, together with feelings of trust
and confidence.56
Given the child’s understanding of his role in an association (an understanding that
presupposes the intellectual skills for adopting the viewpoints of others and, in turn,
recognizing their wants and ends) and his comprehension of the good intentions of others
within this association, he is driven to act with good intent toward his associates in turn
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and, further, to support the very association that has provided for the well-being of all
involved. Although the child’s associations are relatively simple the intellectual skills
developed in these cases start the child on his path to the associations of adulthood (for
example, between just citizens in society or the good parent and his family).57 The
culmination of this stage of development occurs in the well-ordered society “in which the
members of society view one another as equals, as friends and associates, joined together
in a system of cooperation known to be for the advantage of all and governed by a
common conception of justice.”58
At the later stages of the morality of association the individual has relinquished
the primitive nature of the child. As the adult, he now has an understanding of the
principles of justice and regulates his conduct in light of the desire to perform his role as
an equal citizen and to gain the approval (and avoid the disapproval) of his associates.59
But the individual does not reach the final stage of moral development until he “becomes
attached to the highest order principles themselves,” deriving motivation for just action
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not primarily from emotional attachments to others, but rather, from a conception of
justice and desire to advance just institutions.60 This transition occurs with the final stage
of moral development in the well-ordered society—the “morality of principles”61—and
the third psychological law:
Once the attitudes of love and trust, and of friendly feelings
and mutual confidence, have been generated in accordance
with the two preceding psychological laws, then the
recognition that we and those for whom we care are the
beneficiaries of an established and enduring just institution
tends to engender in us the corresponding sense of justice.
We develop a desire to apply and to act upon the principles
of justice once we realize how social arrangements answering
to them have promoted our good and that of those with
whom we are affiliated. In due course we come to appreciate
the ideal of just human cooperation.62
At this stage the sense of justice necessary for the stability of the well-ordered society is
achieved. The individual recognizes that just social arrangements (the basic structure)
have benefitted him and others and, in turn, he desires to set up and support these
institutions.63 Further, if he violates a given moral precept or social value his feelings of
guilt are determined “by reference to the principles of justice” (as opposed to the rules of
an authority figure or emotional attachments within a given association).64 A crucial
feature of Rawls’s moral picture, then, is the developmental advance from the child’s
appetites and an emotionally driven adherence to moral precepts, to moral and political
action informed by abstract moral principles. Ultimately, what distinguishes the ideal just
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agent is his ability to make decisions and act in virtue of the principles of justice,
irrespective of the “contingencies” and “accidental circumstances of our world.”65
Rawls began the Theory by arguing that free and equal moral persons in the
original position would adopt the two principles of justice as fairness as regulative for the
basic structure of the well-ordered society. By turning to the moral development of
children Rawls has attempted to establish that the two principles of justice are not only
rational and ideally just, but also psychologically viable for human persons. To this end,
Rawls’s account of moral development presents a sense of justice as “the normal
outgrowth of natural human attitudes within a well-ordered society.”66 With the care of a
loving family and participation in supportive friendships children will gain strong
attachments to individuals, associations and, eventually, to the complex of just
institutions that provide for the good of society as a whole. The citizen of the wellordered society will recognize the justice of the institutions around him and their
beneficial consequences for his own rational plan of life (his good).67 Therefore, Rawls
concludes, the well-ordered society structured by the principles of justice as fairness
would be stable and practicable for human persons.
My primary concern is not to critique the principles of justice as fairness, nor
Rawls’s argument for the stability of this conception of justice. Under the assumption of
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ideal agents strictly complying with principles of justice in a perfectly just society the
principles of justice as fairness could very well be psychologically viable and best suited
to promote the good of rational agents.68 My concern, instead, is the place of the child in
Rawls’s discourse of the just and stable society. In the Theory we see an approach to the
child familiar to us from the work of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Kant: the child is
conceptualized as the non-adult and, in turn, as a being-to-be-transformed. Rawls chooses
to characterize the child in terms of deficiencies—his limited rationality, lack of moral
agency and appetitive nature. These deficiencies are stark in contrast to the qualities of
the Rawlsian adult—an ideally autonomous, rational and moral being. It is clear that the
child of the Theory is not autonomous, rational, and moral, and thus that he represents a
problem for the perfectly just society. In order to substantiate Rawls’s vision of the just
society the child must somehow become what he is not; he must be transformed into the
adult, a rational being, capable of possessing a sense of justice.69
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We have seen the emergence of this problem along with a similar response in
Plato’s Kallipolis, Aristotle’s city-state, and Kant’s commonwealth. In those cases, too,
the child had to shed his deficient nature and become the adult in order for the ideal
political union to be realized. In approaching the child Rawls does not use the same
methods of control and coercion as his predecessors but the mode of understanding the
child and the end of transformation set out before the child remain the same.70 Rawlsian
moral education and development engages with children insofar as they are potential
adults, deploying these methods to move the child away from his deficient nature toward
autonomy and a sense of justice that expresses “men’s nature as free and equal rational
beings.”71 Throughout this discussion, then, the adult of liberalism is the primary
concern, serving both as the end of the child’s transformation and measure of his
deficient nature.
1.2: Kant, the Theory, and the Child
The impact of Kant’s moral and political thought on Rawls’s Theory is
significant. Rawls goes so far as to describe his work as an attempt to “present a natural
procedural rendering of Kant’s conception of the kingdom of ends, and of the notions of
autonomy and the categorical imperative.”72 Methodological features of the Theory—
such as the original position and the veil of ignorance—are directly informed by these
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concepts. Most importantly for our purposes, we will see that Kant’s account of moral
and political agency influences Rawls’s discussion of the child, contributing to the
conceptualization of the child as a politically and morally deficient being.
To provide a full account of Kant’s influence on the Theory would require a
recapitulation of much of the text in conjunction with an analysis of relevant aspects of
Kantian moral and political theory. For the purposes of this work I will narrow my focus
to some of the most significant areas of Kant’s influence, those impacting Rawls’s basic
methodology and his conception of moral and political principles in the first, fundamental
part of the Theory: the original position and the selection of principles of justice. Taken
together, the restrictions of the veil and the rationality of the contracting parties in the
initial situation ensures that the principles of justice are applicable to all “moral persons”
or “rational beings with their own ends and capable…of a sense of justice.”73 Like Kant,
then, Rawls is concerned with the elucidation and adoption of categorical (as opposed to
hypothetical or heteronomous) moral and political principles, i.e., principles that are
universally binding insofar as they apply to persons in virtue of their inalienable rational
and autonomous nature. Rawls contends that the principles of justice fulfill this
qualification; they are “categorical imperatives” given that they are binding for all
rational beings and, further, they “manifest in the basic structure of society men’s desire
to treat one another not as means only but as ends in themselves.”74 This is to say, the
principles of justice provide for respectful treatment of others as rational, autonomous
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beings (ends in themselves) in accordance with precepts they themselves would adopt in
an initial situation of equality.75
So understood, the perfectly just society resembles the kingdom of ends. Kant
describes the kingdom of ends as follows:
By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different
rational beings through common laws. Now laws determine
ends as regards their universal validity; therefore, if one
abstracts from the personal differences of rational beings and
also from all content of their private ends, then it will be
possible to think of a whole of all ends in systematic
connection (a whole both of rational beings as ends in
themselves and also of the particular ends which each may
set for himself); that is, one can think of a kingdom of ends.76
Like the members of this kingdom, Rawlsian contractors abstract away from their
accidental qualities and differences in order to select laws as essentially rational and
autonomous beings. The principles chosen on this basis do not require heteronomous
motivation for their acceptance. Rather, they issue from the autonomous nature of all
members of the well-ordered society, each of whom is equally capable of adopting the
deliberative procedure of the original position and, thus, can take up the position of
sovereign (or subject) in relation to these principles. Just as Kantian moral principles are
understood as those that “define the moral law that men can rationally will to govern their
conduct in an ethical commonwealth,” so, too, Rawls’s principles of justice are those that
citizens can rationally will to govern their conduct in an ideal political union.77
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Adopting the Kantian interpretation of the original position and the principles of
justice necessitates a further methodological assumption in the Theory. The citizens of
the perfectly just society must be assumed capable of formulating and acting on moral
and political principles as rational agents. In other words, a Kantian interpretation of
justice as fairness is only viable in conjunction with an idealized conception of agents. As
we have seen, Rawlsian citizens are capable of developing and supporting the Kantianinspired state; they are possessed of features familiar to us from The Doctrine of Right
and the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals insofar as they are adults of
liberalism—ideally rational, autonomous, and moral agents. In Kantian terms, they are
active citizens and full members of both the moral and political realms.
The child of the Theory is conceptualized as a deficient being in relation to these
ideal adults (just as he is conceptualized as a passive moral and political actor by Kant).
We can identify this conceptualization of the child in at least two ways: first, the Kantian
adult provides Rawls with a standard in reference to which the child can be regarded as a
deficient being. This same standard serves as the ideal end point of Rawls’s account of
moral development. Rawls contends that “moral education is education for autonomy”
and the culmination of moral development—the morality of principles—is achieved with
the moral agent basing his actions and attitudes on general principles of justice,
acceptable and binding for all rational agents.78 As Rawls writes, the morality of
principles:
defines the last stage at which all the subordinate ideals are
finally understood and organized into a coherent system by
suitably general principles. The virtues of the other moralities
receive their explanation and justification within the larger
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scheme; and their respective claims are adjusted by the
priorities assigned by the more comprehensive conception.79
Insofar as the child is not at this stage he is a deficient being. His task is to escape the
“contingencies of early childhood” and progress to the end of adulthood.80 To this end,
the process of moral development is understood teleologically, beginning with a
deficient, “subordinate” being and culminating in the moral agency of the rational and
autonomous adult. As taken up in this process, the child’s moralities of authority and
association are understood as subordinate elements of the morality of principles and are
valued insofar as they lead to this highest stage. Likewise, the child is understood as a
subordinate being in relation to the moral and political adult and is valued insofar as he
will reach adulthood and become an active member of the well-ordered society.81
Second, the child’s deficient status is disclosed in his near absence in the Theory.
Given that the child is not rational and autonomous there is little need to discuss him,
except insofar as he must be directed toward adulthood (as was the case in Kant’s moral
and political realms). The child is covered over by his deficient moral and political status
and, as a result, Rawls often fails to see children at all. We can understand, then, why he
experiences no conflict in claiming that the principles of justice are universal and
objectively valid for all persons (as categorical imperatives) and that they only cover
“persons with a rational plan of life.”82 For both Rawls and Kant, only those possessed of
a rational and autonomous nature are persons in the full sense of the term; they are
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complete beings capable of selecting and promoting a conception of justice. Conversely,
those who lack reason and autonomy (or who possess it in a deficient form) belong to “a
lower order;” they are deficient beings “whose first principles are decided by natural
contingencies.”83 Such beings take no part in the political and moral deliberations
relevant to complete persons. Given that children just are beings whose deliberation is
dominated by natural contingencies (emotions, family ties, desires, etc.) they are
“creatures” of this lower order and are largely dismissed from discussions of political
justice in the Theory.
1.3: Ideal Theory and the Nonideal Child
Much as Kant did in his own work, Rawls presents us with moral and political
realms composed exclusively of ideal adults. We are again left with a vast silence
surrounding the child. The ostensible exception to this silence—the discussion of the
child as the subject of moral development—finds the child encountered exclusively as a
being-to-be-transformed. The child remains within the shadow of a liberal adult serving
as both his end and the measure of his current deficiency as the non-adult. We have seen
that this account of the child is developed in relation to the Kantian interpretation of
ideally rational agents. But to fully understand the deficient status (and, in turn, the
absence) of children we must consider a foundational element of Rawls’s discourse;
namely, his systematic assumption of ideal theory. This mode of understanding
permeates Rawls’s work, directly informing his methodology and determining the
problems relevant to the formation of a theory of justice. Insofar as the child is
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understood as a nonideal being his fate is that of all other nonideal concerns in the
Theory—he is largely irrelevant to the project of developing an ideal theory of justice.
Rawls’s commitment to ideal theory is grounded in two related claims: first, a
complete theory of justice cannot be achieved unless we take a simplified approach to the
problem of justice. Rather than attempting to account for all of the contingencies of the
everyday world (an impossible task) we adopt idealizing assumptions as to the nature of
society and its citizens. For example, we posit a fully rational and autonomous citizenry
strictly complying with principles of justice in society conceived as “a closed system
isolated from other societies.”84 Accommodating actual persons’ propensities for injustice
and varying cognitive abilities would hopelessly complicate a theory of justice, as would
considering the problem of justice apart from society so conceived. By bracketing these
nonideal contingencies and assuming ideal social conditions a “coherent and manageable
theory” becomes possible.85
Second, Rawls contends that an ideal theory of justice in turn provides for a
“systematic grasp” of injustice in our world.86 The well-ordered society acts as a
comprehensive standard by which we can assess the basic structure of our own society
and its deviations from “perfect justice.”87 These deviations comprise the subject matter
of nonideal theory and are divided into two basic classes: first, in any society there are
necessary restrictions of liberty arising from “natural limitations” and “permanent
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conditions” of human life.88 The liberty of persons (such as children or the intellectually
disabled) lacking the intellectual abilities to participate in a just society must be restricted
in various ways, as must the scope of majority rule when in conflict with a chosen
political constitution and the priority of equal liberty for all. Second, in any society there
are problems of “partial compliance”—violations of the principles of justice in “social
arrangements or in the conduct of individuals” such as civil disobedience and
conscientious refusal, intolerant behavior between individuals of conflicting religious
beliefs, or a racially motivated withholding of voting rights.89
Nonideal problems such as these represent the “pressing and urgent matters” of
actual societies and, as such, Rawls acknowledges the need to consider how the
principles of justice “apply to institutions under less than favorable conditions, and
whether they provide any guidance for instances of injustice.”90 Given that these
principles are chosen by ideal agents for application in a perfectly just society it is not
clear that they are relevant to problems of injustice in the everyday, nonideal world. But
for whatever reason, Rawls never pursues these questions. Instead, he offers the
following:
These [nonideal problems of actual societies] are among the
central issues of political life, yet so far the conception of
justice as fairness does not directly apply to them. Now I
shall not attempt to discuss these matters in full generality. In
fact, I shall take up but one fragment of partial compliance
theory: namely, the problem of civil disobedience and
conscientious refusal. And even here I shall assume that the
context is one of a state of near justice, that is, one in which
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the basic structure of society is nearly just, making due
allowance for what it is reasonable to expect in the
circumstances.91
Rawls’s substantive consideration of nonideal problems of injustice is confined to a focus
on civil disobedience and acts of conscientious refusal in the nearly perfectly just
society.92
There is a clear tension here: Rawls acknowledges the need to consider the
relevance of ideal principles of justice for the injustices faced by nonideal citizens and
societies and, yet, he fails to follow through with this consideration.93 I do not intend to
resolve this tension. Rather, having noted it here I want to focus on Rawls’s failure to
attend to nonideal theory and its relevance for the deficient place of the child in the
Theory. In comparison to the ideal adult the child is a nonideal being.94 The adult is a
rational, autonomous, and moral being, capable of actively participating as citizen in the
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well-ordered society. Taken together, Rawls’s focus on ideal theory and the differential
moral and political status of the adult and child—the former, ideal; the latter, nonideal—
helps to explain the impoverished account of the child in the Theory. Recall that Rawls
maintains that ideal theory provides a “systematic grasp” of nonideal problems of
injustice. We gain a “deeper understanding” of nonideal problems by first developing an
account of a perfectly just society.95 With this ideal account in hand we can then turn to
actual institutions and recognize them as unjust to the extent they depart from the
perfectly just conception.96 In turn, Rawls contends that we have “a natural duty to
remove any injustices, beginning with the most grievous as identified by the extent of the
deviation from perfect justice.”97
In the case of children and adults a similar relation takes shape. By focusing on
the ideal adult Rawls provides a systematic grasp of the human person as citizen, one
who is rational, autonomous, and moral. This account of the adult also provides a deeper
understanding of the problems of the child. The child is problematic insofar as he lacks
the rational and moral agency of the adult and cannot act as a citizen. The child—like the
actual society in relation to the perfectly just—is here understood as nonideal. As taken
up in Rawls’s ideal theory one is classified as a child to the extent he has not yet reached
the perfectly just state of adulthood. In turn, the adult approaches the child with a clear
duty in mind—to remove his “most grievous” deficiencies, to advance the child toward
the perfection of adulthood via moral education and development. In effect, the discourse
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of ideal theory has been applied to the human life cycle, delimiting ideal adults, deficient
children, and the requisite response to the child as nonideal citizen.98
Section 2: Tamar Schapiro
It is fitting that we turn to Tamar Schapiro’s work on the child as in significant
ways it represents a continuation of the Kantian and Rawlsian discourse on the child.
Schapiro’s child retains the status of the non-adult and is approached by the adult as a
being-to-be-transformed.99 This is not to say, however, that Schapiro adopts all of the
concerns of her predecessors. For one, Schapiro is not concerned with providing an
account of an ideal commonwealth and, thus, she does not take up the child within the
contours of this problem. Nor does Schapiro provide a lengthy account of the moral
development of children, explicitly marking their advance from deficient to ideal
existence (as we find to varying degrees in On Education and the Theory). Rather,
Schapiro is primarily concerned with the ethics of adult-child relations in contemporary
Western society as grounded in the markedly different moral and political status of the
child and the adult.
It is in Schapiro’s account of the adult-child distinction that the influence of Kant
and Rawls becomes clear. Schapiro synthesizes significant elements of the Kantian and
Rawlsian discourse on the child, uniting them in a contemporary account of the deficient
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moral status of the child. The adult qua adult is the Kantian moral and political agent, a
person possessed of a self-legislating will and capable of rational, autonomous
deliberation.100 Conversely, the child is a “predicament,” a human person needing, but
lacking a rational will or voice of his own.101 Insofar as the child lacks the reason and
autonomy of the adult he is “nonideal,” his state of being is “an obstacle to morality, a
condition which in principle ought to be eliminated.”102 Given the child’s deficient status
we are presented with a familiar conception of adult-child relations: the adult must
“eliminate” the deficient condition of the child by moving the child—via education in
autonomy—into the ideal realm of adulthood.
2.1: The Child as Predicament
In our daily lives we often apply the adult-child distinction without much
reflection; there are children and there are adults. In contrast to the adult the child is
generally thought of as “a person who in some fundamental way is not yet developed, but
who is in the process of developing.”103 Given their lack of development we often feel it
appropriate to treat children in a manner deemed unsuitable for most adults—we
approach children as beings in possession of a secondary moral and political status. We
often treat children paternalistically, taking on special obligations to nurture, protect, and
raise them (irrespective of their consent or objection to this treatment). Further, we regard
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the consent or dissent of children as lacking the “moral significance” of the adult’s and
we do not hold children responsible for their actions in the way that we would an adult.104
In “What Is a Child?” Schapiro moves beyond these practical observations,
offering philosophical justification for the adult-child distinction and its consequences for
adult-child relations. Schapiro begins with a question: “what is a child, such that it could
be appropriate to treat a person like one?”105 At first glance we might regard the answer
to this question as a simple, empirical matter: “child” just is a nonnormative, biological
concept best articulated within the natural sciences. But notice that biological features
alone underdetermine the contrasting positions of the adult and the child in Western
moral and political realms. That is to say, just as biological features underdetermine a
person’s classification as, say, a “citizen,” so do they underdetermine a person’s
classification as a “child” or “adult” (as well as the experiential consequences of these
classifications). In these cases we are not only pointing to empirical facts, but are also
making normative judgments as to which facts are relevant for a given status (citizen,
adult, child). In the case of citizenship status this could be one’s birthplace or age; in the
case of adult or child status, Schapiro contends, we do well to focus on a person’s agency
and whether it is “developed” or “undeveloped.”106
The import of Kant for Schapiro’s account of the child now presents itself. In
order to flesh out a distinction between (adult) developed and (child) undeveloped agency
Schapiro relies on Kant’s account of the child in the Doctrine of Right. We will recall that
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Kant classified children (as well as women, servants, and domestic laborers) as “passive
citizens” and adult (males) as “active citizens” with the distinction between active and
passive citizenship primarily hinging on the quality of independence.107 Unlike the
servant or domestic laborer, the child is “naturally” dependent on others due to his
deficient reason and inability to act from choice with others. By contrast, the adult—the
full “member” of the commonwealth possessed of voting rights and political liberties—is
not dependent in these ways. From the adult’s independence “follows his civil
personality, his attribute of not needing to be represented by another where rights are
concerned.”108
Schapiro appropriates the Kantian conception of the child, arguing that in the
moral realm, too, we can understand the child’s status as “passive” and “dependent.” The
child lacks autonomy and is incapable of exercising “the distinctively human capacity for
self-determination independent of nature.”109 That is to say, children lack the ability to
choose their own path, to regulate impulse and instinct on the basis of a self-chosen
principle. Instead, “alien forces” in the form of desires and animalistic impulses guide
children.110 Seen in this light Schapiro regards the child as inhabiting an existential state
of nature. The child is beset by motivational impulses and as a minimally reflective being
he experiences some measure of conflict between them. Like persons in a pre-political
condition, however, he lacks the normative authority to arbitrate between impulses (or
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claims).111 Such persons require a common political authority to provide their provisional
claims with normative authority. In similar fashion, the child requires a normative ground
from which he can adjudicate and authoritatively choose between his multifarious desires
and motivational claims. But this is precisely what the child lacks. He is devoid of “an
established constitution, that is, a principled perspective which would count as the law of
his will.”112 He exists within “nature’s rule” whereas the adult, having “completed the
task of liberation from nature,” is “fully subject to her own authority.”113
To return to Schapiro’s question (What is a child?), then, the child is a being
without a rational will, determined by natural impulse and dependent on others. Insofar as
the child lacks autonomy and independence (and the adult possesses them) we can “draw
something like a distinction in kind” between dependent children and rational,
independent adults.114 This distinction provides for the differential moral regard and
treatment of adults and children. First, the presence (or absence) of a rational will
provides a basis for the adult-child distinction in moral status. Unlike the child, the adult
possesses a rational will and maintains an “authoritative relation to the various
motivational forces within her.”115 Developed, adult agents can resolve their motivational
conflicts and act from rational, moral principles while undeveloped, child agents cannot.
As a result, we rightly regard adults (and conversely dismiss children) as proper subjects
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of moral praise and blame, holding them responsible for claims as representative of their
will.
Second, given that the child lacks an established constitution he faces a
“predicament”—he cannot resolve the conflicts within him until he “pulls herself
[himself] together” into the normative stability of adulthood.116 But the child lacks the
very normative foundation (the rational will) needed to choose a path out of nature’s rule
into the rational realm of adulthood. Until this transition occurs the adult is justified in
subjecting children to the paternalistic action common to Western adult-child relations.
For if the child lacks a rational will, then the primary objection to paternalism—a
violation of the will of a rational agent—loses all force.117 And, given the child’s
animalistic condition, failing to subject the child to paternalistic action is tantamount to
abandoning him to the dominion of nature.
2.2: Correcting the Nonideal Child
How, then, does the child escape his predicament and reach the normative
stability of adulthood? The separation between these two states of being is vast. In a
sense, we face the problem of accounting for how something (adulthood and rational
agency) can come from nothing (childhood and the absence of rational agency).118 On the
one hand, it seems clear that the child cannot will himself (via a one-off act) into
adulthood as he is devoid of the very constitution needed to do so (the established
deliberative perspective of the adult). The child is not a rational agent and, thus, he is
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

!

116

Schapiro, “What Is a Child?,” 716, 729.

117

Schapiro, “What Is a Child?,” 730-731; “Childhood and Personhood,” 594.

118

Schapiro, “What Is a Child?,” 731 (n.35).

$$+!

!
incapable of choosing any state of being, including his own animalistic existence. On the
other hand, the child’s achievement of adulthood cannot be understood solely as a
process. If it were, Schapiro notes, we would not “even try to help children learn how to
see and conduct themselves in more mature ways.”119 The distinction between children
and adults is not a mere matter of procedural degree; the achievement of adulthood
represents a “new normative order,” a state of being that is wholly distinct from that of
the child.120
Given the tension between these two accounts—the act and the process of
achieving adulthood—Schapiro offers a different option. The transition from the child to
the adult can be usefully understood as occurring through the concept of play:
It may make sense to see play as a strategy—perhaps the
strategy—for working through the predicament of childhood.
By engaging in play, children more or less deliberately ‘try
on’ selves to be and worlds to be in. This is because the only
way a child can ‘have’ a self is by trying one on. It is only by
adopting one or another persona that children are able to act
the part of full agents, to feel what it must be like to speak in
their own voices and to inhabit their own worlds.121
On Schapiro’s account children are emerging persons, not yet capable of action in a
robust sense of the term (action as representative of one’s will). But children can “playact,” adopting various personas and experimenting with the representative actions of the
rational adult.122 In doing so, children provisionally transcend their deficient status and
rehearse for life as rational adults; they “try on principles in the hope of developing a
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perspective they can endorse as their own.”123 Eventually the trial and error of play-action
gives rise to advances in autonomy and rational deliberation in various “domains” of life
such that children gain increased sovereignty over their natural impulses and desires. As
children learn to “carve out a space between themselves and the forces within them” they
escape from the dominion of nature and “become themselves.”124
But notice that “becoming oneself” is equivalent to becoming the rational,
autonomous adult. Being a full person just is being an adult with childhood regarded
negatively as a “temporary deviation from adulthood.”125 Thus, if the child has a positive
identity at all it is that of a problem to be solved with the achievement of adulthood
serving as resolution. This mode of approach is not without precedent; it is familiar to us
from Kant’s political philosophy (and as discussed in Chapter 1 it can be seen in various
forms in the work of Plato, Aristotle, and Rousseau). In the Doctrine of Right the child is
problematic insofar as his deficiencies threaten the achievement of the ideal
commonwealth. Until he becomes the active citizen the child cannot support the civil
condition by “acting from choice…in community with others.”126 The child must become
the rational, autonomous adult in order to act and regard others within a conception of
public right. In Schapiro’s account the child represents a similar problem insofar as he
lacks the established deliberative perspective to author representative actions. The child is
incapable of acting in a moral commonwealth with others; he is instead fit to be acted
upon by the adult.
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Fortunately, the problem of the child is temporary—given time and the concerted
effort of the adult, childhood will pass. As we have seen, the play-action of children
promotes the transition of children out of their deficient condition. But if the child’s
condition is an “obstacle to morality”—impeding the child’s moral actions and, in turn,
the achievement of a community of moral actors—the adult must take an active role in
removing this hindrance. The adult must help children to eliminate the impediments they
face on the path to full personhood. In the first instance, adults can help children simply
by refraining from hindering the developmental process. The child’s deficiencies,
numerous as they are, will fall away as he makes advances in reason and autonomy. As
long as the adult does not treat children “as if they belonged to a distinct and permanent
underclass”—disregarding his potential for moral agency and discouraging his rehearsals
of autonomous action—he will make progress on his own.127 In turn, as the child
gradually frees himself from the grasp of natural impulse and desire adults can take on an
increasingly positive role in his transformation: modeling autonomy and action based on
moral principles and explaining their choices and deliberative procedure to children while
encouraging them to formulate their own maxims for action.128
As noted above, Schapiro accepts the Kantian account of the child as passive
citizen and mere part (as opposed to full member) of the moral and political realms.
Given this conception of the child the adult is obligated to care for the child (in part,
through paternalistic action) and, most importantly, to “help children work their way out
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of childhood.”129 But our understanding of Schapiro’s account of the child and the adult
response is incomplete if we fail to account for the influence of Rawlsian ideal theory.
Schapiro moves beyond a mere recapitulation of the Kantian discourse on the child,
adding a Rawlsian “two-level, ideal/nonideal” analysis of moral agency.130 On the ideal
level we find the adult—an independent being capable of actively participating in the
moral and political commonwealth alike. The adult possesses an agential “basic
structure” (analogous to the basic structure of the Theory), a “critical perspective” that
organizes “the fundamental constituents of the agent’s motivational world.”131 In virtue
of his basic structure the adult can adjudicate between personal impulses and desires and
act in concert with others in a moral or political commonwealth.
By contrast, on the nonideal level we find the child—a dependent being devoid of
a voice in moral and political realms as “there is no voice which counts as hers.”132 The
child lacks a voice until he develops a basic agential structure, or, what is the same, until
he becomes the adult. Prior to this achievement the adult must cope with and correct the
nonideal child.133 Taken together, the child’s nonideal status and the adult’s need to cope
with his deficiencies yield the adult’s responsibilities to the child (as discussed above):
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These obligations, both positive and negative, all stem from
the idea that in order not to abuse our privilege as adults, we
must make children’s dependence our enemy. Call this a
principle of Kantian nonideal theory. In the spirit of Rawls’s
nonideal theory, this principle helps us to find the least
immoral way of coping with an obstacle to morality. The
condition of childhood poses an obstacle to morality insofar
as it prevents people from being agents in the full sense. The
kingdom of ends must be a place in which every person’s
voice counts, but childhood prevents some from having
voices of their own. Nonideal theory shows us how to
acknowledge this fact without fully accepting it. It tells us to
accord children a special status while striving to make them
unworthy of it.134
In Schapiro we see an explicit application of ideal theory to the human life cycle, yielding
an account of the child as a nonideal being in relation to the ideal, liberal adult. If
Schapiro’s attempted synthesis of the Kantian and Rawlsian approaches to the child is
unique, her account of the child most certainly is not. For Schapiro, as for her
predecessors, the child inhabits a deficient state of being, regarded as an “enemy” of
morality that is overcome by the guidance of the adult.
2.3: The Hegemony of Adulthood
Throughout this chapter I have attempted to draw attention to the silence
surrounding children in the Western philosophical canon. To listen for the child’s voice
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important types of deviation can be defined. Once they are defined, ideals can tell us what is
involved in treating deviant conditions as the deviations they are. They can tell us, in other words,
what virtue demands when conditions happen to be inhospitable to virtue itself” (“What Is a
Child?,” 737). But the ideal in question here just is the adult and the condition “inhospitable to
virtue” just is that of the child. As with Rawls, Schapiro assumes a structural equivalence
between ideal agency and adult agency such that the child (given that he is not the adult) is
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the structural equivalence between adult agency and ideal agency, there can be no ideal child. The
adoption of ideal theory and, in turn, the assumption of the adult as the ideal in question
structurally excludes the child from consideration as an ideal being, as well as consideration of
the adult as a nonideal being.
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in the moral and political realms of philosophers such as Kant and Rawls is to listen in
vain. And, yet, this silence is significant; we should take notice of it as it presents an
additional means of understanding the place (or, rather, the lack of place) of the child in
Western philosophy. Of course, we do well to pay heed to the explicit characterizations
of the child put forward by these philosophers—the child as animalistic, appetitive,
irrational, etc. Characterizations such as these are straightforward, unambiguously
revealing the classification of the child as a deficient being. But the overwhelming silence
of children reveals that even when children are not explicitly discussed as “animals” or
appetitive “creatures,” even when they are formally acknowledged as persons (as they are
by Kant and Rawls), they are still not actively recognized as such. This is clear, for
example, in considerations of the rights and interests of persons in political and moral
realms (such as Rawls’s well-ordered society and Kant’s commonwealth). In these
discussions children go missing or simply are not seen as relevant factors for
consideration. The child does not surface in these discussions as a person worthy of
consideration and respect in his own right, but rather, as a being-to-be-transformed.
Covered over by strategies of control, he is a totalized child, always approached by the
adult as a problem to be solved.
Schapiro’s work is not novel for its silencing of the child—she follows a well
trodden path in the Western philosophical canon. Rather, Schapiro’s contribution comes
in the form of a more refined explanation for the child’s silence:
Childhood as I have described it is a condition in which the
personhood of the person, her capacity to have a mind and a
voice of her own, is as yet ill constituted. On this view, the
idea that children are people who have to be raised does not
simply mean that they need to be trained and informed; it
means, quite literally, that they need to be brought out of the
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animal state in which they begin their lives…Children need,
in other words, to establish the constitutions on the basis of
which the words and deeds they produce will come to count
as exercises of their own wills.135
If the child qua child does not possess a rational will, if he has no authoritative voice to
be heard, then his silence in moral and political realms necessarily follows. Having no
voice of his own the child cannot be consulted in matters concerning his own education
and development, nor can he contribute to the moral and political deliberations of the
adult (that being who unquestionably does possess a rational will or voice). Rather, the
adult must relate to the child as he would to any other being lacking a rational will, such
as the mentally ill or clinically depressed.136 He must choose on the child’s behalf in
paternalistic fashion, acting in accord with what his wishes would be if he were a rational
and autonomous adult. The condition of the child is akin to these deficient conditions
insofar as it, too, is an “alienating condition,” one in which a person lacks the ability to
make fully autonomous choices and, thus, in an important sense, lacks a “self.”137
Conceiving of childhood as akin to a mental illness, as a form of madness or
disease (as can be found in the work of philosophers ranging from Aristotle and Plato to
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Schapiro, “Childhood and Personhood,” 589. Prior to establishing this constitution, the
“motivational apparatus” in children is “governed largely by instinct, and…this prevents them
from establishing their own perspective” (“Childhood and Personhood,” 591). The child is not
devoid of will insofar as he can “produce” actions and, from an early age, “has the capacity to
form and express very definite opinions” (“Childhood and Personhood,” 586, 583). But these
actions and opinions are not fully representative of the child insofar as his will is not fully
liberated from “nature’s rule.” Until the child gains a rational will (and is fully liberated from
nature’s rule), adults view the child’s claims as possessing only a “provisional” force (“Childhood
and Personhood,” 590).
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For a discussion of the place of mental and physical disability in liberal political
philosophy see Barbara Arneil’s “Disability, Self Image and Modern Political Theory,” Political
Theory 37 (1999).
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Rawls and Schapiro) prescribes a specific mode of approach to the child; namely, just as
the diseased require treatment to be cured, so, too, the child must receive treatment from
the adult. In the case of the child these treatments come in the form of education for
autonomy and various strategies of control, progressively curing the child of his deficient
condition. In comparison to the severely mentally retarded and severe forms of mental
illness, the child is fortunate—he can be cured of his condition, he can become the adult
and abandon his deficient condition.
We have arrived, then, at an account of childhood as a deficient state of being
akin to a disease, “an obstacle to morality” fit for elimination by the adult.138 This
characterization can be placed alongside the account of childhood as an animalistic state
of being. As we have seen, the child is often discussed as a creature that remains close to
nature, not yet free from the grasp of natural impulse and desire. Taken together, the
condition of childhood as disease or animalistic state calls for the intervention of the
ideally moral and political adult, the human person that has mastered his animalistic
impulses and no longer suffers from an ill-constituted autonomy:
The adult, qua adult, is already governed by a constitution, so
to speak—a unified, regulative perspective which counts as
the expression of her will…An adult, in other words, is one
who is in a position to speak in her own voice, the voice of
one who stands in a determinate, authoritative relation to the
various motivational forces within her.139
This ideal conception of the adult—one possessing unhindered autonomy and
unidirectional control over impulses and desires—serves as “a standard relative to which
certain agents can count as undeveloped” and guides us in “treating deviant conditions
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[childhood] as the deviations they are.”140 Unlike the child, the law of the adult’s will is
firmly in place such that he possesses the “requisite critical perspective” (or “basic
structure”) to arbitrate between his desires and act in accord with political and moral
obligations.141
At this point, I want to turn critical attention to Schapiro’s ideal conception of the
adult and her consequent estimation of the child as a deficient being. It is important to
recognize Schapiro’s equivocation between the ideal adult and the actual adult (those
classified as adults in the everyday world). On Schapiro’s account “our everyday concept
of an adult…just is that of a full person in Kant’s sense.”142 That is, those persons
classified as adults in the everyday world (actual adults) are classified as such in virtue of
their developed rationality, autonomy, and ability to act as the “ultimate source” of their
“words and deeds” (the qualities of ideal adults).143 Thus, Schapiro is not simply
developing an ideal concept of the adult that lacks relevant application to adults in the
world. Rather, Schapiro’s discussion assumes that adults just are human persons that
realize the qualities of this ideal conception. Schapiro’s adult (both as the ideal and in the
world) is “governed” by a rational constitution, possesses a “unified, regulative
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Schapiro, “What Is a Child?,” 737. For Schapiro, our “everyday concept of an adult”
and Kant’s ideal concept of the “full person” are congruent. Schapiro writes, “our everyday
concept of an adult, I want to claim, just is that of a full person in Kant’s sense. To treat someone
like an adult is to treat her as the ultimate source of her words and deeds, as the final authority to
whom those words and deeds are attributable…an adult is the source of her beliefs and actions in
the sense that she authorizes them” (“Childhood and Personhood,” 588).
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perspective,” and “stands in a determinate, authoritative relation” to impulses and desires
as they arise.144
It is in relation to this dual conception of the adult (one that equivocates between
the ideal and the actual) that Schapiro classifies the child as a deficient being. Unlike the
adult, Schapiro notes, the child inhabits early stages of development and is less mature in
relation to the mature adult.145 But the deficient status of the child is not limited to
biological or developmental immaturity. Rather, as compared to Schapiro’s concept of
the adult, the child’s deficiencies also cross over into moral, educational and sociopolitical realms. Developmental distinctions between adults and children, then, are but
one factor among many taken up in support of the hegemony of adulthood, a broader
thread of discourse that presents adulthood not merely as one life phase among others,
but rather, as an ideal, as a distinct value-end in reference to which the existence of all
other persons is explained and deemed valuable (insofar as they are “steps” toward this
end state). Here, the adult-child distinction does not act as a mere dividing line for the
ontological or biological division between the child and the adult. Adulthood is not
merely that condition which is not childhood; rather, adulthood is as much a normative
evaluation as an ontological classification. In effect, adulthood is presented as a state of
being that conditions and is superior to all others.
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Within this discourse adulthood is presented as a static end, a state of being
achieved by the human person once and for all such that growth and development cease.
Adulthood is a state of being free of existential upheaval, identity crises, or unresolved
motivational conflicts, characterized instead as a time of completed development,
independence, unhindered autonomy, and rationality. This conception brackets (or simply
ignores) plausible interpretations of “child” and “adult” as fluid categories, present within
a person to various degrees throughout one’s development in the human life cycle.146
Instead, searching for an identity (or a “voice”) and forming a deliberative perspective is
presented as the exclusive work of the child, whereas the adult has (assumedly) already
completed these tasks. Fully secure in identity and deliberative perspective, the adult can
devote himself to other activities such as participation in moral and political affairs. In
effect, adulthood and childhood are presented as rigidly separate, fixed phases of the
human life cycle, with philosophers such as Rawls and Schapiro presenting the
achievement of adulthood as equivalent to ascending to the pinnacles of humanity, never
to look back again—freedom, rationality and autonomy have been achieved and the
developmental cycle has ended. By uncritically accepting this conception of adulthood a
vast expanse is opened between those who are classified as adults and, conversely, all
Others—beings who have yet to (or that never will) achieve this ideal status, such as the
non-human animal, the mentally ill, and the child.
Within the hegemony of adulthood we do not understand adulthood as one life
phase among others, replete with modes of being both unique to it and shared within the
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continuum of the life cycle147; rather, we are presented with an adulthood that is wholly
distinct from childhood, a superior end state toward which all development aims. Given
this evaluative sense of adulthood, the child is imbued with a negative value,
“developing” to the extent he takes on the (assumedly) exclusive traits of the adult—
independence and autonomy, rationality and morality. Childhood is not a robust state of
being, comprised of unique interests and concerns or significant modes of engagement
with the world. Rather, childhood is simply not adulthood. Out of numerous potential
modes of conceptual approach to this state of being childhood is presented as best
understood by analogy to non-human animals and mentally ill adults, conditions that
depart from the normative ideal of adulthood. Within the hegemony of adulthood such a
characterization of childhood is obvious, even a matter of common sense. If adulthood is
uncritically accepted as a wholly distinct, ideal condition then it follows without question
that non-adults (in all forms) are deficient beings.148 We need only determine the extent
of the deficiency at hand.
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Like other developmental models, conceptions of the human life cycle can be
informed by a normative teleology. One could develop a conception of the human life cycle that
presents the child as a deficient start to the cycle and the adult as the ideal completion of the
cycle. Constructed in this fashion, a conception of the human life cycle would not radically depart
from the stage model of moral developmental as presented by Lawrence Kohlberg (see Section
3.1 below). However, unlike a stage model of moral development, a conception of the human life
cycle can avoid drawing rigid, linear boundaries between the conditions of the child and adult.
For example, on many psychoanalytic accounts of the human life cycle (as evident to some extent
in Erik H. Erikson’s “The Eight Ages of Man”) the condition of adulthood is never fully
separated from the condition of childhood. Rather, the adult must refer back to and continue to
develop in light of the formative experiences of childhood. Thus, on this conception the adult qua
adult has not completed his development once and for all, but rather, is still in the process of
developing (whereas for Kohlberg the child is in need of development and the adult is the end of
development).
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Section 3: Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg
In the previous section I began to outline a discourse on the child and the adultchild distinction emerging from contemporary Western liberal philosophy. As present in
the work of Rawls and Schapiro a discursive hegemony of adulthood presents adulthood
as an ideal, fully developed state of being that is rigidly distinct from childhood (and
other forms of non-adulthood such as the non-human animal, the mentally retarded, and
the mentally ill). Adulthood is presented as a value-end, an optimal end-point for human
development in relation to which childhood is deemed deficient. Biological distinctions
between adults and children—primarily in terms of cognitive maturity—are taken up
within this account as supporting sharp political and moral divisions between adults and
children.149 Further, the adult is discussed as one possessing the unhindered autonomy,
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once achieved, adulthood is treated as if it is a distinct kind, as rigidly separate from all
conditions prior to it. On the basis of this hard distinction, Rawls and Schapiro can claim that
adults are moral and political agents, while children are not; that adults have been liberated from
the rule of nature, whereas children are still within its grasp; that adults are possessed of rational
wills, while children are irrational. In the work of Rawls and Schapiro, similar distinctions are
made between the adult and the mentally ill (for example, see Theory, 249, 510, and “Childhood
and Personhood,” 584-585) and, we can assume, would hold between the adult and aged persons
to the extent they are “not themselves,” i.e., no longer in possession of a rational will.
149

Although Rawls does not discuss the child’s biological development in detail, his
account of moral development “takes up” (that is, “discusses” or “adopts a discussion of”) a thin
account of the child’s biological growth and development. To say that the child is “not in a
position to reject precepts on rational grounds” (Theory, 464), that he “cannot comprehend the
larger scheme of right and justice” (Theory, 466), and that he lacks “the intellectual skills
required to regard things from a variety of points of view” (Theory, 468-469) is to say (among
other things) that he is lacking cognitive maturity (a biological category that, in turn, is deployed
in the service of normative distinctions between the adult and child). Ultimately, the child’s lack
of cognitive maturity informs his exclusion as a moral and political agent in the Theory (Theory,
249). It is also important to note that Rawls’s account of moral development is largely influenced
by the moral and cognitive developmental work of Piaget and Kohlberg. Schapiro’s concern with
empirical, biological elements of the child’s development is evident in the following passage: “it
helps to notice a very general empirical fact about the way human beings develop. Our capacity
to reflect upon our perceptual and motivational impulses develops gradually. Thus, those at the
very beginning of human life, infants, are in an important respect more like nonhuman animals
than they are like adult human beings…But somewhere along the way between infancy and
adulthood, or perhaps at every point along the way, human beings develop the capacity to
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the will (or “voice”) required for political and moral agency, whereas the child, in his
animalistic or “diseased” state, lacks these traits (or, at most, possesses them in
impoverished form).
It is here that developmental psychology comes to play a significant role in the
discourse on the child as located in contemporary Western liberal philosophy. There is a
reciprocal or mutually reinforcing relationship between, on the one hand, the account of
the child in the developmental psychology of canonical figures such as Jean Piaget and
Lawrence Kohlberg and, on the other, the ethical and political work of Kant, Rawls, and
Schapiro. Piaget and Kohlberg provide scientific legitimacy (with all the epistemological
strength this entails in contemporary Western society) for the liberal philosopher’s
account of deficient children and ideal adults. Regarding the child as morally (as well as
intellectually and politically) deficient, Kohlberg describes moral development in terms
of a continuum of naturally occurring stages. The child is associated with early, deficient
stages of moral agency whereas the adult is associated with higher, optimal stages. In
turn, this cognitive developmental, stage-based account of moral maturation hinges on
philosophical, normative conceptions of moral agency. Kohlberg characterizes the
“highest” stage of moral development as the realization of the ideal moral agency of the
Western liberal philosophical tradition (especially as presented by Kant and Rawls)—the
rational, autonomous orientation of the adult acting from general, universalizable moral
principles.
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demand reasons of themselves and of others—both reasons for belief and reasons for action”
(“Childhood and Personhood,” 588-589). I take it that, like Rawls, Schapiro is here referring to
biological processes in the child’s growth and development and his eventual achievement of the
human capacity for reason. Until the child develops in this sense, he is excluded from moral and
political realms of activity, as is evident throughout Schapiro’s work in her discussion of the child
as deficient in reason (“Childhood and Personhood,” 575).
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Taken together, these psychological and philosophical discourses present a
formidable regime of truth, a psycho-philosophical account of moral development as
originating with the deficient child and naturally proceeding to the liberal adult.150 On
this account liberal adulthood is not simply a desirable state of being, it is the universal
end point of moral evolution. Failure to achieve this end is a failure to follow a natural,
universal course of development. Thus, this psycho-philosophical account of
development strengthens the historically grounded place of the child in Western
philosophy as a deficient being, ostensibly offering scientific justification for his
classification as deficient and calling for a necessary relationship of reform to the child
through moral education.
3.1: A Naturalistic Account of the Deficient Child
Although my primary focus in this section is the moral developmental work of
Kohlberg and its reciprocal relationship to the discourse on the child in Western liberal
philosophy, we should begin with a discussion of Piaget’s work in The Moral Judgment
of the Child. Piaget was immensely influential for Kohlberg and the fields of
developmental and educational psychology as such insofar as he pioneered cognitive
developmental investigations of the child.151 What is more, Piaget provides a substantive
link between Western liberal philosophy and developmental psychology. Heavily
influenced by Kant’s moral theory, Piaget discusses morality in terms of respect for rules
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discussions of the child’s development in Rousseau’s Emile, and, to a lesser extent, in Aristotle’s
Ethics.
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and persons with his empirical account of children’s moral development terminating in
the achievement of a “sense of justice” and “rational mentality.”152 In conjunction with
his increasingly rational and moral orientation the child comes to prioritize autonomy,
equality, and reciprocity in his engagement with others.
Piaget’s greatest contribution to the field of moral development came in the form
of identifying the origins of moral obligation in children (primarily male children153) and
the evolution of this moral sense through natural “stages” of development. “Morality,”
Piaget contends, “consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be
sought for in the respect which the individual requires for these rules.”154 Piaget locates
the origin of children’s respect for moral rules in their experience of the juridical
complexity of games (specifically, the game of marbles). Like the system of morality (as
Piaget defines it), children’s games are constituted by a formal system of rules in relation
to which children take on evolving modes of judgment and relations of respect:
The rules of the game of marbles are handed down, just like
so-called moral realities, from one generation to another, and
are preserved solely by the respect that is felt for them by
individuals. The sole difference is that the relations in this
case are only those that exist between children. The little
boys who are beginning to play are gradually trained by the
older ones in respect for the law; and in any case they aspire
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Piaget’s child research subjects are male in the vast majority of cases. Ch.1, Section 7
of Moral Judgment contains Piaget’s most extensive discussion of moral development in female
children. Piaget notes, “the most superficial observation is sufficient to show that in the main the
legal sense is far less developed in little girls than in boys. We did not succeed in finding a single
collective game played by girls in which there were as many rules and, above all, as fine and
consistent an organization and codification of these rules as in the game of marbles examined
above [played by boys]” (Moral Judgment, 77). For more on Piaget’s (and Kohlberg’s) exclusion
of females from moral developmental research see Carol Gilligan’s In A Different Voice.
Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
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from their hearts to the virtue, supremely characteristic of
human dignity, which consists in making correct use of the
customary practices of a game. As to the older ones, it is in
their power to alter the rules. If this is not ‘morality,’ then
where does morality begin? At least, it is respect for rules,
and it appertains to an enquiry like ours to begin with the
study of facts of this order.155
By analyzing children’s practice and consciousness of game rules in conjunction with
their broader moral judgments (in response to hypothetical moral dilemmas) Piaget
uncovers a parallel between the child’s sense of obligation to game rules and moral rules
(for example, obligation to abide by rules against playing out of turn and rules against
lying or cheating).156 In both cases, the child’s development can be schematized in virtue
of distinct stages. Beginning with a deficient mode of understanding all rules as
emanating from adults and akin to physical laws—as external to the individual and
unchangeable—the child advances to developed agency as he takes on an increasingly
rational and autonomous mental orientation toward rules and, in turn, a progressive
respect for rules as the product of autonomous deliberation and cooperative discussion
between peers. In short, with advances in age, cognitive development, and increased roletaking opportunities in social interactions, the early provisional morality of the child
gives way to higher forms of reasoning, respect, and moral judgment, moving the child
from a morality of heteronomy to a morality of autonomy.157 It is to the significant (and
disparate) elements of these moralities that I now turn.
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Piaget’s research focuses on the child’s theoretical moral judgments in relation to
hypothetical dilemmas (as opposed to a child’s practical moral thought or his affective response
to hypothetical dilemmas). Piaget acknowledges the limitations of his research given its narrow
focus on theoretical moral judgments. For example, see Moral Judgment, 112, 135, 174-177, 274.
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In early infancy the child is not consciously aware of rules as such. The infant is
primarily engaged in individualistic motor activity, developing basic habits and ritualized
schemas of action.158 At this developmental stage factors essential for rule formation—
reciprocal imitation, consciousness of obligation, and “submission to something superior
to the self”—are absent.159 But with the advance of age the child enters the social realm,
the dominant focus on individualistic motor schemas yielding to engagement with others
in the child’s environment. Outside of familial interactions, the social realm is
particularly prominent for the young child in the form of game play with peers and the
external constraint of rules within these institutions.160 At this stage of development the
child’s mental orientation toward rules is thoroughly heteronomous, an orientation that
pervades his sense of moral obligation as well—game rules and injunctions against lying,
cheating, and stealing alike are completely external to the child, perceived as “sacred and
untouchable” laws emanating from adults (or older peers).161 This morality of
heteronomy is the product of two primary factors: the child’s primitive mental orientation
and his inherently unequal interactions with adults. Given the young child’s limited
cognitive development he fails to distinguish between the subjective contents of his mind
and external, objective realities. For the young child these distinct realities are conflated,
resulting in the contents of consciousness being mistaken for (or understood as akin to)
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realities independently existing in the physical or social world.162 What is more, the
child’s unequal interactions with the adult—interactions of constraint and unilateral
respect—reinforce his spontaneous realism, causing it to carry over into his
understanding of moral rules. The rules laid down by the adult are external to the child
and are interpreted as part of the world-order, as indubitable and obligatory as the law of
gravity.163 Having little understanding or internal motivation to follow these rules the
child simply accepts them as objective realities of the world:
Being therefore a realist in every domain, it is not surprising
that the child should from the first ‘realize’ and even ‘reify’
the moral laws which he obeys. It is forbidden to lie, to steal,
to spoil things, etc.—all, so many laws which will be
conceived as existing in themselves, independently of the
mind, and in consequence independently of individual
circumstances and intentions…The child, up to the age of
about 7-8, always regards the notion of law as
simultaneously moral and physical.164
But the child is not forever confined to this primitive mentality and deficient
understanding of obligation. The child evolves, progressing beyond a “morality of
external rules” to a morality of autonomy and “sense of justice,” thereby setting the
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necessary condition of the universe” (Moral Judgment, 189). For the young child, then, the act of
lying necessarily incurs punishment in the same sense an object necessarily falls to the ground
due to the law of gravity.
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ground for the development of full moral agency in adulthood.165 This evolution is
constituted by the child’s advancing cognitive abilities—the ability to reason formally
and understand general principles—as well as his increased social interaction with peers
in the form of cooperation and mutual respect (as opposed to the constraint and unilateral
respect characteristic of early adult-child relations).166 These interactions are imbued with
reciprocity between peers and, in turn, the emergence of autonomy as the “fruit of a
mutual engagement” in children’s societies.167 Piaget writes:
From henceforward a rule is conceived as the free
pronouncement of the actual individual minds themselves. It
is no longer external and coercive: it can be modified and
adapted to the tendencies of the group. It constitutes no
revealed truth whose sacred character derives from its divine
origin and historical permanence; it is something that is built
up progressively and autonomously…it is from the moment
that it replaces the rule of constraint that the rule of
cooperation becomes an effective moral law.168
This transition—from the primitive to the precipice of full morality—can be tracked as a
“law of evolution in the moral development of the child”:169 the young child experiences
obligation as external constraint based in foreign, coercive laws authored by the adult.
But as he grows older, developing in reason and accumulating social interaction, the child
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begins to resemble the autonomous adult, acting both as “sovereign and legislator” in the
formation of rules and guided by a rational “inner law.”170
We see, then, that heteronomy and autonomy act as opposing poles of the child’s
moral evolution.171 From a primitive morality and understanding of the world the child
naturally evolves to the borders of adult morality, advancing toward a rational,
autonomous condition that characterizes moral agency in Western liberal ethical theory
(as found, for example, in the work of Kant and Rawls). Piaget’s task is not that of
discussing adult, fully formed moral agency, but rather, that of tracing the “psychological
origins” of this morality, one that culminates in the values of justice, equality, and
reciprocity in the adult.172 As Piaget writes, “if we want to form men and women, nothing
will fit us so well for the task as to study the laws that govern their formation.”173 At the
conclusion of The Moral Judgment of the Child the biological and social origins of the
morality of autonomy have been located—we now have an understanding of the child as
naturally progressing to a morality of autonomy through cognitive and moral stages.
Normal children will advance to a sense of justice and understanding of rational moral
laws; “backward children” are those who fail to advance along these rational, liberal
lines.174
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In the Theory Rawls leans heavily on Piaget’s account of cognitive and moral
development, adopting significant elements of Piaget’s work in his own discussion of the
child’s transition from a morality of authority (or in Piaget’s terms, the morality of
heteronomy) and association to that of a morality of principles (the morality of
autonomy). Through Piaget’s work (in part), Rawls inherits an empirical, naturalistic
foundation for his claims of the stability of his conception of justice—children just do
develop toward rational and autonomous agency such that, as adults, they would adopt
and support the two principles of justice.175
But despite his influence on Rawls (and Western liberal accounts of child
development more generally) Piaget’s work does not substantiate the hegemony of
adulthood on its own. For one, Piaget’s project is incomplete insofar as he does not
devote substantive attention to the telos of moral development in Western liberal
theory—the morality of the adult. Piaget’s analysis does not depart from the realm of the
child, focusing instead on development within “children’s societies” and “the point of
view, not of the adult conscience, but of child morality.”176 It is true that Piaget’s work
provides the resources to identify the biological and social origins of Western liberal
moral agency, but it is left to others to provide detailed analysis of the finished product—
the rational, autonomous adult with a fully developed sense of justice. Second, the
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Assumedly, Rawls need not worry about the “backwards child” in the well-ordered
society. At any rate, he does not consider any cases of children incapable of developing into the
rational adult possessed of a sense of justice. The absence of this consideration is in line with
Rawls’s general failure to theorize the place of the mentally ill or disabled in the just state. Rawls
writes, “the problem of those who have lost their realized capacity temporarily through
misfortune, accident, or mental stress can be regarded in a similar way [as dealt with via
principles of paternalism]. But those more or less permanently deprived of moral personality may
present a difficulty. I cannot examine this problem here, but I assume that the account of equality
would not be materially affected” (Theory, 510).
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naturalistic foundation provided by Piaget is not sufficient to ground the hegemony of
adulthood. Simply put, Piaget fails to mark the rigid conceptual and developmental
distinction between the adult and child required within this discourse. As Piaget writes,
“there is an adult in every child and a child in every adult” with the main difference being
that “there exist in the child certain attitudes and beliefs which intellectual development
will more and more tend to eliminate.”177
Piaget does discuss moral and cognitive development in terms of distinct “stages”
and these structural reorganizations of the child’s cognitive, social, and moral
orientations are presented as marking the child’s progress toward the agency of the
adult.178 But despite his reliance on a stage model of development Piaget wavers on the
ontological status of stages and calls into question the possibility of a stage functioning as
a rigid point of separation between the adult and the child. Piaget openly questions
whether stages are objective features of human development or, rather, subjective
analytical devices for divining conclusions from empirical data on the child. Ultimately,
Piaget adopts a stage model conception of development for methodological purposes but
he is forthcoming about the limitations of his approach:
These stages must of course be taken only for what they are
worth. It is convenient for the purposes of exposition to
divide the children up in age-classes or stages, but the facts
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Piaget, Moral Judgment, 85. Also see 96, 257. Of course, Piaget is not concluding that
the adult and child are one and the same. Rather, he is using “adult” and “child” to refer to
elements of their shared moral psychology. Piaget writes, “after having tried to describe the
child’s mentality as distinct from the adult’s we have found ourselves obliged to include it in our
descriptions of the adult mind in so far as the adult still remains a child. This happens particularly
in the case of moral psychology, since certain features of child morality always appear to be
closely connected with a situation that from the first predominates in childhood…but which may
recur in adult life, especially in the strictly conformist and gerontocratic societies designated as
primitive” (Moral Judgment, 84-85).
178
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present themselves as a continuum which cannot be cut up
into sections. This continuum, moreover, is not linear in
character, and its general direction can only be observed by
schematizing the material and ignoring the minor oscillations
which render it infinitely complicated in detail.179
But where Piaget wavers, Kohlberg does not, advancing an account of culturally
universal and invariant stages of cognitive and moral development.180 Kohlberg begins
from the foundation set by Piaget in The Moral Judgment of the Child, adopting a focus
on moral development as development in moral judgment (as opposed to an emotional
state or behavior).181 For both Piaget and Kohlberg moral judgments evince an
underlying logical structure, a form that can be discerned (for the purposes of their
research) by focusing on an individual’s responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas and
conflict situations.182 In turn, these forms of judgment can be evaluated for moral and
logical adequacy and classified within a stage of moral development. Adopting a Kantinspired formalism, Kohlberg classifies moral judgments as deficient when issuing from
situated, heteronomous concerns centering on punishment and reward, affective ties
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Piaget, Moral Judgment, 27-28. Also see 85, 87, 130, 156, 267. In some cases Piaget
uses the term “process” (Moral Judgment, 124, 175, 195-196) or “attitude” (Moral Judgment,
160, 284) in place of “stage,” though he does not abandon characterizing the child’s moral and
cognitive development in terms of stages.
180

I will focus on two volumes of Kohlberg’s work: Essays on Moral Development,
Volume 1. The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice; and
Essays on Moral Development, Volume 2. The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature
and Validity of Moral Stages (San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984).
181

For Kohlberg’s focus on moral development in terms of the development of moral
judgment see Essays, Vol. 1, 136-138, 145; Essays, Vol. 2, 282. For Kohlberg’s discussion of
Piaget’s influence on his own work see Essays, Vol. 1, preface, xvii, 16, 116, 145; Essays, Vol. 2,
225. Like Piaget, Kohlberg also focuses his research on male subjects (see Essays, Vol. 1, 16;
Essays, Vol. 2, 188).
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within relationships, and approbation within a given community.183 By contrast,
advanced forms of moral judgment reveal an internal, principled orientation to moral
conflict, imbued with higher-order reasoning, impersonality, universality and ideality in
the evaluation of moral conflict.184 For both Piaget and Kohlberg, the advanced moral
agent evaluates moral situations (that is, unresolved conflicting claims between persons)
in a formalistic, rational manner, authoring moral judgments informed by the logic of
justice:
The most essential structure of morality is a justice structure.
Moral situations are ones of conflict of perspectives or
interest; justice principles are concepts for resolving these
conflicts, for giving each his or her due…Justice is the
normative logic, the equilibrium, of social actions and
relations.185
Just as cognitive development is indicated by an agent’s logical reasoning ability and
application of concepts such as reciprocity, reversibility, and equality in scientific
domains of understanding, moral development is evidenced by an agent’s logic of justice
and the application of these same concepts to conflicts in the moral realm.186 There is a
“parallelism or isomorphism between the development of the forms of logical and ethical
judgment” such that an individual’s moral judgments (governed by a justice and roletaking orientation) presuppose parallel stages of intellectual development (governed by a
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For Kohlberg’s discussion of Kant’s influence on his work and conception of
developed moral agency see Essays, Vol. 1, 164, 170-171; Essays, Vol. 2, 183, 225, 248, 251,
253.
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Kohlberg, Essays, Vol. 2, 184.
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logico-mathematical orientation).187 In the moral realm these forms of development
collectively culminate in the rational, autonomous agent who grasps the “core of
justice”—the achievement of social and moral equilibrium in conflicts by applying an
equal and reciprocal distribution of rights and duties.188
By uniting his account of moral development with Piaget’s account of cognitive
development, Kohlberg attempts to identify a parallel, natural trajectory of moral
evolution, an “invariant” and “culturally universal” path of development.189 Prior to
Kohlberg’s work on moral development Piaget argued that advanced logical reasoning is
the culminating point of cognitive development in all fully developed human persons.
Beginning with primitive forms of reasoning in early childhood—sensorimotor and
concrete operational thought—the human person advances to the formal operational
thought of adolescence and adulthood, expressed in its highest form in the Western
scientific orientation to the world (as opposed to the mystical and superstitious mental
orientation of “lower grades of civilization” and “primitive societies”).190 Building on
Piaget’s work, Kohlberg points to a parallel, universal process of development in the
moral realm: human persons begin with logically deficient, heteronomous forms of moral
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
187

Kohlberg, Essays, Vol. 1, 136; Essays, Vol. 2, 171-2, 245, 248.
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Kohlberg, Essays, Vol. 2, 184.
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Kohlberg, Essays, Vol. 1, 20, 23-25, 122-3, 126; Essays, Vol. 2, Ch. 8-9. Kohlberg
contends that “anyone who interviewed children about moral dilemmas and who followed them
longitudinally in time would come to our six stages and no others” (Essays, Vol. 2, 195.) Part of
Kohlberg’s support for this claim—and his discussion of culturally universal, invariant stages of
moral development in general—comes from his longitudinal moral developmental studies in the
United States of America, Mexico, Taiwan, Turkey, the Yucatan, and Israel.
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For Piaget’s discussion of “primitives” see Moral Judgment, 251, 262. For the
influence of Piaget’s theory of cognitive developmental on Kohlberg’s theory of moral
development see Essays, Vol. 1, 136-138, 145.
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judgment and advance toward the ideal traits of the Western liberal adult (as represented
in the work of Rawls and Kant).191 This developmental process is schematized in three
distinct levels of moral reasoning and judgment—the preconventional (Stages 1 and 2),
the conventional (Stages 3 and 4) and the postconventional (Stages 5 and 6)192—forming
a moral developmental trajectory that, Kohlberg contends, is “universal for all
children.”193 Advanced moral agents are rational, autonomous adults, capable of
abstracting away from their situated condition and interpersonal relationships to deploy
“universal and impersonal” principles of moral judgment:
At Stage 6 people have disentangled judgments of—or
language about—human life from status and property values
(Stage 1); from its uses to others (Stage 2); from
interpersonal affection (Stage 3); and so on; they have a
means of moral judgment that is universal and impersonal.
Stage 6 people answer in moral words such as duty or
morally right and use them in a way implying universality,
ideals and impersonality. They think and speak in phrases
such as ‘regardless of who it was’ or ‘I would do it in spite of
punishment.’194
Regardless of race, culture, or class, all children begin with a primitive understanding of
morality in terms of heteronomous concerns, such as the preconventional interpretation of
justice as punishment and reward or the conventional understanding of justice as
equivalent to the will of an authority figure. But given the advance of age and, with it, the
progress of cognitive development and increased exposure to moral conflicts, children
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Kohlberg, Essays, Vol. 1, 164-165, 192, 197, 201.
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Discussion of these moral developmental levels and corresponding stages can be
found in numerous sections of Kohlberg’s work. For examples, see Essays, Vol. 1, 16-19; Essays,
Vol. 2, 172-177.
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develop into models of Western liberal adulthood, fully realizing a conception of justice
in terms of universal ethical principles.195
This is not to say that all individuals will realize a fully developed morality of
autonomy (postconventional morality). On the contrary, in his later work Kohlberg
acknowledges that few individuals reach the highest, principled stages of moral
development.196 Nonetheless, the “Universal Ethical Principle Orientation” (Stage 6)
remains as the ideal telos of Kohlberg’s account of moral development, conditioning the
moral quality of all prior stages and demarcating the morally deficient child from the
morally advanced adult (one who, even if never achieving Stage 6, is closer than the child
to the ideal moral state of being).197 Although the child may never reach the apex of
moral development he must, as far as is possible, be led to this ideal end:
A very genuine although four-year old sense of
justice…contains within it the Stage 6 sense of justice in
shadowy form. The problem is to draw the child’s
perceptions of justice from the shadows of the cave step by
step toward the light of justice as an ideal form…Children
who turn from the dark images of the cave toward the light
are at first still convinced that the dark images best represent
the truth. Like Meno’s slave, children are initially quite
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Kohlberg cites the categorical imperative as a primary example of a universal ethical
principle (Essays, Vol. 1, 17-19).
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Although he does not abandon Stage 6 morality as the standard and measure for all
other moral stages (as well as the moral agency of individuals classified by those stages),
Kohlberg drastically scales back his claims of individuals actually achieving this highest stage of
morality. Whereas in Essays, Vol. 1, Kohlberg references numerous examples of individuals at
Stage 6 (22, 27, 207) in Essays, Vol. 2, Kohlberg backs away from these claims. Kohlberg writes,
“we no longer claim that our empirical work has succeeded in defining the nature of a sixth and
highest stage of moral judgment. The existence and nature of such a stage is, at this moment, a
matter of theoretical and philosophical speculation and further empirical data collection” (215).
Also see Essays, Vol. 2, 224, 270, 273.
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confident of their moral knowledge, of the rationality and
efficacy of their moral principles.198
Whatever confidence children place in their moral principles and concerns is misplaced
as authentic, fully developed moral agency only comes with the “eventual adult
attainment of the highest stage.”199 To become a moral agent the child must depart from a
“shadowy” state of intellectual and moral deficiency (childhood) and ascend to the moral
agency of the rational, autonomous adult.
Within Kohlberg’s developmental model both the ideal standards of adult moral
agency and the ideal form of morality as justice are appropriated from the normative
moral theory of Kant and Rawls.200 Serving as the standard and measure of Kohlberg’s
empirical account of moral development, liberal normative accounts of moral agency
directly inform the conceptualization of the child as a deficient being and, in turn, the
conceptualization of the adult as the ultimate end of moral development. In turn, the
hegemony of adulthood—a discourse permeating the Western philosophical tradition—
has now (ostensibly) gained epistemological strength within the Western scientific realm:
the liberal philosopher is empirically justified in dismissing the moral agency of children
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Kohlberg, Essays, Vol. 1, 47. Kohlberg contends that the process of cognitive and
moral development is invariant and universal, but it can be advanced or hindered by social
conditions and certain forms of education for moral development. For example, see Essays, Vol.
1, 27.
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Kohlberg, Essays, Vol. 1, 91.
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For Kohlberg there is an isomorphic relationship between the projects of Western
liberal moral philosophy and developmental psychology: “Our work on ethical stages has taken a
philosophical notion of adequate principles of justice (represented especially in the work of Kant
and Rawls) to guide us in defining the direction of development…The isomorphism assumption
is a two-way street. Moral philosophical criteria of adequacy of moral judgment help define a
standard of psychological adequacy or advance, and the study of psychological advance feeds
back and clarifies these criteria” (Essays, Vol. 1, 194). For more on the reciprocal relationship
between the normative philosophical work of Kant and Rawls and the empirical psychological
work of Kohlberg see Essays, Vol. 1, 165, 192, 195. 197.
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and in classifying the child as a deficient being. Following Kohlberg, this classification is
no longer primarily bound up with the broader political and moral interests of
philosophers; rather, it is an objective classification, stemming from the child’s natural
place within the cognitive and moral developmental schema.
Conclusion
We have seen that philosophers such as Kant, Rawls, and Schapiro dismiss the
moral agency of the child, rigidly separating the deficient (or animalistic and diseased)
condition of the child from the ideal, rational, and autonomous condition of the adult. In
turn, the adult’s relation to the child is one of reform—the adult’s task is that of leading
children out of their deficient (nonideal) condition toward liberal, fully developed
adulthood. With Kohlberg’s naturalistic account of moral development, this normative
account of the deficient child, the ideal adult, and the resulting conception of adult-child
relations ostensibly gains substantial strength. As seen through the lens of this
developmental model the normative distinctions between the adult and the child offered
by Kant, Rawls, and Schapiro (and the Western liberal philosophical tradition more
generally) become objective, natural divisions in the human species. Following Kohlberg
one can claim that the “scientific facts” demonstrate that there is a “universal ontogenetic
trend toward the development of morality as it has been conceived by Western moral
philosophers”201 On Kohlberg’s account, liberal adulthood just is the universal end point
of moral evolution, an ideal state of being separated from the child by an expanse of
developmental stages. Given that the child has not realized adulthood—the biological and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
201

!

Kohlberg, Essays, Vol. 1, 178-180, 105.

$'+!

!
evaluative end of this developmental model—he is classified, both naturally and
normatively, as a deficient being.
The historical account of the child in Western philosophy as a deficient being—
familiar to us from the philosophical canon ranging from Plato to Rawls—is now
advanced via (ostensibly) scientific justification. As understood in the moral theory of
Kant, Rawls, and Schapiro and, now, as empirically demonstrated by Kohlberg, the child
is a deficient being in need of reform. Adult morality (and the condition of adulthood as
such) represents a distinct, biological, and normative advance beyond its childish
precursors. In order to become a moral agent—or, what is more, in order to develop
naturally—the child must shed his deficient condition and become the liberal adult.
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CHAPTER III
RECONSIDERING THE CHILD: VOICE, RECOGNITION, AND THE
DECONSTRUCTION OF THE HEGEMONY OF ADULTHOOD
Introduction
In Chapters 1 and 2 I examined the place of the child in the work of major figures
in the Western philosophical tradition ranging from Plato to Rawls. Throughout the
history of Western philosophy—both in the ancient and modern eras—the child is
approached as the non-adult and being-to-be-transformed. That is, the child is
conceptualized in ethical and political discussions as a being lacking (or possessing in
primitive form) the positive traits of the ideal adult and, in turn, as a being that must shed
his deficiencies and take on the moral and socio-political norms of the adult. Insofar as
the child is new—born into the world devoid of the norms and traditions of the adult—he
is potentially dangerous and is in need of control and reform. The conceptualization of
the child as non-adult and being-to-be-transformed continues in contemporary Western
philosophy, most notably in liberal ethical and political thought. In the work of Rawls
and Schapiro, the child is still understood through a negation of the positive traits of the
ideal adult. And, for Rawls, discussion of the child continues to be motivated by the
concern to create an ideal state and citizenry. In conjunction with the cognitive
developmental work of Piaget and (especially) Kohlberg, the hegemony of adulthood
crystallizes in contemporary accounts of the child. Adulthood is regarded as the valueend of a person, serving as both the normative standard for all other moral developmental
states and the natural end point (telos) of moral evolution.
!
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further and present a critical response to the conceptualization of the child in Western
philosophy. My critique of the Western philosophical concept of the child is not confined
to its presence within canonical texts (as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2). Rather, having
revealed the dominant conception of the child as deficient being, in this chapter I point to
the material relevance of this concept for those classified as children. That is, I contend
that the Western philosophical account of the child is problematic and ought to be
rejected insofar as it informs the adult’s relation to (and, ultimately, the production of)
children as deficient beings. If the paradigmatic concept of the “child” (one deployed by
philosophers and accepted throughout Western culture) designates a deficient being,
lacking moral and political possibilities,1 those classified as children are excluded from
moral and political realms of human activity. In virtue of his classification, the child—as
discussed within the canon and, ultimately, as existing in the world—is “subjected” to the
corrective strategies of the adult and the restricted field of action proper to a deficient
being (one that excludes possibilities for authentic moral and political experience). 2
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By “moral and political possibilities” I mean the ability to act morally and politically
and/or possess authentic moral and political concerns. The child is often regarded as possessing a
potential for moral and political activity that is actualized once the child becomes the adult. But
until the child becomes the adult, he is not (qua child) recognized as possessing positive ability or
concern in moral and political realms.
2

My use of the term “subjected” is influenced by Foucault’s use of the terms “subject”
and “subjection” in “The Subject and Power” in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and
Hermeneutics, eds. Hubert L Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1983). Foucault states that there are two meanings of “subject”: to be “subject to someone else by
control and dependence…[or] tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge” (212).
Foucault refers to “struggles against these forms of domination” as “struggles against subjection”
(212). I regard the child’s deficient classification as informing his subjection to the corrective
strategies of the adult (such that he sheds his deficiencies by becoming the adult), as well as his
subjection to a pathological identity (such that he accepts his identification as a being without
moral and political possibility).
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Following this analysis—one informed by Michel Foucault’s work on power,
knowledge, and the production of human subjects3—we will better understand the child
as a subjected being that originates at the intersection of the ethical and political interests
of canonical figures and the continuing maintenance of the hegemony of adulthood. Only
after accounting for the birth of the deficient child within this network of ends, tactics,
and power-knowledge relations can we offer substantive resistance to this production.
Only then can we begin to move beyond accounts of the child that, from the start, harbor
assumptions as to his deficient status and begin to consider different possibilities for the
child.
But let me be clear: in departing from the discourse on the child in Western
philosophy, I will not repeat the mistake of insisting on (or assuming) an essentialist,
monolithic vision of the child. The Western philosophical canon is littered with such
attempts, ones that often serve the interests of the adult and/or subsume attributes of
children (as distinct individuals) within the concept of a totalized (animalistic, appetitive,
innocent, etc.) Child. Instead, I will focus on delimiting necessary conditions for
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Foucault’s understanding of the human subject is best understood in reference to his
discussion of power, knowledge, and discourse. Foucault’s focus on the human subject is meant,
in part, to contest the privileged place of the autonomous, sovereign individual as represented in
Western philosophy. As opposed to this conception of the individual, Foucault discusses the
individual as a subject; he is never free of subjection to a specific network of discourse,
knowledge, and power “which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality,
attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and
which others have to recognize in him” (“The Subject and Power,” 212). For example, the
delinquent, although a human person or individual, is a subject insofar as he is classified by
others through a field of knowledge surrounding delinquency, is taken up in discourse as a
delinquent, and, further, comes to understand himself and his possibilities in reference to this
classification (delinquency). The subject, then, is a kind of human person (whether the
delinquent, the sexually perverted child, the mad, or the sane) constituted within networks of
knowledge, power, and discourse. For more on the formation of the human subject, see Section 1
below.
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reconsidering the possibilities of the child.4 I contend that reconsidering the child’s moral
and political possibilities requires an antecedent examination of the concept of the “adult”
and the deconstruction of the hegemony of adulthood. There is little possibility for
fundamentally different accounts and treatment of the child—beyond his status as the
non-adult and being-to-be-transformed—if adulthood continues to be identified (or,
structurally linked) with the ideal state of human existence.5 By deconstructing the
hegemony of adulthood (which presents adulthood as an ideal, value end of human
existence, a condition of completed development that is rigidly separate from childhood)
I intend to create the conceptual and practical space within which the child can be
considered apart from this tradition.6 In that space, I contend, we can counter the silence
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By “necessary conditions for reconsidering the possibilities of the child,” I mean those
conditions that set the ground for alternative accounts of the child’s state of being. As I contend
below (Section 3) we cannot fully reconsider the possibilities of the child without contesting the
hegemony of adulthood. That is, rather than attempting to contest the child’s deficient
classification by insisting that the child is essentially “rational” or “moral,” we should deconstruct
the image of the adult in reference to which the child is regarded as deficient in the first place.
After doing this we can move forward to consider the child apart from his deficient relation to the
adult. We will then be in position to begin work on a rival conception of the child. This
dissertation does not complete the task of developing a new concept of the child. However, it sets
the ground for this work and, in doing so, makes a significant contribution to reconsidering the
child.
5

Many of the figures considered in this dissertation do not regard adulthood per se as the
ideal state of existence. For example, for Plato and Aristotle, sagehood, or the virtuous life is the
ideal state of existence. For Rousseau, a particular form of natural freedom is the ideal state.
However, being an adult is a necessary condition of the achievement of these states and, in this
sense, there is a structural link between being an adult and inhabiting the ideal state of existence.
Only adults can inhabit the ideal state of existence, even if some adults do not inhabit the ideal
state of existence. None of the figures considered in this dissertation would allow that a child
could achieve this ideal state (that is, until the child becomes the adult).
6

As I contend below (Section 3.1), a significant aspect of deconstructing the hegemony
of adulthood involves rejecting the structural link in Western philosophy between adulthood and
moral and political existence. Insofar as the concept of a moral and political agent refers to adults
(and excludes children), children are conceptually excluded from consideration as moral and
political agents and are treated as morally and politically deficient beings. But after
deconstructing the hegemony of adulthood, the structural link between adulthood and moral and
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imposed on children throughout the Western philosophical canon. We can begin to listen
for the voices of children and recognize them, perhaps for the first time, in their distinct
identities and moral and political locations.7
Section 1: Producing Subjects: The Sexually Perverted Child and the Delinquent
The child occupies a paradoxical place in the Western philosophical canon. On
the one hand, the child is consistently characterized in negative terms. As a deficient
being, the child is often overlooked, remaining silent in moral and political realms wholly
populated by adults. On the other hand, the child is a major preoccupation for
philosophers, surfacing in a multitude of canonical texts from the Republic to A Theory of
Justice. As we have seen, the child most often emerges as the subject of strategies of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
political agency will no longer be maintained. We will have created the “conceptual space” to
reconsider the concepts of moral and political agency and the possibility of their extension to
beings that are not adults. In turn, if the adult is no longer the sole bearer of moral and political
agency, then we will have opened a new “practical space” for different forms of engagement with
the child. That is, if the child’s moral and political possibility is now an open question (given that
moral and political agency are no longer assumed to be exclusive traits of the adult), we have
reason to consider interacting with children in different ways—for example, we might begin to
listen to children’s concerns or engage them in moral and political discussion in order to grasp the
extent of their moral and political possibilities (whereas previously they were simply not-adults,
and, thus, not moral and political beings).
7

Throughout this dissertation I have discussed the “silence” of children in the Western
philosophical canon. First, children are silent in the canon insofar as they are absent in moral and
political discussions. The figures considered in this dissertation do not regard children as active
participants in these moral and political realms. Nor do they devote significant attention to what
just treatment of the child would entail or how goods should be distributed with respect to
children. Second, in this chapter I consider a second form of the child’s silence—the silence of
actual children insofar as they are governed by the deficient classification of the child. That is, if
children are regarded as deficient moral and political beings, then they will not be listened to or
consulted in moral and political matters by adults. Instead, the adult will necessarily speak for the
child as a deficient being. Children, then, are “silenced” both in the canon and, in turn, in the
world. In response to this tradition and corresponding treatment of children, I argue that we
should begin to listen to the “voices” of children, both in theory and practice. We listen to the
voices of children in theory by devoting more attention to the child’s place within theories of
morality and justice, both by reconsidering the child’s agency in these realms and adult
obligations to children. We listen to the voices of children in practice insofar as we listen to actual
children in the world as they engage in moral and political realms of action, or simply by ceasing
to exclude children from philosophical, moral, or political discussions.
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control, education, and moral and political development. In turn, these strategies serve as
conditions of possibility of broader ethical and political aims, such as the formation of the
ideal state and its population of ideal citizens. The child, then, is torn between two
locations—a location of deficiency and obscurity and a location of prominence and
instrumentality.8
At this point I want to focus on the deficient child as produced at the intersection
of these locations. The deficient child is a production insofar as he does not pre-exist the
discourse on the child in Western philosophy. That is, he is not a being found in the
world (as a natural kind) and documented by various philosophers, but rather, is produced
within and by specific educational, moral and political discourses and strategies.9 A
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More specifically, the child’s “obscurity” in the Western philosophical canon is largely
determined by his agential irrelevance. That is, the child is not considered in moral and political
discussions given that he is not a moral and political agent in his own right. As such, he is not
regarded as a relevant point of consideration in these discussions (as are rational, moral and
political adults). But this is not to say that the child is absent from the canon. As is evident in
Chapters 1 and 2, the child occupies a “prominent” position in the canon insofar as he frequently
surfaces in discussions of education and development. If the child is deficient, he is also the
starting point for the broader moral and political projects of the figures in question. The child
occupies a position of structural significance in canonical works, making possible the formation
of the ideal adult or state.
9

To be clear, I am not claiming that the child—whether understood as a natural or social
kind—cannot be found in the world. Nor do I contest the possibility of providing thin naturalistic
accounts of the child. For example, it is possible to describe a child, in part, as a biologically
immature instance of the human species. Rather, my concern centers on the application of the
“natural” to the child as described in the Western philosophical canon. Recall that the child of
Western philosophy is discussed as naturally innocent and pure, as well as naturally appetitive
and animalistic. Although these traits are presented as “natural” (as essential attributes of the
child, merely awaiting description by the adult), I contend that these qualities take shape or “show
up” for the adult in virtue of a specific mode of approach to the child. For one, it is always the
adult that determines the child’s “natural” qualities. And given that the adult is assumed as the
norm of human development, the standard of moral and political agency, and the ideal instance of
humanity as such, the child appears to the adult as a deficient being. In this sense, the deficient
child is not “natural” (representing what the child essentially is), but rather, is a production that
cannot be understood apart from the adult’s position of power and normative standing in relation
to the child. In the Western philosophical canon, this production is perhaps most evident in the
educational, moral, and political discussions of the adult philosopher. Although the child is
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specific mode of understanding children qua deficient subjects—as beings that exist to be
invested with the ethical and political projects of the adult—has formed within the
institution of Western philosophy as evident in the work of major figures spanning the
tradition.
My understanding of the deficient child as a produced being (and, in part, my
understanding of the means of this production) has affinities with the later work of
Michel Foucault, particularly in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison and The
History of Sexuality, Vol. I.10 A primary focus of Foucault’s work in these texts is to
develop the “history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are
made subjects.”11 Previously nonexistent subjects are created through shifting discursive
conditions and networks of knowledge and power, with kinds of individuals (human
subjects) emerging as effects of these relations.12 Part of the value of Foucault’s work lies
in his attempts to disentangle these complex relations, revealing the paths of production
of subjected individuals, such as the sexually perverted child and the delinquent. Within
and through their production, the perverted child and the delinquent become possible
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presented as naturally deficient, his deficiencies are malleable and shift in relation to the needs
and concerns of the adult. These are usable deficiencies, posited by the philosopher such that,
when corrected or reformed, they lead to the realization of his moral and political ends. For more
on this point, see Section 2 below.
10

Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan
(New York: Vintage, 1995); The History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert
Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990).
11

Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 208.

12

See page 97 of Foucault’s “Two Lectures,” trans. Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale
Pasquino, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin
Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980). Foucault writes, “we should try to discover how it is that
subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of
organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts etc. We should try to grasp subjection in
its material instance as a constitution of subjects.”
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objects of knowledge and sites for the extension of power relations. As delimited kinds of
persons (the sexually perverted individual or the delinquent individual), they can be
recognized, documented, discussed, and subjected to the corrective interests of others.
What is more, these subjects can come to understand and evaluate themselves (as
perverted, as delinquent) in virtue of their subjection. Three, interrelated concepts are
essential for understanding the processes and effects of subjectification: power,
knowledge, and discourse. I will now turn to a brief discussion of these concepts,
followed by examples of their application in the production of the sexually perverted
child and the delinquent.13
In The History of Sexuality, Vol. I, Foucault presents an account (or “analytics”)
of power in opposition to common, “juridical” representations of power in modern
political thought.14 Foucault advances the historical claim that “since the classical age the
West has undergone a very profound transformation of…forms of power.”15 Prior to the
seventeenth century, juridical power (in the form of the law that prohibits or the rights of
the sovereign over his subjects) was the major form of power in the West.16 But since the
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Ultimately, I contend that Foucault’s methodology—his analysis of the production of
human subjects and the relations of power, knowledge, and discourse immanent to these
productions—is useful in understanding the production of the deficient child (see Section 2
below). This is not to say that the deficient child is coextensive with the sexually perverted child.
These subjects are distinct, both in terms of their historical point of origin and the distinct
relations of knowledge, power, and discourse providing for their production.
14

Foucault, History of Sexuality, 82, 87.

15

Foucault, History of Sexuality, 136.

16

Foucault writes, “perhaps this juridical form of power must be referred to a historical
type of society in which power was exercised mainly as a means of deduction (prélèvement), a
subtraction mechanism, a right to appropriate a portion of the wealth, a tax of products, goods and
services, labor and blood, levied on the subjects. Power in this instance was essentially a right of
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seventeenth century, this form of power has gradually receded, giving way to a radically
different form of power. Juridical power has become the “counterpart” of a form of
power—“bio-power”17—that does not primarily function as a power of death and
restraint, but rather, as a power that “exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to
administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive
regulations.”18
In its paradigm representations, juridical power cannot account for the exercise of
modern, bio-power. Juridical power takes the shape of the law that prohibits, the
sovereign that punishes, or the state that represses a citizen body.19 It is a power that can
be possessed by an individual (or group) and wielded unilaterally against those without
power, forcing them to obey.20 Perhaps the most striking feature of this account of power,
Foucault contends, is that it has “only the force of the negative on its side, a power to say
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seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize
hold of life in order to suppress it” (History of Sexuality, 136).
17

Foucault refers to the modern era as “an era of ‘bio-power’” (History of Sexuality,
140). “Bio-power” (or a “power over life”) takes two primary forms: First, it is a power that
centers on the human body, primarily exercised through various disciplines (such as the school,
the military, or the hospital) that make the body docile while increasing its utility. Second, it is a
power that centers on regulating the greater population, supervising “biological processes” and
conditions of birth, death, and health. Foucault refers to these “two poles” of bio-power as (1) an
anatomo-politics of the human body and (2) a bio-politics of the population. See History of
Sexuality, 139.
18

Foucault, History of Sexuality, 137.

19

Foucault, History of Sexuality, 85. Foucault writes, “whether one attributes to it the
form of the prince who formulates rights, of the father who forbids, of the censor who enforces
silence, or of the master who states the law, in any case one schematizes power in a juridical
form, and one defines its effects as obedience.”
20
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no; in no condition to produce, capable of only posting limits.”21 Thus, juridical power
cannot account for forms of subjugation apart from prohibition and repression; it cannot
account for power in its positive, productive forms. In his attempt to develop a richer
account of power, Foucault departs from a juridical power “poor in resources” and
“monotonous in the tactics it uses.”22 Instead, he examines a modern form of power that
is irreducible to the representation of law.23 That is, power qua power relations, broad
networks or fields of force relations that, brutally or subtly, are always at work in human
interactions, producing subjects and investing persons as objects of knowledge. Foucault
writes:
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of
power in negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it
‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact,
power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of
objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge
that may be gained of him belong to this production.24
To better understand Foucault’s rejection of juridical accounts of power (as
wholly negative in their effects) we can consider the positive nature of power relations as
deployed in the production of knowledge of human subjects and as transmitted in
discourse. Foucault contends that power does not function apart from knowledge, nor

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21

Foucault, History of Sexuality, 85. The full quotation reads: “It [power] is defined in a
strangely restrictive way, in that, to begin with, this power is poor in resources, sparing of its
methods, monotonous in the tactics it utilizes, incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed
always to repeat itself. Further, it is a power that only has the force of the negative on its side, a
power to say no; in no condition to produce, capable only of posting limits, it is basically antienergy.”
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 85.
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 85.
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Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 194.
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does knowledge function independently of power. Rather, power functions in the
production of truth and the accumulation of knowledge relies on relations of power:
We should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to
imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power
relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only
outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests. Perhaps
we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that,
by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the
conditions of that knowledge. We should admit rather that
power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging
it because it serves power or by applying it because it is
useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one
another; that there is no power relation without the
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the
same time power relations.25
Together, power and knowledge form a strategic unity (“power-knowledge relations”)
best understood in their situated forms of operation.26 In any society, a vast network of
power relations—broadly understood as a “chain” or “net-like organization” of force
relations27—conditions (among other things) one’s identity, social status, and possibilities
of action. We can see this most clearly within specific grids of power-knowledge
relations, for example, those that have “crystallized” in the form of disciplines such as the
human sciences and their supporting institutions.28 On the basis of these systems, certain
individuals can be classified as scientific “experts” or “specialists”; they are coded with a
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Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 27-28.
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For Foucault’s methodological focus on situated, localized forms of power-knowledge,
see “Two Lectures,” 96-97; History of Sexuality, 98; and “The Subject and Power,” 219.
27

Foucault, “Two Lectures,” 98.

28

Much of Foucault’s work on power/knowledge—in texts such as Discipline and Punish
and The History of Sexuality—occurs in conjunction with an analysis of the formation and
operation of the human sciences. For example, see Discipline and Punish, 305-306. For
Foucault’s use of the term – “crystallized” – see “The Subject and Power,” 222.
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legitimized form of knowledge capable of deployment through the specialized tactics of a
scientific methodology (observation, statistical analysis, treatment, etc.). Both this status
(scientific expert or specialist) and the power-knowledge system that serves as its
condition of possibility create a “field of knowledge” within which specific kinds of
objects can be known (via specific tactics of observation, analysis, or treatment). The
primary object of the human sciences (the human subject) emerges from a field of
knowledge that is not separate from relations of power, but, on the contrary, that follows
upon “the advances of power, discovering new objects of knowledge over all the surfaces
on which power is exercised.”29 In short, it is because certain individuals and institutions
are distributed within a network of power-knowledge relations as capable of speaking the
truth of an Other that others can emerge as spoken for. With a unified network of power
and knowledge in place, a correlative field of subjects become possible, a field in which
power-knowledge relations “invest human bodies and subjugate them by turning them
into objects of knowledge.”30
Far from being exclusively repressive or prohibitive, then, power and knowledge
(which, again, are coextensive in their operation) function positively in the creation of
kinds of individuals as “submissive subjects.”31 Discourse is a necessary condition of the
emergence of subjected individuals insofar as “it is in discourse that power and
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Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 204.
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Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 28. Also see 155, 194.
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Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 295.
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knowledge are joined together.”32 We can think of discourse (or a “discursive
formation”) as a specified body of knowledge that “transmits and produces power,”
providing power relations with increased points of application within a society.33
Foucault writes:
In any society, there are manifold relations of power which
permeate, characterize and constitute the social body, and
these relations of power cannot themselves be established,
consolidated nor implemented without the production,
accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse.
There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain
economy of discourses of truth which operates through and
on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the
production of truth through power and we cannot exercise
power except through the production of truth…In the end, we
are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our
undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying,
as a function of the true discourses which are the bearers of
the specific effects of power.34
In their relationship to networks of power, discourses are productive (as opposed to
merely descriptive) practices, capable of acting as both the “instrument and effect” of
power-knowledge relations:35 as instrument, spreading the surface of power-knowledge
relations (via a legitimized field of knowledge) and thereby making “possible the
formation of a whole group of various objects”;36 and, as effect, formulating the truth of
these newly formed objects. For example, by classifying certain persons as “deviants”
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 100. For Foucault’s most comprehensive account of
“discourse” see The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York:
Pantheon, 1972).
33

Foucault, History of Sexuality, 100-101. For Foucault’s use of the term – “discursive
formation” – see The Archaeology of Knowledge, 38.
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Foucault, “Two Lectures,” 93-94.
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 101.
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Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, 44.
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who must be examined, treated, and spoken for, a discourse immanent to the human
sciences (such as psychology) also defines their subjection.37 It structures a “possible
field of action” for the deviant human subject (what he is capable of; what ought to be
expected of him); it “governs” him insofar as he is recognized by others as deviant; and,
further, it subjects him to a pathological self-identification insofar as he comes to
recognize himself (and his possibilities) in virtue of this identity.38 The deviant originates
in what it is possible to say of him and, ultimately, is governed by what he can say of
himself.
To concretize our understanding of power, knowledge, and discourse as related to
the production of human subjects, we can look at two examples from Foucault’s work:
the production of the sexually perverted child and the delinquent. In The History of
Sexuality, Vol. I, Foucault counters a dominant narrative concerning the relationship
between power and sex throughout the modern era. The “repressive hypothesis” holds
that, beginning in the seventeenth century and increasing throughout the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, sex was increasingly “repressed” and “prohibited”;39 it was “driven
out, denied, and reduced to silence,” only recognized in certain legitimized or tolerated
forms (such as the procreative couple and the brothel).40 Foucault disputes the repressive
hypothesis and its maintenance of repression as “the fundamental link between power,
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For a discussion of my use of the term “subjection,” see footnotes 2-3 above.
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Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 221.
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 10.
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 3-5.
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knowledge and sexuality since the classical age.”41 Without doubt, restrictions and
prohibitions have been placed around sex—rules of propriety and restrictions on rhetoric
have attempted to silence sex, while “deviant” forms of sexuality (the homosexual, the
zoophile, the pederast) have been subjected to strategies of prohibition and reform. But
the repressive hypothesis provides for an understanding of sex and sexuality as natural
kinds, as realities that power must “hold in check,” and that knowledge must gradually
“uncover.”42 On Foucault’s account, sex and sexuality are “historical construct[s]” that
do not predate the strategies of repression and the relations of power, knowledge, and
discourse giving rise to them.43 Developing an account of the “deployment” or
“production” of sexuality (as opposed to its mere identification and repression), Foucault
writes:
We are compelled…to accept three or four hypotheses which
run counter to the one on which the theme of a sexuality
repressed by the modern forms of society is based: sexuality
is tied to recent devices of power; it has been expanding at an
increasing rate since the seventeenth century; the
arrangement that has sustained it is not governed by
reproduction; it has been linked from the outset with an
intensification of the body—with its exploitation as an object
of knowledge and an element in relations of power.44
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 5. Foucault’s “classical age” spans roughly the 17th and
18 centuries.
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 105.
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 105.
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 107. For Foucault’s use of the terms “production” and
“deployment,” see History of Sexuality, 105-106.
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Far from being consigned to a “shadow existence,” then, Foucault contends that sex
(since the seventeenth century) has been tirelessly “transformed” into discourse.45 In
areas such as medicine and pedagogy, sex has been a constant preoccupation (not a
silenced reality)—a primal soil for the production and dispersion of “peripheral
sexualities” that, in turn, must be sought out, studied, and controlled.46 Through the
multiplication, identification, and consolidation of these sexualities, power-knowledge
relations have gained additional points of application, penetrating further into the social
body to regulate forms of perversion and modes of conduct.
The sexually perverted child (or the “masturbating child”) originates as a “localcenter” of power and knowledge within this multiplication of discourses on sex and
peripheral sexualities.47 At first glance it might seem that (Freud aside) a “general and
studied silence” was imposed upon children’s sexuality throughout the modern era.48 If
adult sexuality was masked, children’s sexuality was veiled all the more. But this silence
is pierced by a multitude of institutional discourses on the child’s sexuality—discourses
that ultimately provide for the emergence (as a distinct personage) and subjection of the
sexually perverted child. The perverted child is known (and constituted as a possible
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 35, 23, 105-107. This is not to say that sexuality literally
“becomes” or is “converted” into discourse. Rather, the point is that sexuality is put into
discourse (perhaps, “discursified”) such that it can become a possible object of constraint and
repression and provide for the proliferation of points of application for power-knowledge (such as
the “aberrant sexualities” identified in the form of the sexually perverted child or the hysterical
woman).
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 30, 48, 105.
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 104-105. Also see Foucault’s Abnormal. Lectures at the
Collège de France, 1974-1975, trans. Graham Burchell, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (New York:
Picador, 2003), 59.
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object of knowledge) through a discursive “implantation” of perversions. For example,
we can consider the emergence of concerns regarding child masturbation in the
nineteenth century. Medical, psychiatric, and pedagogical discourses of this era presented
child masturbation as “an epidemic that needed to be eradicated,” as a “dangerous”
perversion present to all children.49 On the basis of these discourses (and the
institutionalized grids of power-knowledge relations supporting them), the masturbating
child—a subject gripped by his dangerous sexual activity—became knowable, constituted
as both an “object of analysis” and a “target of intervention.”50
From the moment he became known in discourse, the perverted child became
subject to greater manifestations of power: the doctor must now study the child in order
to track down the origins (and eventual repercussions) of his perversity; the teacher must
educate the child as to the dangers of his “sin” and submit the child to projects of
reform;51 the parent must constantly watch the child and, what is more, bring him to
confess those secret acts that escape surveillance. The multitude of concerns and
strategies centering on the child’s sexuality were not mere steps in a process of
repression, but rather, surface elements of the formation of a human subject—the
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 42, 104.
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 26.
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Foucault, History of Sexuality, 27-29, 41-42. In this instance, Foucault uses the term
“sin” to describe the fault at issue. This sense of the child’s fault carries a religious connotation, a
failure of the soul to choose virtue over vice. Foucault mentions this sense of the child’s fault as
located in the contexts of religious confession and, to a lesser extent, the school (History of
Sexuality, 19-20, 29). But an essential aspect of Foucault’s account of the child’s sexuality (and
sexuality in general) is its eventual “implantation” in the body such that the source of a sexual
perversion or fault can be medicalized and treated as a matter of pathology and illness (as
opposed to a matter of sin and salvation). The child’s sexuality is no longer (primarily) a matter to
be confessed to the priest, but a defect in the body to be sought out, treated, and controlled by the
medical professional or pedagogue.
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sexually perverted child—as a localized site for the extension of power-knowledge
relations. The child’s body became something to be managed and administered by others
(the doctor, the teacher, the parent); it became a site for “the operation of a subtle
network of discourses, special knowledges, pleasures, and powers.”52 The child is made
subject to, on the one hand, strategies of knowledge and power immanent to medicine,
pedagogy, and the family and, on the other hand, his self-identification as a perverse
being in need of reform. Constituted as sexually perverse, the child ultimately comes to
embody his classification. The child is bound up in a form of power which “categorizes
the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity,
imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to
recognize in him.”53
Foucault’s discussion of the delinquent serves as another example of the
production of a submissive subject within an institutionalized network of power,
knowledge, and discourse. In Discipline and Punish Foucault provides a genealogy of
punishment, beginning with the torture and public execution common to the classical age
and culminating in the modern carceral system. The transformation of punishment is
constituted by interrelated shifts in penality and power. Foucault identifies a historical
transition away from classical punishment as a “ceremonial of sovereignty.”54 This form
of punishment marked the presence of the sovereign (and the “truth” of a crime) on the
tortured body through “excessive pains, spectacular brandings” and “the ritual of public
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execution.”55 In contrast to classical punishment, modern punishment functions as a
“technique of improvement,” a means to “correct, reclaim” and “cure” the offender.56
These disparate forms of punishment reveal (and operate on the basis of) a parallel shift
in techniques of power. In contrast to the spectacle of “sovereign power” and its visible,
violent manifestations, the modern era is marked by a subtle, more pervasive,
“disciplinary power”—a technique that constitutes the individual as an object of
knowledge and instrument for the greater exercise of power.57 Unlike the criminal of the
classical age, the “disciplinary individual” is not confined to the rack, nor placed upon the
scaffold. Instead, he is enclosed (and becomes knowable) within a web of scientific
discourses that describe, judge, and measure him so as to provide for his classification,
correction, and normalization.58
The delinquent is a particular kind of disciplinary individual that originates within
the modern penitentiary apparatus and its project of “unceasing discipline.”59 The
manifestations of sovereign power were as haphazard as they were spectacular, punishing
certain offenders (while leaving others untouched) and yielding uncertain results (ranging
from greater allegiance to the king to public outcry and revolt). In contrast to the
deployment of sovereign power, the birth of the prison marks the institutionalization of
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an efficient, continuous power to punish. The architectural design of the prison locates
the convict in a “field of visibility” such that he never escapes the reach of observation,
nor the interventions of power.60 This architectural design and its corresponding effects
of power are best understood in terms of the “Panopticon,” a model of the prison that
provides for the unceasing observation, and, in turn, subjection of prisoners.61 Within the
panoptic prison, prisoners and their cells are distributed around a central observation
tower such that they can always be seen, but can never see their observer. In virtue of its
design, the Panopticon induces “in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent
visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.”62 Subjected to a constant
visibility, the prisoner is no longer primarily controlled through force or constraint.
Instead, the prisoner “assumes responsibility for the constraints of power” and becomes
“the principle of his own subjection.”63 Further, within the panoptic prison the prisoner
can be subjected to precise regulations (of behavior and movement, of expression, of
labor, etc.) culminating in a “total education” that seeks to impose a “new form on the
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Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 200-201. Foucault makes clear, however, that the
function of the Panopticon and its effects of power and knowledge are not confined to the
architecture of the prison. Rather, the Panopticon serves as a general model for the functioning
and effects of disciplinary power in the modern era. Foucault writes, “The Panopticon…must be
understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of
the everyday life of men…The Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building: it is the
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(Discipline and Punish, 205).
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perverted individual.”64 In short, the panoptic prison functions as a “disciplinemechanism” that does not (primarily) torture and exclude the offender, but rather, that
constantly includes him in a controlled and “useful training.”65
These modern techniques of observation, training, and correction constitute a new
form of punitive relation to the offender. Within the penitentiary apparatus the criminal is
no longer merely a body to be tortured or a threat to be overcome. Rather, as the focus of
a detailed plan of conduct and constant surveillance a “body of knowledge” accumulates
around the inmate and transforms him into “an individual to know.”66 It is at this
moment—when the inmate is “constituted himself as the object of possible
knowledge”—that the figure of the delinquent begins to “substitute” for the convicted
offender.67 The latter committed a crime and is delivered to the prison, but the
penitentiary operation—as understood in its attempts to know, control, and reform the
offender—applies itself not to the juridical offence, but rather, to the psychological
causality (the “soul of the criminal”68) that gave rise to it. Behind every criminal act lies a
“biography” to be read, a path of “sordid detail” to be analyzed, or a “syndrome” to be
discovered.69 On the basis of this approach (and the power-knowledge relations
sustaining it) the delinquent—a distinct personage “existing before the crime and even
outside it”—emerges as a pathological subject “linked to his offence by a whole bundle
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of complex threads (instincts, drives, tendencies, character).”70 Once defined, the
pathological state of delinquency provides a “whole horizon of possible knowledge” for
criminology and the human sciences.71
In turn, the formation of delinquency provides for greater applications of power,
both in the prison and within the social body. The doctor, psychiatrist, and warden (as
distributed within the prison and broader penitentiary apparatus) must collectively trace
delinquency back to its origins, define its variations, compare it with other pathological
states, and, as far as is possible, submit it to regulation. Insofar as he is known as a
dangerous being, the delinquent must be controlled and subjected to precise interventions
of power (isolating him from others, prescribing his schedule of activity each day,
subjecting him to constant surveillance). And insofar as he is known to suffer from a
pathological condition (delinquency), these punishments must simultaneously function as
a “treatment,” with their effects “inscribed among the discourses of knowledge.”72
But knowledge of delinquency is not confined to the prison; it is spread over the
surface of the social body, allowing for the specification of a “delinquent milieu” that
must be sought ought, studied, and controlled.73 Delinquency is not merely a target of
penal repression, then, but rather, a strategic classification, capable of being invested and
extended by power-knowledge relations. Foucault writes:
One should not see in delinquency the most intense, most
harmful form of illegality, the form that the penal apparatus
must try to eliminate through imprisonment because of the
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danger it represents; it is rather an effect of penality (and of
the penality of detention) that makes it possible to supervise
illegalities. No doubt delinquency is a form of illegality;
certainly it has its roots in illegality; but it is an illegality that
the ‘carceral system’, with all its ramifications, has invested,
segmented, isolated, penetrated, organized, enclosed in a
definite milieu, and to which it has given an instrumental role
in relation to other illegalities…For the observation that
prison fails to eliminate crime, one should perhaps substitute
the hypothesis that prison has succeeded extremely well in
producing delinquency, a specific type, a politically or
economically less dangerous – and, on occasion, usable –
form of illegality.74
The production and specification of delinquency provides for the creation of a correlative
“field of illegal practices.”75 Once recognized (or implanted) within the social body, these
illegalities can be used to extend relations of knowledge and power. They can be
analyzed and supervised by legitimized experts (such as criminologists and
psychologists); and, as knowledge of delinquency expands, so does its potential threat
(which calls for further response). Far from the penitentiary, delinquency surfaces as the
“faceless enemy” of society that must be searched out in “the slightest illegality, the
smallest irregularity, deviation or anomaly.”76 The penitentiary technique—which
emerged coextensively with the formation of knowledge and control of delinquents
within the prison—now extends into society to pursue its own production via a
“generalized policing” and “perpetual surveillance of the population.”77
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And while it is left to the criminologist or psychiatrist to determine the figure of
the delinquent in the social field, it is left to each individual to question his own position
in relation to this pathological state. As with the formation of the sexually perverted
child, the production of delinquency makes it possible for each individual to inhabit this
classification and become “the principle of his own subjection.”78 By interrogating his
own potential for delinquent acts or seeking treatment for criminal desires, the individual
serves as an element of the material constitution of delinquency and is distributed within
the continuing play of power-knowledge relations surrounding this production. Whether
in the prison, as subjected to psychological analysis, or, more commonly, by evaluating
himself and his possibilities in relation to a norm of legality, the individual can now be
“governed” by the classification of delinquency.
Section 2: The Production and Problem of the Deficient Child
Following Foucault, we have seen how previously nonexistent subjects can be
formed within institutionalized networks of discourse, knowledge, and power. A complex
of discourses (medical, psychological, pedagogical, and penal) condition the historical
emergence of the sexually perverted child and the delinquent—kinds of subjects that
crystallize in the world as objects of analysis and targets for interventions of power. By
and within their formation, the sexually perverted child and the delinquent are subjected
beings: subjected to material relations of power (from corrective strategies of the doctor
and pedagogue to tactics of discipline found in the prison) and, what is more, to their selfidentification and interaction with these pathological conditions (as perverse, as
delinquent). To the extent individuals inhabit (or are confined to) these classifications
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they are effectively constituted as subjects, governed by the plans and intentions of
others, the power-knowledge relations sustaining them and, ultimately, by their
assumption of a pathological identity.
Foucault’s account of the production of human subjects can help us gain further
insight into the fundamental problem of this project—the deficient child. Like the
sexually perverted child and the delinquent, the deficient child is a historical formation,
originating within relations of discourse, knowledge, and power immanent to the Western
philosophical canon. That is to say, the deficient child is not a natural kind; he is not
found in the world and described by philosophers (or, for that matter, by developmental
psychologists). Rather, I contend that both the child and his deficiencies take shape
within and in relation to the moral, political, and educational discourses of figures
ranging from Plato to Rawls.79 In virtue of his classification, the child—as discussed
within the canon and, ultimately, as existing in the world—can be subjected to both the
corrective strategies of the adult and the restricted field of action proper to a deficient
being (a field of action that, among other things, excludes possibilities for authentic
moral and political experience).
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To understand the subjection of the deficient child we must return to the origins of
his formation as a distinct personage in Western philosophy. Like the delinquent, the
child of Western philosophy is an “institutional product,”80 capable of recognition (as a
knowable individual) through a discursive implantation of deficiencies. From Plato to
Schapiro, children are constituted as a deficient class of humanity, identified through
their possession (or, in some cases, their lack) of the following qualities: the child is
animalistic and appetitive, guided in his conduct by desire, pleasure and pain; the child is
irrational and incomplete, lacking the developed reason and autonomy (or will) to
comprehend and authentically participate in moral and political affairs; the child is
dangerous, a novel being that threatens the norms of the adult and traditions of the state;
the child is naïve and innocent, a being that must be made docile in order to preserve his
purity; and, finally, the child is nonideal, classified in virtue of his deviation from the
ideal, evaluative end of adulthood.
These classifications of the child have shifted throughout the canon, just as
conceptions of childhood have changed throughout the West generally.81 Regardless of
their similarities as, say, irrational and appetitive beings, the child of Plato and Aristotle’s
polis is not identical to the child of Kant’s commonwealth and Rawls’s well-ordered
society. Rather, these children are distinct historical formations, bound up in the specific
moral, political, and pedagogical projects of the philosopher in question. For example,
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consider Plato and Kant’s accounts of the child: Plato’s child lacks the just constitution of
the adult (the soul governed by reason), instead possessing an animalistic nature (the soul
governed by its appetitive element). In order to become the virtuous adult citizen—and,
in turn, make possible the ideal polis—the child must be subjected to precise regulations
of social and educational control (via games, song, stories, and surveillance). Through the
deployment of these corrective measures the child will shed his deficient, dangerous
nature and become the virtuous adult. Kant, too, broadly characterizes the child as an
animalistic and appetitive being. Nonetheless, Kant’s child is a distinct historical
formation birthed from a specific set of philosophical concerns. In contrast to Plato,
Kant’s child does not possess a disordered soul, nor is he understood through his
subjection to mousike and gumnastike (musical and physical education). Rather, Kant’s
child is primarily characterized by the absence of the autonomy, freedom, and
independence of the adult. The child now inhabits a passive state of existence and
becomes active insofar as he acquires the ideal, rational nature of the adult. In order to
transform the child into a full person—an active member of the commonwealth and
potential member of the kingdom of ends—he must develop in reason and undergo a
moral education in virtue of which he becomes capable of self-legislation (acting out of
duty to the Moral Law) and rational engagement with others.
Reviewing Plato and Kant’s children alongside each other illustrates the
instrumental and malleable character of the deficient child in the Western philosophical
canon. We could arrive at the same illustration by returning to the children of Aristotle,
Rousseau, Rawls or Schapiro (as detailed in Chapters 1 and 2). For each of these figures
the child takes shape within and through the various ends of the adult, serving as fertile
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ground for the formation of educational, moral and political projects. That is, if the child
is (in some form) always deficient, he also always possesses the potential to change, to
become a different kind of person. And on the basis of this posited potential—whether
specified as a potential for the achievement of reason and autonomy or virtue and natural
freedom—whole classes of beings (from virtuous citizens to noble savages) and ideal
states (from the Kallipolis to the well-ordered society) become possible. At the heart of
the child’s production lies an instrumental, productive form of deficiency, perhaps most
visible in those defects (or potentialities) that, when corrected or reformed, provide for
the realization of the moral and political ends of the philosopher. Given that these moral
and political ends shift throughout the canon the child, too, must be malleable; he must be
capable of bearing a multitude of attributes—appetitive and animalistic, naïve and
innocent, passive and nonideal—that call for correlative moral and political projects
(such as the formation of the child into the virtuous citizen or autonomous agent that
provides for the possibility of the ideal polis and the well-ordered society). In short,
whatever else he is, the child of Western philosophy always possesses the capacity to be
what the adult needs him to be.
We can see, then, that the deficient child (as well as that which makes him
deficient) is not uniform. Rather, his classification shifts throughout the canon (and
without doubt, continues to do so), in relation to a diversity of figures and their
educational, moral, and political objectives. But none of this is to say that the canon lacks
a paradigmatic conceptual approach to the child. On the contrary (and as illustrated in
Chapters 1 and 2), in the midst of this diversity of projects and productions, the child is
consistently characterized, on the one hand, in terms of the qualities he lacks (as the non-
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adult, lacking the autonomy, agency, and freedom of the adult) and, on the other hand, in
terms of the qualities he possesses (as the being-to-be-transformed, possessing dangerous
appetites and desires, as well as usable potentialities). To the extent the child has been
known in this two-fold manner, correlative fields of action have been created for the adult
philosopher, legislator, and educator. If the child possesses animalistic and appetitive
desires, he must be reformed. If the child is innocent and naïve, he must be protected. If
the child lacks autonomy and independence, he must be educated and developed. In
contradistinction to the adult, the child of Western philosophy is generally constituted as
the subject of treatment which, in turn, calls for experts—Plato’s “Director of Children”
and “Minister of Education,” Aristotle’s “child-supervisors,” Rousseau’s “governor”—to
guide the child to adulthood; for developmental psychologists to analyze the child; for
pedagogues to form the child into the adult citizen. Throughout the canon, knowledge of
the child as deficient (whether in virtue of his lack or possession of certain qualities) is
always intertwined with relations of power,82 conditioning the child’s visibility to the
adult as an object of analysis and subject of reformatory projects.
In his production as an instrumental being, object of analysis and subject of
reform, the deficient child remains silent; he is always spoken for in a unidirectional
discourse of the adult about the child, approached as an “object of information, never a
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subject in communication.”83 And if the child is distributed within the canon as spoken
for, it is always the adult that is in position to speak the child’s truth. That is, it is always
the adult that determines the child’s deficiencies (defining what children are), as well as
his progress toward a predetermined moral, political, or educational end (dictating what
children can be). In one sense, the adult’s ability to speak the truth of the child stems
from the practical fact that adults (not children) write philosophical treatises. Canonical
works from Plato’s Republic to Rawls’s Theory are authored by adults, and, thus, quite
literally, the adult is in position to define the child, to dictate his deficiencies and
possibilities. But the adult’s ability to speak the truth of the child runs deeper than his act
of authorship; this ability is conditioned by broader, hegemonic conceptualizations of the
adult as the standard for moral and political existence (and the ideal of humanity as such).
In the Western philosophical tradition, the adult is not just a moral or political being
among many. The adult is the only moral and political being, possessing the exclusive
traits of agency (reason and autonomy, independence and freedom). On the basis of this
idealized conception of the adult it becomes possible to constitute the child as the Other,
as a being best defined through his deviation from the ideal condition of the adult.84
So understood, the nature (and, ultimately, the problem) of the child’s location in
adult-centered conceptions of moral and political existence resembles that of the woman
in male-centered conceptions of moral development and the human life-cycle. In In a
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Different Voice, Carol Gilligan argues that psychological theories of human development
have consistently relied on developmental models in which “men’s experience stands for
all human experience.”85 From Piaget to Kohlberg, Freud to Erikson, major figures in
psychology and psychoanalysis have assumed (and, in turn, produced) the equivalence of
the “developed” individual and the adult male committed to traditionally masculine
values (such as separation, independence, and autonomy).86 As taken up in these
developmental models, the woman is constituted as the Other. Traditionally feminine
values (such as maintaining relationships and connection, care and responsibility for
others) are constituted as deviant in relation to the norm of masculine adulthood.87 Given
the position of the adult male as the “vertex of maturity” in developmental theory,
woman’s divergence from this standard is no mere “descriptive difference,” but rather, a
“developmental liability.”88 In effect, the woman of the psychological canon is left to
overcome her deficiencies and discover her (marginal) place in “man’s life cycle.”89
Gilligan identifies a number of problems with the dominance of male-centered
conceptions of development in psychological theory. For one, although presented as
scientifically objective, these models of development have issued from a “consistent
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observational and evaluative bias.”90 In many cases (as in the work of Piaget and
Kohlberg), canonical standards of moral maturity and universal claims about moral
development are grounded in empirical studies composed exclusively of males.91 As a
result, conceptions of development as seen “through men’s eyes” are uncritically
presented as universal standards for human development as such, prompting the
evaluation of those diverging from these standards—most commonly, women and
children—as developmentally and morally immature.92 As Gilligan writes, “as long as
the categories by which development is assessed are derived from research on men,
divergence from the masculine standard can be seen only as a failure of development.”93
Further, disproportionate research on men has “blinded psychologists to the truth
of women’s experience,” obscuring alternative lines of moral development centered not
on the achievement of separation and the formal recognition of rights, but also, the
maintenance of connection and the capacity to care.94 Consideration of these alternative
models not only benefits women—responding to the systematic dismissal of women and
feminine values within the psychological canon—but also broadens the horizons of moral
experience for all human persons. The greater inclusion of women in developmental
research provides for a more comprehensive understanding of moral (as opposed to male)
experience, including an ethic of care alongside a morality of rights, the recognition of
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responsibility for others along with the logic of justice.95 Arguing for a broader
conception of moral existence for both men and women, Gilligan writes:
Only when life-cycle theorists divide their attention and
begin to live with women as they have lived with men will
their vision encompass the experience of both sexes and their
theories become correspondingly more fertile.96
But the primary problem of hegemonic,97 male-centered conceptions of
development is the consequent lack of recognition of women apart from the norm of
maleness. That is, if a traditionally masculine conception of man is taken as the apex of
human development, then woman can be visible in developmental theory only as, at best,
a deficient being, defined by her degree of deviation from the image of the rational,
autonomous male. In virtue of this mode of classification—one that, from the start,
conceptualizes woman as less-than, as deviant, and morally immature—it becomes
possible for women to inhabit a submissive subject position, to self-identify with the
image of the undeveloped, irrational woman as constituted in developmental discourse.
Women are left to reconcile their moral experiences and concerns—for example, the
valuation of connection with others as opposed to the exclusive prioritization of
separation and independence—with entrenched psychological discourses that present
these very experiences and concerns as indices of deficient stages of moral development.
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In the face of an institutionalized devaluation of their lived experience women must
struggle to find a voice—an identity or “core of the self”—that is not derived in
opposition to maleness nor formed in accord with their deviant classification.98
Seen in this light, the harm done to women by developmental theory (and its
broader social, educational, and political manifestations) is akin to that suffered by
minority groups and colonized populations as discussed in Charles Taylor’s “Politics of
Recognition.”99 Taylor contends that human life has a “fundamentally dialogical
character” such that, in large part, we “become full agents, capable of understanding
ourselves, and hence defining our identity” in our interactions with others.100 There are:
links between recognition and identity, where this latter term
designates something like a person’s understanding of who
they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a
human being…Our identity is partly shaped by recognition
or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a
person or group of people can suffer real damage, real
distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back
to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of
themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict
harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a
false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.101
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Women in patriarchal societies, blacks in societies of white privilege, and colonized
populations alike are susceptible to the harm of “misrecognition.”102 In each of these
cases, “an inferior or demeaning image” (the irrational woman, the lazy black, the
uncivilized aboriginal) is projected upon a class of individuals and to the extent these
individuals accept this image they are inflicted with a “grievous wound”—they
internalize forms of pathological identity that can lead to self-depreciation and “a
crippling self-hatred.”103 Subjugated by the imposition of demeaning images, these
individuals gain their freedom, in part, through a struggle to revise these images, to
realize identities—as rational, as industrious, as moral and political beings104 —that
subvert demoralizing self-conceptions born from their location within a dominant culture.
Along with the disenfranchised minority or colonized population, the woman of
developmental psychology, too, is susceptible to the harm of misrecognition. As taken up
in theories that “eclipse the lives of women and shut out women’s voices,” she is, on the
one hand, systematically ignored as a moral agent and, on the other hand, conceptualized
as a deficient being in relation to man.105 In either case, the woman is denied recognition
as a moral being that, following Taylor, is essential for the formation of her own identity
as a person possessed of valid moral concerns, worthy of the acknowledgment and
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response of others. By and through her misrecognition, then, the woman’s voice is not
only dismissed by others—whether the psychologist, teacher, colleague or peer—but
ultimately, is liable to be dismissed by the woman herself. In continually failing to gain
recognition from others (including psychologists legitimated as “experts” on moral
development) as a moral being, the woman is deprived of inclusion in a community of
moral actors, a community that allows for its members to be seen (and, in turn, to see
themselves) as moral beings. Instead, she is limited to the field of action of a deficient
moral being and spoken for as a morally immature woman. As constituted in relation to
the possibilities of the adult male, the woman’s ability to recognize herself as a moral
being is contingent upon her acceptance (and prioritization) of the values of autonomy,
separation, and the logic of justice.
Above, I attempted to reveal the child’s formation as a subjected being in the
Western philosophical canon. For one, as created in conjunction with the plans of the
adult philosopher, legislator, and educator, the deficient child is an instrumental being. If
the child is deficient, he must be treated, controlled or corrected, thereby making possible
the formation of the ideal citizen, savage or state. In this sense, the child of Western
philosophy is conceptually born as a subjected being, shifting in characteristic and quality
(whether as the non-adult or being-to-be-transformed) to suit the moral, educational, and
political projects of the adult.
But with an account of the harm of misrecognition in hand we can identify a
related, yet, deeper, form of the child’s subjection. As emerging from the Western
philosophical canon, a specific (if long sustained) grid of knowledge and power provides
for a paradigmatic form of relation between the adult and child—that of one who speaks
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in relation to one who is spoken for. Insofar as the canon overwhelmingly articulates
moral and political existence through the voice of the adult, children are silenced, always
emerging as less-than, as poor in (if not completely devoid of) moral and political
possibility. The child is not only subjected to the material plans and projects of the adult,
then, but also is made subject to a degrading self-image that confines him to a limited
“space of possibilities.”106 As with Foucault’s “submissive subjects”—the sexually
perverted child and the delinquent—the deficient child originates within his subjection to
a pathological identity. And akin to (though not exactly the same as) Gilligan’s morally
immature woman, children subjected to this image—the “deficient child”—are restricted
from authentic participation in a moral and political community composed exclusively of
adult (male) actors. The child’s exclusion from moral and political realms is no
insignificant matter; rather, I contend that it is a harm that cuts him to his core. For in
failing to gain recognition from others as capable of moral and political expression the
child is deprived of (or, at the very least, seriously hindered in) the ability to regard
himself as a moral and political being.107 In the face of an adult-centered account of
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see Hacking’s The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
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This is not to say that the situation of the infant or young child in the face of
misrecognition is the same as that of the disenfranchised adult (for example, the woman subjected
to sexism or the African-American subjected to racism). For one, due to various developmental
differences, the infant and the adult differ in their ability to regard themselves as moral and
political beings and speak in their own voice. And regardless of whether or not he is offered
recognition, the infant (unlike the adult) will be incapable of acting in moral and political realms.
Further, I do not intend to conflate the histories and harms of racism, sexism, and the discourse on
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moral and political existence the child is bound up in a reciprocal process of
misrecognition: conceptualized as a deficient being the child is deprived of recognition
from adults inhabiting a moral and political community; and in failing to gain recognition
from others the child really is deficient—he is deprived of elements of moral and political
agency (ranging from a basic interest in the political realm to the capacity for moral
expression and action) that are constituted, in large part, through one’s recognition and
participation in a moral and political community. Given the canonical and social
dominance of the image of the deficient child (as well as that of the ideal adult) the child
is provided with little opportunity to be recognized as (and, I contend, to be) anything
other than the subject of correction and reform. Instead, children are “colonized” by their
conceptualization as deficient and in need of reform, confined to forms of action that
fulfill the plans of others and their consequent acceptance of an impoverished field of
moral and political action.108
To better understand Taylor’s account of recognition and its applicability to
children (in addition to Taylor’s examples of disenfranchised adults), it will be helpful to
return to his account of the formation of identity. Taylor contends that the individual’s
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the child. Nor do I claim that the infant or young child is in need of “liberation.” Rather, I draw a
parallel between the disenfranchised adult and the child (whether younger or older) to the extent
that (1) they are both subjected to a deficient identity and (2) this subjection provides for their
own self-identification—whether in the present or the future—as lacking all moral and political
possibility. For example, both the morally immature woman and the deficient child are evaluated
in reference to the image of the adult male as the ideal of humanity. The image of the ideal adult
male conditions the evaluation of the woman and child as deficient and, further, determines their
status (insofar as they are closer to or further from the condition of the adult male). Although the
experiences and abilities of the adult woman differ substantially from those of the child, both are
subjected to deficient identities and, in turn, hindered in their ability to solidify identities as moral
and political beings apart from the image of the adult male. For more on this point, see 192-197
below.
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For an excellent discussion of the relationship between the ideology of colonialism
and the Western concept of the child, see Nandy’s “Reconstructing Childhood,” 57-59.
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identity is not primarily forged in isolation, but rather, through an intersubjective
process.109 The individual’s search for an “authentic” identity—an identity that is unique
to an individual—is not primarily a monological task, but rather, a dialogical pursuit.110
Taylor understands recognition as an essential element of this dialogical process. As
Taylor writes:
Discovering my own identity doesn’t mean that I work it out
in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly
overt, partly internal, with others. That is why the
development of an ideal of inwardly generated identity [an
authentic identity] gives a new importance to recognition.
My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations
with others.”111
On my reading, then, Taylor’s account of recognition is primarily generative as opposed
to responsive.112 That is, Taylor’s account of recognition does not primarily focus on
identifying privileged characteristics of the individual that already exist and, thus, merit
recognition in response. Rather, Taylor also considers the constitutive (or generative)
importance of recognition in the formation of the individual’s identity, as, say, a political
being, worthy of respect. It is in the latter, generative sense of recognition that Taylor
speaks of individuals as “formed by recognition.”113 For my purposes, it is important to
note that Taylor discusses the constitutive importance of recognition for all human
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Taylor, “Politics of Recognition,” 32-34.
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My reading of Taylor’s account of recognition has benefitted from Markell Patchen’s
analysis of recognition in “The Recognition of Politics: A Comment on Emcke and Tully,” in
Constellations 7 (2000) and Arto Laitinen’s analysis of recognition in “Interpersonal
Recognition: A Response to Value or a Precondition of Personhood?” in Inquiry 45 (2002).
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persons (not just adults). Although Taylor does not discuss children explicitly, he
repeatedly states that recognition is essential “throughout our lives,” including at the
“beginning of our lives.”114 Whether one is an adult, an adolescent, or a young child, the
formation of one’s identity is hampered by misrecognition. It is this aspect of his account
that I have adopted in my own discussion—not only disenfranchised adults, but also
children cannot come to regard themselves as moral and political beings without being
recognized in this fashion by other moral and political actors.
To be clear, I am not arguing that the conceptualization of the child as deficient is
problematic because it has led Western philosophers (and adults generally) to overlook
the essential or natural moral qualities possessed by all children. I do not claim that all
children—understood as, say, morally pure, innocent beings—are violated by
philosophical discourses that fail to recognize their true moral and political qualities. Nor
do I maintain that children (as a class of persons) are essentially devoid of moral and
political experience and concern. In contrast to philosophers ranging from Plato to Rawls,
I assume no totalizing grasp of the Child. Instead, I contend that a conceptualization of
the child as deficient has been deployed by major figures in the Western philosophical
tradition, permeating the canon and gaining broad acceptance in Western culture.115
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This dissertation is not a work of social science and, thus, I do not focus on empirical
research to demonstrate the acceptance of the child’s deficient status in Western culture. In future
work, I plan to move further beyond the Western philosophical realm to devote greater attention
to the material relevance of the Western philosophical concept of the deficient child for the lives
of children in the world. However, even now we can recognize the acceptance of the child as a
deficient being in Western culture: First, this acceptance is evident in the use of “child” as a
common slur, as a negative valuation of an adult as lacking or deficient. Second, this acceptance
is evident in Western political realms of human activity, where one’s participation or exclusion is
determined, in large part, on the basis of whether one is classified as an “adult” or a “child.”
Third, major figures in the Western philosophical tradition have had a great impact on Western
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Given the dominance of this account of the child, children are denied both the conceptual
space and practical experience to be moral and political beings and, in turn, are hindered
in their self-identification with moral and political actors. This self-identification is a
necessary condition for actually being a moral and political actor, and, thus, the child’s
deficient classification acts as a form of oppression, confining him to a demeaning
identity and an impoverished field of action.
Section 3: Beyond the Hegemony of Adulthood: Listening for the Voices of Children
and Reconsidering the Possibilities of the Child
If my analysis of the formation of the deficient child is sound, we should be
cautious in our attempts to specify exactly what the child is. We need not accept the
terms of a ceaseless debate on the child’s essential nature and whether it more or less
resembles the idealized rationality and autonomy of the adult moral actor. Nor do we
need to confine ourselves to a discussion of whether the child is naturally virtuous or
vicious, fundamentally moral or deficient. These discussions have their place, but each
misses a crucial point: we cannot define what the child is apart from an understanding of
what he has been.116 I have shown that the child has been overwhelmingly classified as
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moral, political, religious, scientific, and educational realms of thought and human activity. For
example, consider the import of Kant’s account of the “dignity” and “autonomy” of human
beings for Western moral codes; the import of Plato and Aristotle’s thought for Catholic
philosophy and theology; the import of Descartes’ skepticism and theory of knowledge for the
formation of the Western scientific tradition; and the import of Rousseau’s conception of natural
education for Western approaches to pedagogy, particularly in primary education. Likewise, I
contend, Western philosophical conceptions of the “adult” and “child” are not without influence
in the Western world. Although few will have the work of, say, Aristotle or Kant directly in mind
when thinking of an adult or child, Aristotle and Kant’s understanding of moral and political
agency has undoubtedly been influential in the West. Given that their accounts present moral and
political agency as exclusively adult traits, they have also served as a conceptual resource in the
Western world to differentiate adults and children and regard the latter as deficient in moral and
political realms of human activity.
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That is, attempts to reconsider or redefine the child do not begin from a blank slate.
We must be sensitive to the historical and contemporary discourse on the child as a deficient
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(and, in turn, confined to the possibilities of) a deficient being. The general evaluation of
the child as deficient has conditioned a multitude of declarations as to his natural state of
being—from his appetitive and animalistic nature to his innocence and lack of agency.
Instead of embarking on a search for the natural Child, we might instead consider
what children can be apart from their historical and contemporary subjection to the image
of the deficient child. But this is no simple task. It is tempting to counteract the child’s
subjection to a demeaning image by asserting his possession of those traits denied to him
throughout the canon. That is, rather than accept the image of the appetitive, pre-moral
and pre-political child, we might assert the child’s rationality, autonomy, and moral and
political agency. This tactic has been used to great effect by reformers and child
advocates in the political realm, leading to significant advances in children’s legal and
political rights throughout the world.117 However, in the conceptual realm of Western
philosophy, asserting the child’s rationality or autonomy runs the risk of reinforcing the
hegemony of adulthood and, with it, the child’s deficient status in relation to the adult.
We must not forget that, throughout the canon, rationality, autonomy, and moral and
political agency have been theorized as adult traits. So-conceptualized, moral and
political existence are essential qualities of adult existence and, thus, antithetical to the
existence of all non-adults. In the work of philosophers ranging from Plato to Schapiro,
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being and the continuing impact of this discourse on adults, their evaluations of children, and
children themselves. This discourse has impacted what adults take the child to be (deficient or
less-than the adult) and, further, has contributed to the subjection of the child to a deficient
identity (in moral, political, and educational realms). Any reconsideration of the child must begin
here, recognizing and challenging the conditions of the child’s contemporary and historical
production as a deficient being.
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For example, see Howard Cohen’s Equal Rights for Children (Totowa: Littlefield,
Adams & Co., 1980); Richard Farson’s Birthrights (New York: Macmillan, 1974); and the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
in 1989.
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moral and political agency is achieved in one’s separation from childhood, presented as a
mark of one’s transcendence of “childish” modes of being. For this reason, asserting the
child’s possession of rationality, autonomy, and moral and political agency does not, by
itself, act as substantive critique of his deficient classification. These assertions leave
untouched (and potentially reinforce) the structural equivalence of adult existence and
moral and political existence, producing, at best, a conception of the child as closer to the
ideal adult than previously thought, as less deficient in relation to the ideality of
adulthood. Paradoxically, then, in order to reconsider the possibilities of the child we
must attend to the adult and his ideal status. We must contest the hegemony of adulthood
and the canonical uniformity between adult existence and authentic moral and political
existence. For if we do not take this course of action, the child—conceptualized as the
deficient non-adult in relation to the positive, ideal qualities of the adult—will remain
subjected to an image of deficiency and the correlative harm of misrecognition.
Let us return to the image of adulthood common to the Western philosophical
tradition: adulthood is an evaluative end, the telos of human existence that conditions the
value of all other states of being (insofar as they are steps toward adulthood); adulthood
is a static end, a state of being in which the pinnacles of humanity—rationality,
autonomy, moral and political agency—have been achieved and, thus, growth and
development have ceased; and, given these characterizations, adulthood is rigidly
separate from all other deficient conditions of humanity (such as childhood and
conditions of mental illness). Taken together, these conceptions of adulthood yield the
figure of the ideal adult—the moral and political agent that serves as the standard and
measure for all other persons. Given its correlative impact on images of the child, it is
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essential to recognize this image of the adult (and its hegemonic status in the canon).
Conceptions of the “child” and “adult” are logically necessary to each other—
consideration of one of these concepts always occurs in relation to some consideration of
the other118—and, thus, the continuing maintenance of the ideal image of the adult
(whether in its ancient, modern, or contemporary, liberal manifestations) conditions a
correlative image of the child as deficient and nonideal.119 That is to say, if the adult—as
the citizen of Plato’s polis, the moral actor in Kant’s kingdom of ends or Rousseau’s
natural savage—is accepted as the ideal end and perfection of the human species, and the
child is not the adult, then the child is, by contrast, a nonideal, deficient instance of
humanity. Given the necessary relationship between these concepts, reconsidering the
possibilities of the child calls for more than a positive assertion of the child’s
unrecognized qualities and characteristics—merely swapping the “rational child” or the
“moral child” for the “deficient child” is not sufficient. Rather, reconsidering the
possibilities of the child calls for an antecedent examination of the ideality of adult
existence.
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I am indebted to David Kennedy on this point. See his “Empathic Childrearing,” 9.

119

I make this conceptual point in regard to the “child” and “adult” as conceptualized
within the Western philosophical canon. In canonical discourse on the child and adult, the
concept of the adult (as an ideal moral and political being) conditions conceptualizations of the
child (as the non-adult, one who is deficient and not a moral and political being). This is not to
say that all related pairs (for example, the “caterpillar” and the “butterfly”) necessarily maintain a
similar conceptual relationship. It seems possible to compare the existence of the caterpillar and
the butterfly without adopting a normative stance on the superiority of the latter over the former.
One need not assume the caterpillar is “deficient” until reaching “completion” as the butterfly.
But this is precisely why the historical and contemporary relationship between the child and adult
needs to be understood. The paradigmatic account of these concepts does present a normative
description of the child and adult, while presenting these descriptions and the transition from the
deficient child to the ideal adult as “natural.”
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The conceptualization of the adult as the ideal moral and political agent is
problematic insofar as it is both illusory (grossly misrepresenting adult existence) and
harmful (conditioning the devaluation of other states of being). Western philosophers (for
example, Kant, Rawls, and Schapiro) have relied upon ideal conceptions of adulthood as
a fully developed state of being, as a condition of complete autonomy and rational control
over impulses and desires. In the work of these figures, the adult gains separation from
the existential condition of the child insofar as he possesses (and, conversely, the child
lacks) an established sense of self, a self-legislating will, and a basic rational structure on
the basis of which he unfailingly adjudicates between rival desires and motivational
claims. But the actual conditions of adulthood rarely replicate these idealizations.120 For
one, it requires minimal reflection to recognize that the continuing development of a
“voice” or “sense of self “ is not absent from adult existence—adults undergo identity
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A Kantian might grant this objection, but maintain that, ultimately, it is of little
consequence. The Kantian will contend that I am merely offering a descriptive critique of the
assumed uniformity between the ideal traits of the Western philosophical adult and the traits of
actual adults. But even if this critique is sound, it does not provide motivation to reject the
Kantian’s normative concept of the adult (as a complete moral and political agent that one ought
to strive to be). My response is as follows: The Kantian rejoinder to my objection does not pay
sufficient attention to the interrelation of normative and descriptive accounts of the adult, such
that an effective critique of the latter has consequences for one’s maintenance of the former. I
have argued that there is a structural equivalence between adult existence and moral and political
existence in the Western philosophical canon. The normative account of moral and political
agency is linked to the condition of adulthood such that only adults are eligible to be classified (or
described) as moral and political agents (even if not all adults are moral and political agents).
This equivalence is evident in Kant’s own work, for example, in The Doctrine of Right (see
Chapter 1, Section 4.2, above). Kant describes the actual adult male citizen in ideal terms (for
example, as fully independent and autonomous), and on the basis of this ideal account of actual
(male) adults, he excludes all individuals who are not fully independent from active participation
in the commonwealth (women, children, and common laborers). But if it is established—via a
descriptive critique—that few (if any) adults actually reach this ideal condition (the normative
standard of moral and political agency), then the normative and the descriptive accounts come
apart and we must reconsider the structural equivalence of adulthood and moral and political
agency. Along with this reconsideration we open a conceptual space for reconsidering the moral
and political possibilities of other, previously excluded persons, such as children.
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crises and existential upheavals (from questions of sexual identity to questions about
one’s self in the face of ruptured relationships or “midlife crises”), just as they, at times,
struggle to find a voice in the face of moral and political dilemmas. Indeed, the capacities
for growth and development as a moral agent or political actor are important elements of
adult experience, valuable to adults insofar as these capacities entail the positive ability to
become better people, to learn from mistakes, and to expand the range of one’s moral and
political response. None of this is to say that adults are fundamentally undeveloped or
irrational; rather, it is to say that adulthood can no longer maintain strict separation from
childhood (nor exclusive possession of moral and political agency) through a
characterization of the latter as the sole condition in which a person’s primary task is to
find a “self” or “voice.” To be sure, children are occupied with these tasks, but adults,
too, must continually struggle to find a voice, to grow in relation to the world and
experiences around them, and to develop as moral and political actors.
Nor can the condition of adulthood be rigidly separated from childhood on the
basis of the ideal adult’s independence and autonomy. Along with the illusion of
completed development and growth, Western philosophers have deployed an image of
the active adult operating independently in moral and political realms. Free of animalistic
impulse, unresolved motivational conflicts, and the dependencies of childhood, the ideal
adult selects a rational course of action and promptly follows it for the betterment of
himself and his community. By contrast, the child is conceptualized as devoid of
autonomy, as a passive, dependent being that, at best, must rely on the support of (adult)
others in moral and political realms. But if the child is a dependent being, we must also
recognize the chimera that is the fully independent, autonomous adult. This ideal

!

$,(!

!
conception of adulthood—particularly common to liberal political and moral
philosophy—greatly underestimates the dependence of adults on a multitude of
supporting conditions while abstracting away from the lived experience of actual adults.
As has already been demonstrated at length by numerous feminist philosophers, care
ethicists, and critical theorists, the individualistic autonomy of the ideal, liberal adult
presupposes a web of support: from supportive relationships in the private realm to the
legal framework that preserves one’s rights and freedoms to the social conditions and
labor of others that provides the material conditions of possibility of one’s “independent”
actions.121 We are all—adult and child alike—dependent on others in a multitude of
ways, capable of acting autonomously (to a lesser or greater degree) only from a ground
of interdependency.122 Again, this is not to say that the adult is wholly devoid of
autonomy or moral and political agency. Nor do I maintain that children and adults are
always in equal need of the care, protection, and support of others. The point is simply
this: if adults are not ideally autonomous beings, then the adult’s exclusive status as
moral and political agent cannot be secured on the basis of his illusory achievement (and,
conversely, the child’s lack) of a fully independent state of being.123 Although
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But a possible objection arises at this point: Let it be granted that the adult’s exclusive
status as moral and political agent can no longer be secured on the basis of his assumed
achievement of an ideal state of reason, independence, or autonomy. It is still possible that the
adult can be differentiated from the child on the basis of his consistent aim for this ideal.
Conversely, the child just is a being incapable of this consistent aim. My response is as follows:
This distinction between the adult and child is an improvement over the paradigm distinction in
the Western philosophical canon as presented and critiqued above. At the very least, it no longer
idealizes adulthood as a condition of completed growth and fully developed moral and political
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consistently assumed in the canon, the condition of ideal autonomy is absent from
adulthood and, thus, does not serve as a valid ground to differentiate and automatically
exclude the dependent child from moral and political realms.
In light of these reflections (which are certainly not exhaustive), we can see that
there is a vast gulf between the idealization of adulthood and the actual lived experience
of many (if not all) adults. If adulthood is a condition of developed agency, it is, like
childhood, also a condition pregnant with the potential for growth and development. If
the adult is rational and autonomous, he is, like the child, also always dependent on
others. It is important to identify the influence of the hegemony of adulthood on
canonical conceptions of agency and human existence. But in deconstructing ideal
conceptions of adulthood, we do more than this—we also begin the process of
challenging the misrecognition of all Others in relation to the ideal image of the adult. As
we have seen, the deficient child is subjected to the harm of misrecognition insofar as he
is encountered as the non-adult, as deficient in relation to the ideal adult qua sole bearer
of moral and political existence. Akin to the morally immature woman, the sexually
perverted child and the delinquent, the deficient child is ultimately restricted to a
pathological self-identification; he is regarded as devoid of moral and political possibility
and, ultimately, really is deficient insofar as he accepts the limited field of action
delineated for him by the plans of the adult and the norm of ideal adulthood.
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agency. However, a problem still remains insofar as the ideal in question remains unchallenged.
That is, the moral and political existence to be sought (as the ideal) is defined in terms that, from
the start, exclude consideration of the child’s moral and political possibilities. To classify moral
and political existence in terms of rationality, independence, and autonomy is to understand moral
and political existence in terms that, historically and philosophically, have been structurally
linked to adult existence. Thus, although the objection provides a better descriptive account of the
adult, moral and political existence is still conceived in decidedly adult-centered terms that
exclude the child and his moral and political possibilities from consideration.
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But if we no longer assume that moral and political qualities just are adult
qualities, then it becomes possible to reconsider the moral and political possibilities of
other persons, including children. Prior to challenging the hegemony of adulthood there
was no reason for any such reconsideration—children are not-adults and, thus, are clearly
not capable of moral and political expression and experience (adult traits). Of course,
from time to time children do act in ways that seem to carry moral intent or political
purpose, but within the purview of the hegemony of adulthood these actions were, at best,
shadowy images of the true form of moral and political action inherent to adult existence.
Now, free of the assumed equivalence between moral and political existence and adult
existence, the moral and political possibilities of children become an open question. We
can begin to ask what children can be apart from their deficient classification in relation
to the ideal adult. And where philosophers have long spoken for children—namely, moral
and political realms—we can instead begin to listen for the voices of children. This is not
to say that all children will be ready to speak and express moral and political concerns;
we should underestimate neither the long-standing dismissal of these capacities in
children, nor the corresponding difficulty for children to recognize themselves as (and be)
moral and political beings under these conditions. But the upshot of the child’s historical
and contemporary classification as a deficient being is that, regardless of how dominant it
has been, it can always be contested. The canonical and social dominance of the image of
the deficient child is daunting, but other narratives are possible, including those that
provide new moral and political possibilities for children.124
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124

On the “moral and political possibilities” of children, see footnote 1 above. I am
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We begin reconsidering the possibilities of the child by making a commitment to
listen to children—both in theory and practice. As illustrated throughout this work, the
child has been silenced in moral and political theory. Although the child is present in the
work of philosophers ranging from Plato to Schapiro, he is always spoken for as an object
of analysis and subject of reform, emerging in the canon insofar as he is capable of
becoming someone else—the ideal adult. Given the dominance of this approach to the
child, listening to children becomes a radical act. For one, in listening for the voices of
children in moral and political theory we counter a tradition of exclusion immanent to
Western philosophy. We no longer accept the voice of the adult as sufficient to speak for
the moral and political experiences of all persons. Instead, we recognize that the
idealization of adult moral and political experience has prevented substantive
consideration of the moral and political possibilities of children, both for adults and
children. In turn, by listening for the voices of children we stand for the recognition of
their value apart from developmental progress toward adulthood. Listening to children
and granting them a place in moral and political theory is, at this point, an act of good
faith. It constitutes both an acknowledgment of the child’s historical and contemporary
subjection to a deficient identity and the start of a process to subvert this subjection by
providing an open space for children to speak, be heard, and, eventually, regard
themselves as possessed of the possibility for moral and political action. As Gilligan
writes, “to have a voice is to be human. To have something to say is to be a person. But
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possibilities. Rather, we know the possibilities (or lack thereof) of the deficient child. Insofar as
children continue to be subjected to this image of deficiency, they are hindered in their ability to
identify with and, in turn, be, moral and political actors.
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speaking depends on listening and being heard; it is an intensely relational act.”125 We
provide for the possibility of the child’s voice and realization of a positive identity (apart
from his derivative moral and political status in relation to the adult) through a
willingness to listen to the child before us, not the non-adult or being-to-be-transformed
imposed upon us.
But in the face of so many philosophical approaches that, from the start, dismiss
the child as a deficient being, it is unclear how we, as philosophers, might begin to
“listen” to the child. There is a need to describe more concretely those approaches that
offer the child recognition (and possibilities for different modes of being) apart from his
status as the non-adult and being-to-be-transformed. Fortunately, we are not without
examples of approaches that do allow for the voices of children to be heard while
rejecting their conceptualization as deficient beings. First, in works such as Philosophy
and the Young Child and Dialogues with Children, Gareth Matthews subverts traditional
conceptions of the child as a deficient being, devoid of the reason, insight and interest
necessary to participate in the practice of philosophy.126 Rather than accept the canonical
image of the deficient child, Matthews engages children in philosophical dialogue,
listening and responding to their claims and concerns on a variety of philosophical
topics—from the nature of happiness and desire to the realities of existence and death.
Matthews’s work with children is interesting in its own right, but it is of particular import
for our purposes for his reconsideration of the possibilities of the child. Implicit in
Matthews’s work is the prioritization of a different form of relationship between children
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and adults, “one without condescension—without the condescension of experimenter to
subject, or of instructor to neophyte, or of loving provider to recipient of care.”127
Departing from these modes of adult-child relations, Matthews offers children
recognition. He offers them respect and, what is more, the opportunity to reconsider their
own possibilities as philosophers, capable of reflecting on philosophical questions and
contributing positively to philosophical discussion.
Matthews’ conception of the child radically departs from those of Plato, Aristotle,
Rousseau, Kant, Rawls, and Schapiro. Recall that these philosophers primarily (though
not uniformly) regard the child as the non-adult and being-to-be-transformed. The child is
often understood in virtue of his deficiencies (his deficient reason, autonomy, and moral
and political agency in relation to the adult) and, in turn, the primary mode of approach to
the child is informed by strategies of control and reform. As taken up within these
strategies, the child is often treated as an instrumental being, one whose transformation
makes possible the moral and political ends of the philosophers in question. Conversely,
Matthews approaches the child outside the bounds of the canonical understanding of the
child. He instead focuses on the child’s possibilities when not saddled by adult
assumptions as to his deficiency. Matthews writes:
What has not been taken seriously, or even widely conceived,
is the possibility of tackling with children, in a relationship of
mutual respect, the naively profound questions of
philosophy…Children can help us adults investigate and
reflect
on
interesting
and
important
questions
and…children’s contributions may be quite as valuable as
any we adults have to offer.128
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Rather than accepting the child’s assumed deficiencies from the start and a corresponding
relationship of reform, Matthews chooses to “take seriously” a different conception of the
child—one that does not exclude the child from the practice of philosophy (a realm of
activity commonly reserved for adults). And as a result of his approach, many of the
children he worked with—as evidenced by a multitude of discussion transcripts recorded
and published by Matthews—actively participated in the practice of philosophy and, in
turn, came to regard themselves as philosophical beings.
Matthews’ work with children demonstrates that the mode of approach one takes
toward the child materially affects one’s ability to recognize (or overlook) the child’s
philosophical possibilities. Matthews writes:
Perhaps it is because so much emphasis has been placed on
the development of children’s abilities, especially their
cognitive abilities, that we automatically assume their
thinking is primitive and in need of being developed toward
an adult norm. What we take to be primitive, however, may
actually be more openly reflective than the adult norm we set
as the goal of education. By filtering the child’s remarks
through our developmental assumptions we avoid having to
take seriously the philosophy in those remarks; in that way
we also avoid taking the child and the child’s point of view
with either the seriousness or the playfulness they deserve.129
In his work, Matthews is able to consult the voice of the child by refusing to characterize
the philosophical voice in exclusively adult-centered terms. As opposed to an adultcentered focus on textual analysis, argumentation, or abstract logical reasoning,
Matthews adopted the use of stories to facilitate philosophical discussion with children.
Making philosophical questions accessible through the medium of a story, Matthews
discovered that children “quickly claimed the [philosophical] problems as their own and
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took responsibility for dealing with them as best they could.”130 Thus, by adjusting the
method of approach to the child—one that allowed him to offer recognition to children as
fellow philosophers—Matthews found that children were quite capable of participating in
philosophical discussion and recognizing themselves as philosophers. By contrast,
evaluating the child in relation to the norm of the adult—as has been the tradition in the
Western philosophical canon—inevitably leads “one to ignore, or misunderstand, the
really imaginative and inventive thinking of young children.”131
We can also consider the work of Robert Coles, the psychoanalyst and child
psychiatrist who has spent much of his life documenting the moral, political, and spiritual
reflections of children. In The Moral Life of Children, Coles speaks of psychological
conceptions of children as morally deficient, as incapable of authentic (adult) moral
concern and action.132 Given his training, Coles initially disregarded the ostensibly moral
actions and concerns of children. To be sure, children of the American civil rights
movement (many of whom Coles interviewed and came to know well) seemed to express
moral and political concerns, but Coles was continually unable to reconcile the actions of
these children (desegregating schools, taking part in protests, remaining nonviolent in the
face of racial hatred and animosity, etc.) with their deficient classification in the stage
theories of Piaget and Kohlberg.133 In the face of this tension, Coles chose a
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methodological departure from his tradition, engaging children apart from pre-judgments
based on adult-centered norms of moral and political agency. Coles listened to children,
treating them with respect as beings possessed of moral and political concerns. In
response, children chose to speak to Coles. They discussed their fears and doubts, their
concerns for their lives and families, and, in many cases, came to see themselves as
beings deserving of recognition, worthy of being listened to as opposed to spoken for.
As with Matthews, Coles was able to establish this possibility (both for himself
and the children he worked with) by adopting a radically different approach to the child.
Discussing the moral character of Ruby Bridges, a young African-American girl who
participated in the desegregation of public schools in New Orleans, Coles writes:
She had somehow managed to obtain: strength to integrate a
southern school; strength to be a young activist in the face of
extreme hostility and plenty of danger; strength to believe not
only in a social and political effort but also in herself as
someone able and worthy to take part in it; and strength to
maintain her high hopes, to keep her spirits up, no matter the
serious obstacles in her way. Whence such strength—in a
child whose parents were illiterate, unemployed, with few
prospects?134
According to standard theories of moral development and philosophical conceptions of
moral agency, Bridges was pre-moral, and, thus, she was incapable of the choices she
made and the actions she performed.135 Rather than accept the contradiction before him—
between canonical, adult-centered conceptions of agency and the ostensibly moral and
political concerns and actions of Bridges—Coles attempted to better understand moral
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and political existence from the perspective of the child. In large part, Coles
accomplished this by adopting a novel form of listening to children. Rather than relying
on the spoken word or argument as representative of the child’s moral and political
concerns (an approach that disadvantages young children uninterested in or incapable of
moral and political discussion), Coles asked children (including Ruby) to draw pictures
of their school, friends, and family, as well as anything they wanted to draw.136 By
engaging with children in this way, Coles was able to ask children about their concerns
and recognize their conceptions of their own lives. In virtue of this method, Coles moves
beyond the totalized child of Western philosophy—a being that is simply not the adult
and, thus, incapable of moral and political concern. Instead, Coles provides a rich account
of the complex and diverse psychologies of children and their varying moral and political
concerns in the midst of crisis in their own lives and communities.
These examples of listening to the voices of children are not exhaustive; rather,
they should be viewed as models for reconsidering the possibilities of the child.
Matthews and Coles distinguish moral and political (as well as philosophical) existence
from adult existence such that the moral and political concerns of children can be
recognized in their own right, apart from their derivative value in relation to the concerns
of the adult. If these figures accepted the canonical understanding of the child—in both
philosophy and psychology, as deficient and devoid of philosophical, moral and political
possibility—they would not have produced the work they did. But in listening to children
they discovered children’s moral, political and philosophical possibilities, while many of
the children they encountered, no doubt, came to regard themselves differently as well.
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Insofar as we develop similar modes of approach to children in our own work we, too,
can begin to offer children recognition beyond their likeness to or divergence from the
condition of the adult. In our philosophical work and practical engagements with children
we can move from the hegemony of adulthood to a systematic exploration of the moral
and political possibilities of the child.
Conclusion
In her “Letter to Readers,” Gilligan describes her work as part of “the ongoing
historical process of changing the voice of the world by bringing women’s voices into the
open, thus starting a new conversation.”137 Likewise, I have attempted to start a “new
conversation” regarding the adult, the child, and moral and political existence by
preparing the way for children’s voices to be included in Western philosophy. We are
quite familiar with canonical discourses that identify the child’s natural limitations and
essential deficiencies while assuming the ideal nature of the adult. Throughout the
Western philosophical tradition (as well as that of developmental psychology) we are
presented with contrasting images of the rational, moral and political adult and the prerational, pre-moral, and pre-political child. In response to this tradition and its
representative figures—from Plato and Kant to Piaget and Kohlberg—I have revealed the
historical and contemporary production of the child as a deficient being. As
conceptualized within the hegemony of adulthood, the child is given no place beyond
deficiency and subjection as the non-adult and the being-to-be-transformed.
Where philosophers have generally presented the child’s deficiencies as markers
of the essential condition of childhood, I understand them as, in large part, contingent
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upon the continuing maintenance of the hegemony of adulthood. Denied substantive
recognition as a human person possessed of moral and political possibilities, the child is
deprived of the opportunity to identify with moral and political actors and, thus, really is
a deficient moral and political being. The proper response to this state of affairs is not to
offer yet another claim as to the child’s nature—as, say, an innocent, morally pure, and
naturally virtuous being. Nor should we simply assert the presence of political interest in
the child. Instead, we can recognize that, in truth, we do not know the possibilities of the
child; we only know the limited possibilities of the deficient child. Our task going
forward, then, is to contest the child’s subjection to this deficient identity, to listen to the
child and, in doing so, to provide an open space for the reconsideration of the moral and
political possibilities of the child.
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CONCLUSION
In the preceding chapters I revealed the formation of the deficient child in
Western philosophy. Throughout the canon the child has been conceptualized in two
related ways: first, the child is regarded as the non-adult, a being lacking (or possessing
in primitive form) the positive qualities of the adult. Whereas the adult is generally
conceptualized as a rational, moral and political being, the child is not-rational, notmoral, not-political. In relation to the adult, the child is regarded as a deficient being.
Second, given his deficiencies the child is regarded as a being-to-be-transformed, one
that must be reformed by the adult. If the child is an animalistic, appetitive being, he must
be corrected such that he can shed his deficient nature and take on the norms and
traditions of the adult.
In Chapters I and II, I illustrated this dual approach to the child in the work of
major figures throughout the Western philosophical canon: Plato and Aristotle regard the
child as a deficient being, a problem that must be corrected through legislation and
authorities empowered to supervise and direct the child’s development. For Kant, the
child is an irrational, animalistic being. Only through discipline and a precise
developmental strategy can the child shed his deficient nature and become a full member
of humanity (as an adult). By contrast, Rousseau extols the distinctive virtues of the child
(for example, his innocence and purity) and departs from classifying the child as deficient
in relation to the moral and political adult. However, Rousseau’s child remains a beingto-be-transformed, one that must remain docile in order to realize Rousseau’s vision of
the natural adult.
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The approach to the child as non-adult and being-to-be-transformed continues in
contemporary Western philosophy (especially in liberal ethical and political thought).
Both Rawls and Schapiro dismiss the moral and political possibilities of the child, rigidly
separating the deficient (or animalistic and diseased) condition of childhood from the
ideal, rational and autonomous condition of adulthood. The adult’s primary relation to the
child is one of reform—the adult’s task is that of leading children out of their deficient
condition toward liberal, fully developed adulthood. In conjunction with Kohlberg’s
naturalistic account of moral development, this normative account of the deficient child,
the ideal adult, and the resulting conception of adult-child relations (ostensibly) gains
substantial strength. As presented by Kohlberg, liberal adulthood just is the universal end
point of moral evolution, an ideal state of being achieved by the child once he sheds his
deficient condition.
A main focus in this dissertation, then, has been to trace the path of the child’s
emergence as a deficient being in Western philosophy. I have argued that the deficient
child has served as the dominant image of the child in the Western philosophical canon.
This conception of the child has developed, in large part, in relation to ideal conceptions
of the adult—a being in possession of virtue and reason, autonomy and moral and
political agency. However, I am not solely concerned with the “child” as a concept in
Western philosophy (an image of the child confined to philosophical texts and of no
practical import in the world). Rather, in Chapter III, I am also concerned with the
subjection of children as deficient beings, persons that, given their deficient
conceptualization, are exclusively regarded as subjects of reform and excluded from
moral and political realms of human experience. Ultimately, the Western philosophical

!

%-,!

!
canon and its depiction of the child as deficient is of interest to me insofar as it has been
instrumental in producing the figure of the deficient child, supporting (whether tacitly or
explicitly) the silencing of children not only within the canon, but also in adult
interactions with children in Western society (that is, if children are regarded as irrational
and appetitive, then adults are ostensibly justified in excluding these “non-political”
children from political discourse and activity; if children are regarded as driven by
natural impulse, then adults are ostensibly justified in excluding these “animalistic”
beings from choice in relation to their own education). Following Foucault, I am
interested in revealing the production of the deficient child as a subjected being, one that
can be identified through his subjection to the plans of the adult and his own selfidentification as a deficient being (as devoid of moral and political possibility).
In response to this tradition and subjection, I have not offered a contrasting,
comprehensive vision of the child and childhood. I assume no totalizing grasp of the
child’s nature and, thus, do not attempt to replace the assumed deficiencies of the child
with an image of the essentially “rational” or “moral” child. Rather, I have argued that we
do not know the child, nor his potential for engagement in moral and political realms of
human activity. Instead, we know the limited possibilities of the deficient child. We are
familiar with approaches to the child that identify his natural limitations and deficiencies,
but we have only a vague idea (at best) of what the child can be apart from his deficient
classification. Thus, I have revealed the historical and contemporary production of the
child as deficient, in large part, to show that the child has been given no place beyond his
status as non-adult and being-to-be-transformed. Denied substantive recognition as a
person possessed of moral and political possibilities (beyond mere deficiency in relation
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to the adult), the child has been deprived of all opportunity to identify with moral and
political actors. This lack of recognition in moral and political realms is, I contend, a
significant reason for the deficient moral and political condition of many children.
In revealing the child’s subjection and canonical idealizations of the adult, I have
set the ground for a reconsideration of the child apart from his deficiency and negative
relation to the adult. But this dissertation is a beginning, not an end. Much work remains
to be done. First, in practice, philosophers (and adults more generally) ought to contest
assumptions as to the child’s deficiency by listening to the child. In doing so,
philosophers support a radically different approach to the child, one that provides an open
space for children to engage with moral and political concerns and move beyond a
pathological identity in relation to the adult. Numerous philosophers have already begun
to take this process seriously, such as those working in philosophy for children and precollege philosophy. Second, in the conceptual realm of Western philosophy, philosophers
need to develop an understanding of the child that is not fundamentally derived from a
negation of the positive qualities of the adult. I have not offered a wholly new conception
of the child here, but rather, have focused on setting a critical foundation and motivation
for this project.
At the conclusion of this dissertation, then, we are left with important questions
for future work. If we have a better understanding of the place of the child in Western
philosophy and the origins of the deficient child, we can now focus on what the child
(and childhood) can be when regarded differently by philosophers and adults. If the child
is not understood, from the start, as an instrumental being possessed of deficiencies, a
new relation—both philosophical and practical—between the adult and child becomes
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possible. At the intersection of this new relation lies the potential for a new conception of
the child and the moral and political existence of children.

!

%$%!

!
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, Joel and Axel Honneth. “Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice.”
In Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism. New Essays, edited by John Christman
and Joel Anderson, 127-149. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Archard, David. Children: Rights and Childhood. London: Routledge Press, 1993.
Ariès, Philippe. Centuries of Childhood. A Social History of Family Life. Translated by
Robert Baldick. New York: Vintage Books, 1962.
Aristotle. Eudemian Ethics. Translated by J. Solomon. In The Complete Works of
Aristotle, Volume Two, edited by Jonathan Barnes, 1922-1981. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984.
---. Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume
Two, edited by Jonathan Barnes, 1552-1728. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
---. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing,
1999.
---. On the Soul. Translated by J. A. Smith. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume
Two, edited by Jonathan Barnes, 641-692. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
---. Physics. Translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye. In The Complete Works of
Aristotle, Volume One, edited by Jonathan Barnes, 315-446. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984.
---. Politics. Translated by C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998.
Arneil, Barbara. “Disability, Self Image and Modern Political Theory.” Political Theory
37 (1999): 218-242.
Brennan, Samantha and Robert Noggle. “John Rawls’s Children.” In The Philosopher’s
Child. Critical Perspectives in the Western Tradition, edited by Susan M. Turner and
Gareth B. Matthews, 203-232. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1998.
Cohen, Howard. Equal Rights for Children. Totowa: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1980.
Coles, Robert. Children of Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 2003.
---. The Moral Life of Children. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986.
---. The Political Life of Children. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986.
---. The Spiritual Life of Children. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990.

!

%$&!

!
de Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex. Translated by H. M. Parshley. New York: Vintage
Books, 1974.
DeMause, Lloyd. “The Evolution of Childhood.” In The Sociology of Childhood.
Essential Readings, edited by Chris Jenks, 48-59. London: Batsford Academic and
Educational, Ltd., 1982.
Erikson, Erik H. “The Eight Ages of Man.” In Childhood and Society, 247-274. New
York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1963.
Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. Translated by Constance Farrington. New
York: Grove Press, 1963.
Farson, Richard. Birthrights. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1974.
Foucault, Michel. Abnormal. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975. Translated
by Graham Burchell. Edited by Arnold I. Davidson. New York: Picador Publishing,
2003.
---. Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New
York: Vintage Books, 1995.
---. The Archaeology of Knowledge. Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York:
Pantheon Books, 1972.
---. The History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction. Translated by Robert Hurley.
New York: Vintage Books, 1990.
---. “The Subject and Power.” In Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and
Hermeneutics, edited by Hubert L Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, 208-226. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1983.
---. “Two Lectures.” Translated by Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino. In
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings, 1972-1977, edited by Colin
Gordon, 78-108. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.
Gilligan, Carol. In A Different Voice. Psychological Theory and Women’s Development
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.
Hacking, Ian. “Making Up People.” In Reconstructing Individualism. Autonomy,
Individuality and the Self in Western Thought, edited by Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna
and David E. Wellbery, 222-236. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986.
---. The Social Construction of What? Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.

!

%$'!

!
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. In The
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, edited by
Mary J. Gregor, 133-272. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
---. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by James W. Ellington.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993.
---. On Education. Translated by Annette Churton. Mineola: Dover Publications, 2003.
---. The Doctrine of Right. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. In The Cambridge Edition of
the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, edited by Mary J. Gregor, 361-506.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
---. The Doctrine of Virtue. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. In The Cambridge Edition of
the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, edited by Mary J. Gregor, 509-603.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Katchadourian, Herant A. “Medical Perspectives on Adulthood.” In Adulthood, edited by
Erik H. Erikson, 33-60. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1978.
Kennedy, David. “Empathic Childrearing and the Adult Construction of Childhood: A
Psychohistorical Look.” Childhood 5 (1998): 9-22.
Kohlberg, Lawrence. Essays on Moral Development, Volume 1. The Philosophy of Moral
Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice. San Francisco: Harper and Row
Publishers, 1981.
---. Essays on Moral Development, Volume 2. The Psychology of Moral Development:
The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages. San Francisco: Harper and Row Publishers,
1984.
Laitinen, Arto. “Interpersonal Recognition: A Response to Value or a Precondition of
Personhood?” Inquiry 45 (2002): 463-478.
Markell, Patchen. “The Recognition of Politics: A Comment on Emcke and Tully.”
Constellations 7 (2000): 496-506.
Matthews, Gareth B. Dialogues with Children. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1984.
---. Philosophy and the Young Child. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Mills, Charles. “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology.” Hypatia 20 (2005): 165-184.

!

%$(!

!
Nandy, Ashis. “Reconstructing Childhood: A Critique of the Ideology of Adulthood.” In
Traditions, Tyranny, and Utopias. Essays in the Politics of Awareness, 56-76. Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1987.
Piaget, Jean. The Moral Judgment of the Child. Translated by Marjorie Gabain. New
York: Simon and Schuster Publishing, 1997.
Plato. Crito. Translated by G. M. A. Grube. In Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M.
Cooper, 37-48. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997.
---. Laches. Translated by Rosamond Kent Sprague. In Plato: Complete Works, edited by
John M. Cooper, 664-686. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997.
---. Laws. Translated by Trevor J. Saunders. New York: Penguin Books, 1970.
---. Meno. Translated by G. M. A. Grube. In Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M.
Cooper, 870-897. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997.
---. Phaedo. Translated by G. M. A. Grube. In Plato: Complete Works, edited by John M.
Cooper, 49-100. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997.
---. Phaedrus. Translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff. In Plato: Complete
Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 506-556. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997.
---. Protagoras. Translated by Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell. In Plato: Complete
Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 746-790. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997.
---. Republic. Translated by C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2004.
---. Symposium. Translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff. In Plato:
Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper, 457-505. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing,
1997.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971.
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.
Reisert, Joseph R. “Kant and Rousseau on Moral Education.” In Kant and Education,
edited by Klas Roth and Chris W. Suprenant, 12-25. New York: Routledge, 2012.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. Translated by Donald A.
Cress. In Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Basic Political Writings, edited by Donald A.
Cress, 25-109. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987.
---. Emile. Translated by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books, 1979.

!

%$)!

!
Schapiro, Tamar. “Childhood and Personhood.” Arizona Law Review 45 (2003): 574-594.
---. “What Is a Child?” Ethics 109 (1999): 715-738.
Scuderi, Phillip. “Rousseau, Kant, and the Pedagogy of Deception.” in Kant and
Education, edited by Klas Roth and Chris W. Suprenant, 26-38. New York: Routledge,
2012.
Simon, Julia. “Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Children.” In The Philosopher’s Child. Critical
Perspectives in the Western Tradition, edited by Susan M. Turner and Gareth B.
Matthews, 105-120. Rochester: Rochester University Press, 1998.
Taylor, Charles. “The Politics of Recognition” In Multiculturalism: Examining the
Politics of Recognition, edited by Amy Gutman, 25-74. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1994.
Walkerdine, Valerie. “Developmental psychology and the child-centred pedagogy: the
insertion of Piaget into early education.” In Changing the Subject. Psychology, social
regulation and subjectivity, 153-202. London: Methuen and Co., 1984.
Weisstein, Naomi. “Power, Resistance and Science.” New Politics 6 (1997): 145-167.

!

%$*!

